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ABSTRACT 
RCE (Resource Constrained Environment) is known for its stringent hardware design 
requirements. With the rise of Internet of Things (IoT), low-complexity and low-area 
designs are becoming prominent in the face of complex security threats. Two low-
complexity, low-area cryptographic processors based on the ultimate reduced instruction 
set computer (URISC) are created to provide security features for wireless visual sensor 
networks (WVSN) by using field-programmable gate array (FPGA) based visual 
processors typically used in RCEs. The first processor is the Two Instruction Set 
Computer (TISC) running the Skipjack cipher. To improve security, a Compact 
Instruction Set Architecture (CISA) processor running the full AES with modified S-Box 
was created. The modified S-Box achieved a gate count reduction of 23% with no 
functional compromise compared to Boyar’s. Using the Spartan-3L XC3S1500L-4-FG320 
FPGA, the implementation of the TISC occupies 71 slices and 1 block RAM. The TISC 
achieved a throughput of 46.38 kbps at a stable 24MHz clock. The CISA which occupies 
157 slices and 1 block RAM, achieved a throughput of 119.3 kbps at a stable 24MHz clock. 
The CISA processor is demonstrated in two main applications, the first in a multilevel, 
multi cipher architecture (MMA) with two modes of operation, (1) by selecting cipher 
programs (primitives) and sharing crypto-blocks, (2) by using simple authentication, key 
renewal schemes, and showing perceptual improvements over direct AES on images. The 
second application demonstrates the use of the CISA processor as part of a selective 
encryption architecture (SEA) in combination with the millions instructions per second 
set partitioning in hierarchical trees (MIPS SPIHT) visual processor. The SEA is 
implemented on a Celoxica RC203 Vertex XC2V3000 FPGA occupying 6251 slices and a 
visual sensor is used to capture real world images. Four images frames were captured 
from a camera sensor, compressed, selectively encrypted, and sent over to a PC 
environment for decryption. The final design emulates a working visual sensor, from on 
node processing and encryption to back-end data processing on a server computer.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Small, low-cost devices with very little design space and computing resources are termed 
“Resource Constrained Environment” (RCE). One of the most notable RCEs is the 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). A WSN sensor node is usually tiny (size ranges from a 
shoebox down to a grain of sand), and resource constrained. Figure 1.1 (left) shows a 
sensor node can be as tiny as a coin and (right) a Crossbow MICAz sensor mote serving 
as a base station.  
 
Figure 1.1: (Left) Illustration of a comparison between a Malaysian 50 cents coin and a 
MICAZ sensor node and (Right) the illustration of a MICAz mote. 
 
Other platforms such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) [1], Radio Sensor 
Networks (RSN) [2], Wireless Identification and Sensing Platforms (WISP) [3, 4], 
handheld devices, tiny portable devices, and Internet of Things (IOT) [5] are also 
considered RCEs. These platforms are usually low-cost, employing general-purpose 
microcontrollers and tiny sensors [5-8]. RCEs are tailored towards multi-disciplinary 
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applications such as real-time surveillance systems, environmental and health care 
monitoring systems, asset tracking and even advanced military applications that deals 
with various data such as general plaintexts, imagery and videos. RCE platforms that 
are equiped with visual sensors such as the Wireless Visual Sensor Network (WVSN) 
adopt Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) for the advantage in terms of flexibility 
and field re-programmability [9]. Ultimately, the visual sensor field-reconfigurable RCE 
[10-12] is the most popular and useful platform for the wide range of applications it 
offers to the users [13-15]. 
Every RCE requires hardware that is tailored to a specific application to minimize cost, 
power requirements and size and to maximize reliability as they are often left in the field 
and not intended to be maintained for extended periods of time [16]. While typical RCEs 
collect environmental data, visual sensor RCEs require more on-node processing such as 
applying computer vision techniques and compression. For efficiency, availability and 
cost reasons, FPGAs are typically used as the processing unit for the RCE node [12, 17, 
18]. The change in the data type collected from scalar to visual data creates a security 
and privacy issue as the data is transmitted over unsecured wireless channels. To 
address this problem, cryptography can be used to encrypt the information before being 
sent. While complex data processors and crypto-processors (CP) working side-by-side are 
the best combination for robust and secured system, this may not be feasible in RCE 
systems due to size, power and cost constraints. One of the main aims of this research is 
to create a low-area, low-complexity CP that can be integrated into RCE devices with 
FPGAs such as in visual RCEs. This is a challenge as each RCE hardware will have 
varying amounts of un-utilized logic leading to the need for a design and implementation 
of low-complexity, low-area crypto-processors for RCEs. [5, 6, 19-22]. 
A crypto-processor, is a processor that carries out cryptographic operations [23]. A 
dedicated CP for RCE, constrained by RCE restrictions [24], has to provide sufficient 
cryptographic functions and flexibility in terms of handling diverse RCE security 
requirements [25, 26]. A CP uses hardware-accelerated cryptographic functions to 
3 
Chapter 1 
provide and formulate security features and protocols such as double or multiple 
encryption [27, 28], multi-cipher [29], support for cipher mode of operation [30], multi-
level security [31], key management [32], authentication [33], and digital signature are 
preferable in facing multiple RCE security threats [31]. However, crypto-processors with 
accelerated crypto-cores requires additional hardware [34]. The cost is greater when 
multiple un-rolled ciphers cores are added to support multiple cryptographic functions 
[35]. An alternative solution is to design a crypto-processor that utilizes the same crypto-
blocks for various ciphers without additional logic components, at a cost of cipher 
program memory. 
Low-complexity computer models are considered in the course of designing a low-area 
crypto-processor. The Ultimate Reduced Instruction Set Computer (URISC) fits the 
profile by having a low-complexity but yet completely functional computing architecture, 
suitable for low-complexity applications. The prominent feature of URISC is that it uses 
only a single instruction set. Through minimalistic modifications and adding resource-
justified application-specific crypto-components, low-area, low-complexity cryptographic 
applications can be designed. Hence URISC-based modified minimalist reconfigurable 
cryptographic processors for low-area, low complexity cryptographic applications in RCE 
are proposed in this thesis. 
While cryptographic solutions are widely used, certain primitives, schemes, and protocols 
are applicable to visual sensor RCE due to the type of the data involved (video, image 
and plaintext), the worth (value) of the data, the computation, resource overhead and 
security requirements [5, 19, 21, 25, 36-38]. These factors will shape and determine the 
type of crypto-processors designed and the choice of ciphers. Visual sensor RCE requires 
visual processing techniques such as data compression to reduce the amount of data 
transmitted [39]. Security can be introduce using techniques such as partial and 
selective encryption [40-42], taking advantage of the characteristics of compressed data. 
The combination of compression and selective encryption results to a robust system that 
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decreases the amount of data to encrypt and transmit, allowing more memory to be use 
for cipher programs. 
This thesis presents low-area modified URISC reconfigurable processor architecture for 
visual sensor RCE cryptographic applications. The proposed modified URISC enables 
security in power and cost contrained RCE applications. A lower-area, low-complexity 
cryptographic processor using the proposed modified URISC as cores, results to flexible 
and versatile configurations, aiding the need for multiple security solutions. Lastly, the 
proposed architecture is presented and integrated into a selective encryption system, to 
emulate on-node encryption, using real world FPGA as a low-power and low-cost RCE 
device. 
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1.1. Problem Statement 
RCEs operate under very restrictive conditions. Power and computation is always the main issue 
while designing the application framework using these devices [43, 44]. In extreme cases, trade-
offs in security have to be made for a functional system and a longer operational lifespan [45]. On 
top of that, RCE devices possess some form of communication ability for them to communicate 
with nearby devices, forming a network of data. With existence of communication between 
different devices, security risks increase. The risks are even higher when the payload data is 
valuable to any party of interest. Hence security plays an important part when the system is 
designed and the already scarce resources in the system [46].  
RCE is broad by definition but the typical resource constrained design issues remain regardless 
of the platforms it takes. Low-complexity, low-memory, low-area, and low-power are the critical 
factors to be considered. And by extension, a smaller area utilized on the same reconfigurable 
hardware will result in reduced power requirement [47, 48].  
When designing for RCE systems, although often holistic, there are a few important design 
issues to be addressed: 
1) Limited or non-renewable on-board power. 
2) Finite capacity of storage memory. 
3) Small physical design space. 
4) Limited communication bandwidth. 
5) Limited computing power. 
6) Low-upgradability. 
In the context of a reconfigurable RCE, the points 1), 2) and 3) above implied that the amount of 
logic and memory resources is limited. Within this context, the constrained resource or the 
hardware costs taken into consideration when designing a cryptographic processor is the area 
utilized and memory resources used within the reconfigurable hardware. 
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Going into the topic of low-area,  low-complexity security designs, there is a distinction between 
the term “low-area” and “low-complexity”. “Low-area” refers to physical (logic or memory) 
resources utilized within the FPGA context and “low-complexity” refers to the computing and 
algorithmic context that describes the ability to solve problems using less complicated means, 
steps or components. In regards to this topic, the area is a form of hardware cost for hardware 
designers. However, the relationship between the hardware cost and the security is unclear. 
Gong stated that a relationship between the three qualities: security, performance and cost of a 
cryptographic hardware system [49]. An illustration of the relationships between the three 
qualities in RCE hardware design is shown in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2: An illustration of the relationships between the three qualities in RCE security 
hardware design based on Gong [49]. 
 
From Figure 1.2, there are two properties to RCE security hardware architectures: 1) low bit-
length and 2) a serial architecture. The factor of low key bit-length is connected to the choice of 
cipher or any other cryptographic protocols. However, the key length is not a factor of 
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performance because the length of a key is attributed to cipher’s strength and mode of operations 
chosen. The key length barely affects the performance and the effects only applies to asymmetric 
ciphers [50, 51]. In short, the resource cost in relation to the cryptographic protocol is subject to 
the protocol’s designer and the protocol’s specification, to a certain key-length in order for the 
cipher to be consider secured [52]. 
On the other hand, a serial architecture suggests a sequential von-Neumann model. URISC 
fulfills the requirement for a basic serial computing architecture because it is claimed to be the 
simplest form of functional computer architecture [53, 54]. This serial computer with only a 
single instruction set poses very obvious weaknesses in terms of complex functionality and high-
level operations. By using techniques like assembly code re-use, program-loops, instruction 
sequencing, parameterization, self-modifying codes, and sub-routines [55, 56], the limitations of 
URISC can be overcome. Initially, the URISC was proposed in [56] as an educational model to 
better understand the concept of computer organization and there are other numerous 
applications which can be found in [57-60]. But the simplicity of its fundamental building blocks 
and data processing components are very attractive features to be explored for complicated 
computing tasks. Hence URISC fulfills the requirement of a low-complexity, sequential 
architecture without the need to design an architecture from scratch. The real problem is what 
and how modifications can be done onto URISC fulfill the requirements of low-area, low-
complexity cryptographic applications. The URISC, like any other instruction set computer 
architecture, has a fundamental data path and a memory unit. Alteration, addition and 
customization of low-complexity cryptopgrahic components on URISC yields a custom-designed 
architecture to suit any target application. 
RCE devices vary in terms of form factor and hardware. To allow adequate level of security, 
complex security algorithms and protocols are considered. Visual sensor RCE has the broader 
context in terms of applications, from simple data relaying to complex video surveilance. Visual 
RCEs can be used as the target application, which inherits the model of common security and 
privacy problems within general RCEs. By using visual sensor RCE as point of reference to the 
generalization of RCE cryptographic problems, the six known security goals are [20, 61]: 
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1) Confidentiality: protecting secret information from unauthorized entities. 
2) Integrity: ensuring message has not been altered by malicious parties. 
3) Data Origin Authentication: authenticating the source of message. 
4) Entity Authentication: authenticating the user, node and sink is indeed whom it claims 
to be. 
5) Access control: restricting access of resource to privileged parties. 
6) Availability: ensuring desired services available when required. 
Goal 1), 2), 3), and 4) can be fulfilled using a combination of cryptographic algorithms, key 
management, and authentication, which are considered as cryptographic solutions. Goal 5) and 6) 
can be solved using attack detection, prevention and routing techniques [20, 61]. One common 
form of cryptographic solution is the direct use of cryptographic primitives, which are referred to 
as ‘ciphers’. Ciphers are generally divided into two types: symmetric and asymmetric. For low-
area, low-complexity applications, symmetric ciphers are preferred due to their nature of being 
hardware implementation-friendly [61, 62]. Law et al [19] concluded that the Skipjack cipher [63] 
is the best lightweight cipher in terms of code memory, data memory, encryption efficiency and 
key setup efficiency and it is also used in Tinysec for WSN RCEs [64]. However, the Skipjack 
cipher is not the best and strongest cipher but would suffice for a lightweight security application 
[19]. 
On the contrary, Rijndael [65] also known as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [66] is 
one of the most popular, strongest and resilient cipher to most known attacks. On top of that, [67] 
concluded that an AES hardware out-performs any software implementation, which further 
validates the cipher choice. However, the AES is known to be resource demanding due to the 
complex encryption operations and the non-linear component named the S-box [68-71]. 
Minimizing the S-box [70-72] is one method towards low-area designs. 
Futhermore, AES and Skipjack are just two out of the long list of ciphers available to choose from 
depending on applications and level of security required [73]. In a real world scenario where 
RCEs are deployed into a hostile environment, secure frameworks [74, 75] utilizes crypto-
processors to ensure critical data do not fall into the wrong hands [76]. Dedicated CP with 
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multiple cryptographic functions and primitives provides variable degree of security for RCE 
secure frameworks. To achieve this, multiple ciphers accelerators within a scalable CP are 
introduced [77, 78]. Multi-cipher and multi-mode systems on the hardware level offer multiple 
cipher algorithms concurrently in a communication session [77, 78], variation of security strength 
and application [29]. These primitives can be replaced when they are outdated or obselete, via 
techniques such as partial or dynamic reconfiguration [9] using FPGA reconfigurable hardware. 
Nonetheless, having multiple cipher accelerators will logically require additional memory and 
logic resources which is already scarce in RCE. A low-complexity multi-cipher [29, 35, 77] 
architecture would be the solution to accommodate multiple cryptographic primitives. By re-
using the same crypto-blocks, multi-ciphers exists with only program memory costs rather than 
using both the logic and memory resources. Hence multiple cipher switching is made available 
and by extension reducing the resources used compared to having the cipher cores in separate 
entities. 
Other cryptographic protocols and techniques for visual data such as the perceptual encryption, 
selective multimedia encryption and watermarking [42, 79, 80] are commonly used in high-level 
visual sensor RCE [15, 81-85]. Unlike normal data, pixel data is very information rich and highly 
correlated. There are a few examples in the literature showing that modifying AES can be a 
potential candidate to play the role of symmetric cipher for image encryption [86-88]. Symmetric 
block encryption will be weaker for the image perceptually due to the nature of the visual data 
[89]. And also, encrypting the whole image would take a large amount of memory overhead, 
draining both memory and power. To solve this, pre-processes or post-processes techniques such 
as the compression algorithms are used to break the pixel correlation, minimizing the amount of 
data to be transmitted [90] and yet, enabling a smaller amount of data to be selected and 
encrypted for adequate security [91]. A selective encryption system would reduce the 
computational complexity and reflects the real visual sensor RCE with visual processing 
components and crypto-processor co-existing in the same FPGA, utilizing the same available 
resources.  
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To form a cryptographic solution, algorithmic understanding and translation to hardware form is 
key. However, the vast option of cryptographic techniques and goals leads to the problem of 
cryptographic versatility and selection. A well-designed cryptographic processor for RCE has to 
possess the necessary security functions and primitives, making it adequate for formulating 
secure protocols. Using modified URISC as a fundamental model, and the generalized RCE 
security goals, custom-designed processor are presented for low-area, low-complexity for 
cryptographic applications suitable for RCEs.  Figure 1.3 illustrates the ubiquitous and pervasive 
nature of RCE devices, forming unique RCE networks. RSN is a network formed by RCE devices 
integrating with RFID (termed eRCE) and VSN RCE is formed by devices equipped with camera 
sensors. Larger heterogenous modern RCEs can be collectively formed by these types of networks 
and devices thus, leading to various security challenges that requires a flexible crypto-processor. 
The red dots depicted in Figure 1.3 shows the points where data security is required for a robust 
and secured RCE. 
1.2. Research Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to design and develop low-area, low-complexity 
security architectures with modified URISC, using FPGA. The main objectives of this research 
are as follow: 
1) Modifying the URISC low-complexity processor for RCE cryptographic application. 
2) Develop a low-area, lightweight cipher processor architecture suitable for lightweight 
specific applications using Skipjack cipher. 
3) Develop a low-area, modern cipher processor architecture for modern cryptographic 
application using AES cipher 
4) Develop a low-complexity architecture that allows multiple ciphers that will work 
towards providing additional cryptographic primitives in a single architecture. 
5) Design and develop a selective encryption system that reflects real-world practicality, 
employing one of the proposed architecture and an image compression technique to form 
a joint encryption system.  
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Figure 1.3: An overview of a heterogeneous modern RCE formed with RSN and VSN, 
further increasing security challenges. 
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1.3. Author’s Contributions 
1.3.1. Low-complexity Two Instruction Set Computer using Skipjack 
(TISC Skipjack) for Lightweight Cryptographic Implementation 
For the area of lightweight security, the design of a low-complexity architecture using 
only two instruction sets, capable of completely execute full 32 rounds of Skipjack cipher 
is proposed. Skipjack has been introduced as the most suitable candidate for lightweight 
cipher.. selection in the area of WSN RCE [19]. The proposed architecture (found in 
Chapter 3) is extremely compact and is designed by modifying URISC to accommodate 
an additional ALU, which is the XOR. 
 
1.3.2. Low-complexity Compact Instruction Set Architecture using 
Advanced Encryption Standard (CISA AES) for Modern 
Cryptographic Implementation 
For the area of modern security solutions, the design of a low-complexity architecture 
using only four instruction sets, capable of completely execute full ten rounds of AES 
cipher is proposed. The proposed compact architecture is designed by modifying the TISC 
Skipjack architecture (found in Chapter 3) due to the overlapping components used for 
both architectures. The new architecture (found in Chapter 4) accommodates two 
additional ALUs, XTIME and S-BOX. This newly modified URISC results in a four 
instruction set, low-complexity, low logic area, compact architecture specifically for AES. 
 
1.3.3. Bi-directional S-BOX gate count improvement 
The AES S-BOX is a large combinational circuit and has always been one of the most 
resource demanding component for AES hardware implementation [92, 93]. 
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Improvement on the current bi-directional S-box suggests the application of linear 
matrix mapping optimization on the inverse affine transformation block. The improved 
configuration of a forward direction S-box together with a minimized inverse affine 
transformation block (found in Chapter 4) shows results to a smaller, low-complexity bi-
direction S-box, in which would be reflected in the hardware implementation results. 
 
1.3.4. Multi-Cipher Architecture (MCA) featuring Arithmetic Logic Unit 
(ALU) Sharing 
The MCA uses AES and Skipjack ciphers in single processor. The previous work (1.3.1, 
1.3.2) was extended to find low-complexity multi-cipher configurations, a single modified 
URISC is used to process two different ciphers by sharing the same set of ALUs. This 
design opens up a new area to RCE multi-cipher systems in sharing the same processing 
blocks. This would provide solutions to having multiple cryptographic primitives at the 
costs of program code memory, while retaining the same amount of logic resources used. 
 
1.3.5. Real-world Hardware Implementation of Selective Encryption 
Architecture (SEA) 
A real-world design and hardware implementation of a SEA for joint security and 
compression application is realized. A complete working system is presented in this 
thesis demonstrating the functionality and feasibility of the proposed CISA AES. The 
proposed design integrates an MIPS-SPIHT compression module with a CISA AES 
module for real-world selective encryption application. 
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1.4. Thesis Organization 
The thesis structure is as follows. Chapter 2 provides the literature review and 
background knowledge of related works in the area of RCEs, symmetric cipher primitives, 
multi-ciphers and selective encryption. Chapter 3 presents a low-area low-complexity 
FPGA TISC for lightweight cipher using Skipjack using a modified URISC. Chapter 4 
presents a low-complexity FPGA CISA, customized specifically for AES, with minimized 
S-box in terms of gate count. Chapter 5 describes a low-complexity multi-cipher 
architecture symmetric ciphers switching. Chapter 6 presents a low-complexity selective 
encryption architecture as a practical example of the real-world application of the CISA 
AES architecture. Lastly, Chapter 7 presents the conclusion of this thesis with potential 
future work and directions discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
2.1. Resource Constrained Environments (RCE) 
RCEs are generally referred to as small hardware systems or devices with very low 
amount of resources in terms of power supply, memory, communication bandwidth, and 
storage memory1. There are currently four known resource constrained environments 
identified: 
1) Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) [19, 25, 94, 95] 
2) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) [2, 96-98] 
3) Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP) [3, 4] 
4) Internet of Things (IOT) [5, 99] 
All the generalized RCEs share similar problems when it comes to hardware design due 
to the scarce resources on the RCE devices. However, there are differences between 
environments in terms of hardware form factors, specifications, communication 
standards and target applications. To understand the need for low-complexity, low-area 
cryptographic processors, each of the four RCEs are briefly discussed. 
 
2.1.1. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
A wireless sensor network is usually made up of tiny sensors that are programmed to 
communicate via wireless medium [100]. The limitation of their physical size results in 
sensor motes that usually have limited amount of on-board resources such as energy, 
                                                     
1 Review of all 4 environments published in “J. H. Kong, L.-M. Ang, and K. P. Seng, "A 
comprehensive survey of modern symmetric cryptographic solutions for resource constrained 
environments," Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 49, pp. 15-50, 2015”. 
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storage, computation power, and communications bandwidth. Figure 2.1 illustrates WSN 
with the collection of sensor nodes (network type is application dependent) and their 
roles in acquiring and relaying data to the base station. WSN can be divided into two 
sub-groups with variation of applications [101]. 
Routing Node
Sensor Node
Sink / 
Base Station
Sensor 
Node
Image,
Noise,
Humidity,
Temperature,
Seismic,
Localization,
Oceanic and etc.
 
Figure 2.1: A general illustration a WSN with routing and sensor nodes. 
 
i. Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
The WSN is a generic term for a network of motes with embedded sensors. WSNs 
normally have tiny sensors to monitor environmental variables such as the temperature, 
humidity, noise, pressure. The choices of security used in a WSN environmental 
application is influenced by the amount of energy the security architecture consumes. 
Law et al  state that lightweight and energy efficient algorithms are preferred [19].  
 
ii. Wireless Multimedia Sensor Network (WMSN) 
The WMSN highlights the use of low-cost cameras in health care monitoring systems, 
incorporating applications that transmit data such as high-resolution still images and 
multimedia video and audio streaming. This is a kind of network is composed of 
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embedded audio and visual collection modules that require the balancing of the energy 
costs, application purposes, and security strength considerations [102]. 
 
iii. Wireless Visual Sensor Network (WVSN) 
This type of network features the use of visual sensors or low-cost cameras for 
environmental surveillance purposes. The crucial area of consideration for WVSN is low 
latency of communication and image processing modules. The real-time systems are 
extremely resource constrained, making designers find extreme measures without 
compromising significant costs [13]. 
According to Roman et al [6], microcontrollers are used in the WSN because of their cost-
effectiveness. Microcontrollers are grouped into weak, normal and heavy-duty for their 
computing capabilities, clock speed, and RAM size. Figure 2.2 illustrates an overview of 
the architecture within a WSN node, including the connections of the microcontroller to 
other input/output components. Roman et al questioned the suitability of some of the 
symmetric cryptographic primitives for some low-end microcontrollers. The 
cryptographic primitive in question are the AES cipher and Twofish cipher, which both 
are known to be optimized for 32-bit processors. However, some of the operations can be 
done using native 8-bit registers [6]. Heavy-duty controllers, such as the PXA271 or the 
ARM920T with a word size of 32-bits, are compatible with these ciphers. The Skipjack 
cipher fits perfectly into the MSP430 family because the operations and the key schedule 
use 16-bit words [103]. The instruction memory and the RAM memory of the RCE have 
to suffice for the storage of: program code, private key, intermediate values, and other 
temporary data. This shows that choosing a cipher to match a microcontroller’s resources 
is an important consideration. 
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Figure 2.2: An illustration of the generic architecture within a WSN node (image 
extracted from [6]). 
 
Johnson et al reviewed the most recent specifications of sensor motes [104].  
Table 2.1 shows the hardware specifications of known motes. Mark Hempstead [95] 
provided a detailed analysis of hardware systems for sensor nodes, focusing on the 
architectural level of the processors used. Hempstead concluded that it would be difficult 
to judge the programmability, energy efficiency, and performance fairly without running 
the same benchmarking application on all these different systems. Hempstead stated 
that the intelligent combination of: circuit techniques, hardware architecture and 
application support can yield ultra-low power systems.  
Table 2.2 shows a summarized version of the table presented in [95]. 
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Table 2.1: The specifications of various sensor motes [104]. 
Mote 
Platform 
µProcessor 
Bus 
(bit) 
Clock 
(MHz) 
RAM 
(K) 
Flash (K) 
EEPROM 
(K) 
Cost / 
node 
(USD) 
TelosB 
(sensor) 
TI 
MSP430F1611 
16 4-8 10 48 1000 99  
TelosB  
(w/o 
sensor) 
TI 
MSP430F1611 
16 4-8 10 48 1000 139 
MicaZ 
Atmel Atmega 
128L 
8 8 4 128 512 99 
Mica2 
Atmel Atmega 
128L 
8 8 4 128 512 99 
SHIMMER 
TI 
MSP430F1611 
16 4-8 10 
48 + 
microSD 
expansion 
None 199 
IRIS 
Atmel Atmega 
1281 
8 8 8 640 4 115 
Sun SPOT 
Atmel 
AT91RM9200 
32 180 512 4000 None 750 
EZ-
RF2480 
TI 
MSP430F227432 
16 16 1 1 None 99 
EZ-
RF2500 
TI 
MSP430F227432 
16 16 1 1 None 49 
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Table 2.2: The specifications of various controller architectures [95]. 
System Architecture Data path Width Memory (KB) 
Atmel  
ATmega 128L 
General Purpose 
Off-the-shelf 
8 132 
TI 
MSP430 
General Purpose 
Off-the-shelf 
16 10 
SNAP / LE 
General Purpose 
Reduced Instruction Set Computer 
16 8 
BitSNAP 
General Purpose 
Reduced Instruction Set Computer 
(Bit-serial data path) 
16 8 
Smart Dust 
General Purpose 
Reduced Instruction Set Computer 
8 3.125 
Charm Protocol Processor N/A 68 
Michigan 1 General Purpose 8 0.25 
Michigan 2 General Purpose 8 0.3125 
Harvard Event-driven Accelerator 8 4 
 
 
2.1.2. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
The RFID system is often referred to as the Extreme Resource Constrained Environment 
due to the nature of its application and devices. The modern RFID system 
infrastructures are seen to be made up of three primary components RFID transponders 
(also known as tags or labels), RFID readers or transceivers, and back-end electronic 
databases. RFID transponders are distinguished based on their operating frequency: low 
frequency (LF), high frequency (HF), ultra-high frequency (UHF) and microwave. 
Transponders categorized by their powering techniques such as passive, semi-passive 
and active. The most common devices are passive RFID tags, where a battery-less IC 
device harvests power from a nearby RFID reader (deriving their transmission power 
from the signal of an interrogating reader) and uses it to respond to the reader with an 
identification number. RFID is deemed resource constrained because of its limited power 
and memory. 
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There are three types of RFID tags: LF, HF, and UHF. Table 2.3 shows a comparison in 
terms of specifications on LF, HF, and UHF tags. Ranasinghe et al  stated that the 
current fabrication of Class I tags consists around 1000 to 4000 logic gates while Class II 
labels may consist several thousand more gates [105]. Ranasinghe et al further 
elaborated the three important components within the RFID: RF front-end, memory 
circuitry and the FSM (Finite State Machine) logic circuitry. Class 1 Transponders have 
only read-only memory while Class 2 Transponders may have some read-write memory 
using Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) [105]. The 
memory circuitry within RFID has memory capacity in the order of hundreds of bits. An 
EPC tag normally has an EEPROM that stores the Tag ID. The rest of the memory (in 
the order of a few kilobytes) within the EEPROM is made available to the users. 
Ranasinghe et al proposed a PUF circuit (Physical Unclonable Function) which costs less 
than 1000 gates to tackle privacy and authentication issues. Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
architecture within a UHF/HF tag is extracted from [105]. 
Table 2.3: Comparison between, LF, HF and UHF RFID tags [106]. 
Operating Frequency 
Low frequency 
(LF) 
125 ~ 135 (kHz) 
High frequency 
(HF) 
13.56 (MHz) 
Ultra-high frequency 
(UHF) 
850 ~ 960 (MHz) 
Read range ~10cm ~1m 1~2m 
Penetration of 
material 
Excellent Good Poor 
Water resistance No Some extent Yes 
Power Source 
Passive 
(inductive) 
Passive 
(inductive) 
Passive (propagation) 
Data-rate Slow Fast Very Fast 
Multiple reading of 
tags 
Poor Good Very Good 
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Figure 2.3: An illustration of the architecture within an HF/UHF RFID Tag (image 
extracted from [105]). 
 
Various resource specifications on RFID transponders [107-110] and the compiled Table 
2.4 shows the list of known RFID tags (LF, HF, and UHF) and their respective memory 
resource specifications. Some of the latest RFID specifications can be found here: [111-
114] 
Table 2.4: A compilation of specifications for various known LF, HF and UHF RFID 
transponders [107-110]. 
Operating Frequency Transponder Storage User Memory 
LF 
125 kHz Hitag1 256 bytes 192 bytes 
125 kHz Hitag S256/2048 256 bytes 248 bytes 
125 kHz Hitag2 32 bytes 16 bytes 
125 kHz EM4001/4102 8 bytes 5 bytes 
125 kHz MCRF200/123 16 bytes 14 bytes 
HF 
13.56 MHz Mifare 1k 1024 bytes 768 bytes 
13.56 MHz Mifare ProX 1024 bytes 768 bytes 
13.56 MHz SmartMX 1024 bytes 768 bytes 
13.56 MHz Mifare 4K 4096 bytes 3456 bytes 
13.56 MHz Ultralight 64 bytes 48 bytes 
13.56 MHz 
ICODE SLI/TagIT 
(ISO15693) 
128 bytes 112 bytes 
23 
Chapter 2 
Operating Frequency Transponder Storage User Memory 
13.56 MHz Mu-chip 128 bits - 
UHF 
902 – 928 MHz 
Alien I2 
(ALL-9250) 
64 bits - 
902 – 928 MHz 
Alien M 
(ALL-9254) 
64 bits - 
902 – 928 MHz 
Alien Squiggle 
(ALL-9238) 
64 bits - 
860 – 960 MHz 
IT36 Low Profile 
Durable Asset Tag 
TID = 64 bits 
EPC = 128 
bits 
512 bits 
902 – 928 MHz 
IT75 Low Profile 
Durable Asset Tag 
TID = 64 bits 
EPC = 128 
bits 
512 bits 
865 – 868 MHz 
IT76 Low Profile 
Durable Asset Tag 
TID = 64 bits 
EPC = 128 
bits 
512 bits 
860 – 960 MHz 
IT67 Enterprise 
Lateral Transmitting  
(LT) Tag 
TID = 64 bits 
EPC = 240 
bits 
512 bits 
860 – 960 MHz 
IT65 Large Rigid Tag, 
Gen2 
TID = 32 bits 
EPC = 96 bits 
0 bits 
869 / 915 MHz Tire Tag Insert - - 
915 MHz Container Tag - - 
902 – 928 MHz 
Matrics / Symbol 
Dual Dipole 
TID = 112 
bits 
EPC = 128 
bits 
- 
902 – 928 MHz 
Matrics / Symbol 
Single Dipole 
TID = 112 
bits 
EPC = 128 
bits 
- 
 
An enhanced version of RFID device called the Computational RFID (CRFID) has 
emerged in the recent years [115], bridging the gap between WSN and RFID with added 
sensing and computation abilities.  
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2.1.3. Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP) 
RFID tags lack re-programmability and computation power. To solve this problem, the 
WISP (Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform) technology is introduced [4]. WISP 
[7] supports sensing and computing  was first developed under the project of Intel 
Research Seattle. WISPs are programmable because of the on board on-board 16-bit 
MCU. Unlike a RFID transponder, the WISP has a more powerful controller and 
spacious memory unit, providing application design spaces. Similar to passive RFID tags, 
WISP is powered and can be read by a standard RFID reader, harvesting the power from 
the reader's emitted radio signals. Most of the work on WISP to date is about single 
WISPs performing sensing or computing functions on data such as light, temperature, 
acceleration, strain, liquid level, and even to investigate embedded security. The next 
phase of WISP’s development probably involves the interaction of multiple WISPs, Thus 
allowing an exciting exploration of a new battery-free form of wireless sensor networking. 
Like any RFID or WSN devices, the sensor hardware and controllers operate under a 
limited amount of power and computation capability. Figure 2.4 shows an example of 
WISP and according to Sample et al [8], WISPs have the following features: 
 Up to 10ft range with harvested RF power, 
 Ultra-low power MSP430 microcontroller, 
 32K of program space, 8K of storage, 
 Light, temperature, and 3D-accelerometers, 
 Backscatter communication to the reader, 
 Reader to WISP communication (ASK), 
 Real-time clock, 
 Storage capacitor (to sense without reader), 
 Voltage sensor (measures stored charge), 
 Extensible hardware (to add new sensors), 
 HW UART & GPIO for external connections, 
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 Works with select EPC Class 1 Gen 2 readers, 
 WISP software to sense and upload data, 
 Reader application to drive WISP, 
 Industry standard development tools, 
 Access to hardware design and source code. 
  
Figure 2.4: An illustration of WISP compared to a coin (Image extracted from [7]). 
 
WISPs are programmable because of the on-board 16-bit MCU. Unlike a RFID 
transponder, the WISP has a more powerful controller and larger memory unit, 
providing application design spaces. Currently, there are three versions of WISP [4, 116] 
shown in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: A table stating WISPs’ version and their current state of development. 
WISP Name MCU Status 
WISP 4.1DL (Blue) MSP-430F-2132 Ramping Production 
WISP 4.0DL (Purple) MSP-430F-2274 Deprecated 
WISP 3.0 MSP-430F-2272 - 
WISP G2.0 (Red) MSP-430F-2012 Limited use 
 
The most recent development is the WISP 5.0 but the information released is limited. 
The price for WISP devices is also currently unknown as the project is open to academic 
collaborators and the WISPs are only given if the project proposal is accepted. The WISP 
proposal is still very recent and the publications and literatures related to WISP are 
limited.  
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Sample et al [8] has written a complete description of the WISP, breaking down the 
WISP with detailed explanations from the analog front-end, the modulation and 
demodulation, the digital section and power conditioning, packet coding and decoding to 
the power requirements and duty cycle. Figure 2.5 shows an illustration of the hardware 
architecture and components within the WISP. 
 
Figure 2.5: An illustration of the WISP platform and its components [7, 8]. 
 
2.1.4. Internet of Things (IoT) 
IoT [117] refers to the interconnectivity of embedded computers. IOT also extends its 
definition of the connectivity between devices and computers beyond the traditional 
machine-to-machine communication, offering advanced services, systems and 
functionality. IOT devices are mostly embedded computing systems that have the nature 
of low-power radios and low-computing power. Applications that researchers have 
identified for the IOT includes: environmental monitoring, energy management, 
industrial and asset management, home automation, healthcare monitoring systems, etc. 
However, integration with the Internet implies that the IoT devices will have an IP 
address as a unique identifier which inherits the security threats of a generic computer. 
This connection of physical devices to the Internet allows the control of the devices 
remotely, very similar to a WSN. IoT building blocks are generally termed Smart Objects 
[117] are also identified as embedded systems connected to the Internet. Current IoT 
market examples include smart thermostat systems, home electrical appliances that use 
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Wi-Fi for remote monitoring, smart home systems, and any systems that generally 
connected to other devices or systems via wireless protocols such as 3G, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth 
and Near Field Communication (NFC). 
Hardware specification and form factors of IoT smart devices vary but generally has the 
following characteristics: 
1) Six known forms: Tabs, Boards, Pads, Dust, Skin, and Clay [118, 119]. 
2) Commonly act as personalized smart mobile devices. 
3) Have ubiquitous computing properties, similar to Sensor Networks. 
 
2.1.5. Radio Sensor Network (RSN, Integration of RFID and WSN) 
In general, WSN is usually used in an environment for sensing and monitoring 
geographical, chemical, visual and even physical environment through various sources 
such as geo-thermal, sound waves or even image. As for the RFID environment, any 
object 'tagged' with an RFID tag is track-able and sense-able in digital form. By 
deploying both tags and sensors, smart nodes are able to make use of the RFIDs for 
intelligent monitoring for unusual events.  Zhang et al [120] stated that the integration 
of these two promising technologies would bring extended capabilities, scalability, and 
portability as well as reduced unnecessary costs.  
Lei et al and Xin et al suggest that the new integrated system will consist of three 
classes of devices. The first class is that of wireless devices known as smart stations, 
containing RF readers, network connectivity and an MCU and its primary task is to 
monitor the tags. The second and third class devices are the tags and sensor nodes [98, 
121]. Lei et al and Xin et al also presents several modes of application such as the smart 
warehouse for asset theft detection, and another example is the smart forklift for 
efficient asset storing. Besides the applications, practically there is a design for the 
smart node proposed by Mason et al [2]. Mason et al presented a design using a Mica2 
mote, interfaced with a TTL converter to allow communication to RF reader, and also 
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demonstrated tag detection. HaiLiu et al [122] suggested 'medical nodes' for medicine 
inventory management and patient monitoring systems. All the above examples show 
the important of such a system in improving our daily lives and the significance of such 
integration of two systems would bring. In many sensor network applications such as: 
home sensing and factory automation can be solved where the readers can be installed 
and carried easily. Figure 2.6 shows one of the proposed integrated RFID readers with 
sensor nodes in the WSN network [120]. 
Wetherall et al [3] introduced RFID sensor networks (RSNs), which consist of small, 
RFID-based sensing and computing devices (WISPs), and RFID readers that are part of 
the infrastructure and provide operating power. They claim that the RSNs bring the 
advantages of RFID technology to wireless sensor networks but they do not expect them 
to replace WSNs for all applications. On the other hand, WISP is very similar to RFID 
devices. Therefore, the potential of WISP replacing RFID is greater in applications that 
require more complex computing and self-sustaining energy harvesting functions.  
Sink Server
Sensor 
Node
Sensor 
Node with 
RF Reader
WISP / 
RFID tags
 
Figure 2.6: The illustration of an integrated RFID and WSN network. 
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2.1.6. Distinction between RCE and eRCE 
Section 2.1.1 to Section 2.1.5 showed that there are two classes of RCE: the typical RCEs 
and the Extreme Resource Constrained Environment (eRCE or XRCE). Typical RCEs are 
systems designed for complex applications and further defined by the sensory hardware 
utilized. A typical example of visual sensor RCEs is the WVSN. eRCEs, such as RFID 
tags, do not possess sensors [123].  
Every RCE requires hardware that is tailored to a specific application to minimize cost, 
power requirements and size and to maximize reliability because RCE devices are often 
left in the field and not intended to be maintained for extended periods of time [16]. For 
WSN and WISP RCEs, general purpose or RISC-like architecture is used as the 
processing unit. Extreme RCEs such as the RFID UHF / HF transponder, application-
specific logic circuits is used to execute read-write commands. While typical RCEs collect 
environmental data, visual sensor RCEs require more on-node processing such as 
applying computer vision techniques and compression [124]. For efficiency, availability 
and cost reasons, FPGAs are typically used as the processing unit for the visual sensor 
RCE nodes [12, 17, 18].  
The hardware property of RCE and eRCE affects the types of data processing algorithms 
used. eRCE is extremely constrained compared to RCE. The extreme constrained nature 
of eRCE led to the introduction and the adoption of lightweight algorithms [125, 126]. 
Many authors suggest that full cryptographic primitives (public key and private key) can 
be used in RCE [127-131], the conservative estimation is that both RCE and eRCE will 
employ algorithms that suit their resource budget. Thus, the algorithms used by both 
systems will vary. Lightweight algorithms are more popular for eRCEs [49, 125, 132, 
133]. The nature of both RCE and eRCE suggests that RCE has the slight flexiblity in 
terms of utilizing modern cryptographic primitives. In contrast, the eRCE has a very 
limited cipher-pool2 to choose from. 
                                                     
2 The findings of the cipher-pool is published in: Kong Jia Hao, Ang Li Minn, Seng Kah Phooi, “A 
Comprehensive Survey of Modern Cryptographic Solutions for Resource Constrained 
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2.1.7. IoT and RSN – Implications for Security 
IoT RCE systems are becoming more prevalent and the devices within the network 
ranges from small sensors to large televisions [5]. Like any other RCEs, IoT has the 
underlying problem of a large spectrum of security problems and constrained resources 
[125]. The options for security are public key or private key encryption but resource 
required for public key primitives is much greater than the private key primitives [125]. 
Similar issues are found in other RCEs [128, 129]. Demand for key management using 
private key cryptography [134, 135] is on the rise as an alternative to the Public Key 
Cryptography. Key management protocols in IoT RCE are in high demand, leading to the 
search for ‘lightweight’ public key primitives. 
RSN [136] is a new type of network that incorperates both the RCE and eRCE [121]. 
Problem arises when secured data communication between RCE and eRCE has to be 
established. Difference in security protocol, device manufacturer, and hardware 
properties lead to the difference in cryptographic primitives employed. Encrypted data 
from eRCE cannot be authenticated or decrypted unless both parties uses the same 
protocol and the same key. A multi-cipher [78] crypto-system is able to solve the 
disparity of cryptographic primitives by adopting the primitives used by the eRCE 
counterpart. Key-predistribution with pair-wise keys [137]  is able to solve the keying 
issue. Alternatively, a pair of session key  generated from a master key [138] can also be 
used with the assumption that the RCE nodes only has to keep a single session key for a 
single eRCE device connected. However, the number of session keys will grow at the rate 
of N − 1 keys (N is the number of neighboring devices) and thus consuming memory 
resources to store the large amount of keys [139].  
                                                                                                                                                       
Environments”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, Vol. 49, No. 0, pp 15-50, 
Elsevier 2014. 
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2.2. Security in Visual Sensor RCE 
Visual Sensor RCE security is a significant concern because the memory and 
computational resources, required to store keys and run encryption programs, are 
additional to the primary application.  
There are two identified challenges regarding RCE security designs [5, 140]: 
1) What are the security requirements for a specific RCE application? 
2) What is the choice of cryptographic algorithms / primitives? 
 
2.2.1. The Security Requirements for Visual Sensor RCE 
The justification for security requirements is highly dependent on the value of the data 
and the type of RCE [5, 19, 21, 25, 36-38]. The security requirements can be attributed to 
these three elements: 
a) eRCE or RCE. 
b) Lightweight security or strong security. 
c) Generic data or multimedia data. 
Extreme RCEs are normally associated with lightweight security because the target 
applications involve extremely constrained devices, low-value scalar data, and low-level 
threat model [133, 141]. Strong security is preferred in Visual Sensor RCEs that 
processes multimedia data [44, 142, 143].  
Visual Sensor RCE generally requires higher level of security when it comes to the data 
value and the potential threat level [144]. Section 1.1 stated that there are six 
generalized security goals for RCE. Image and video encryption [42, 145-147] is one way 
to protect the confidentiality and privacy of sensitive image data. However, image or 
video encryption techniques usually involves encrypting the full multimedia content, 
which is computationally exhaustive and memory consuming [148]. Processing 
32 
Chapter 2 
multimedia data is known to consume large amount of memory that RCE devices 
normally do not possess [94, 149]. Coding methods such as Data compression [150, 151] 
are used to reduce the amount of data payload being stored, sent and processed. Partial 
or selective encryption [40-42] takes advantage of the characteristics of compressed or 
processed data and uses these characteristics to achieve sufficient security protection. 
Partial or selective encryption exploits the characteristics of the coded data using media 
coding algorithms, to provide secrecy while reducing computational complexity [152]. 
This ultimately reduces the amount data to be encrypted, the amount of data to be stored, 
the computation cycles required, the amount of time required for encryption and by 
extension, decreasing the amount of energy consumed via transmission of the system 
[153]. Figure 2.7 illustrates the cryptography paradigm between a traditional encryption 
and selective encryption. 
Input
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Figure 2.7: The Cryptography Paradigm: (a) Traditional Encryption; (b) Selective 
Encryption (Image extracted and redrawn from [148]) 
 
 
33 
Chapter 2 
2.2.2. The Choice of Cryptographic Algorithms / Primitives 
Various types of ciphers needed to be considered. Private Key Cryptography (PKC) is 
considered the commonly used cryptographic primitive for WSN RCE as opposed to 
Public Key Cryptography [19, 83]. There are two general types of ciphers: Symmetric and 
Asymmetric ciphers. To find out the choice of cipher algorithms suitable for WSN RCE, 
Law et al [19] reviews the Private Key Symmetric Block ciphers used in WSN RCE and 
provided insights for security options in different resource and security requirement 
scenarios. Besides the Symmetric Block ciphers, ciphers such as the Lightweight, 
Involution and Stream ciphers were investigated on the suitability for RCE applications 
in [6, 96, 140, 154-159]. For low-area, low-complexity applications, symmetric ciphers are 
preferred due to their nature of being hardware implementation-friendly [61, 62]. Law et 
al [19] concluded that the AES cipher is best suited for higher security but worst 
performing in terms of memory and power consumption. On the other hand, Skipjack is a 
viable option for low-security applications. Law et al [19] has also made a specification 
comparison of sensors nodes, claiming that the rate of improvement is conservatively at a 
lower rate than Moore's law prediction. This further confirms the need for cheaper 
security designs and the conclusion reached is founded on MCU-based WSN nodes.  
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2.3. Security in Multimedia Data Processing 
Security for multimedia can be achieved on multimedia content using encryption 
techniques. Multimedia compression [160] is often used to save cost in memory and 
bandwidth. Compression is a way to discard redundant information by searching for a 
less-correlated representation of an image or a video data. Compression techniques often 
revolve around two concepts: spatial redundancy and temporal redundancy. Temporal 
compression techniques take advantage of areas of the image that remained unchanged, 
from the previous frame to the current frame. Temporal techniques focus on storing the 
‘changes’ between subsequent frames rather than the entire image frame. Sequential 
image or video without many changes take the best advantage of temporal compression. 
Spatial compression is a technique of information reduction on a single image or frame 
independent of other frames and thus, suitable for still images.  
There are two type image compression algorithms: lossless and lossy compression. 
Lossless, decorrelation compression technique is preferred for image application because 
it removes redundancy and allows important data to be perfectly reconstructed, 
especially for classified images [161]. Chew et al concluded that the Set Partitioning in 
Hierarchical Tree (SPIHT) compression algorithm has the highest compression ratio and 
reasonably low computation complexity, which is very suitable for WMSN or WVSN RCE 
applications [162]. 
 
2.3.1. Set Partitioning in Hierarchical Trees (SPIHT) – A Lossless 
Compression Technique 
The set partitioning in hierarchical trees (SPIHT) algorithm by A. Said and W. A. 
Pearlman [163] is a lossless-compression algorithm. SPIHT is a powerful compression 
algorithm as it allows progressive reconstruction. To acquire higher quality image, more 
refinement bits are required and decoding can stop at any point in the bit-stream. Ritter 
et al [164] stated that Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) followed by Embedded 
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Zerotree Wavelet (EZW) is a very efficient combination for image compression. The 
SPIHT is a highly refined version of the EZW and has higher compression ration than 
EZW.  
The EZW coding uses the DWT to decompose an image into multi-resolution sub-bands, 
creating low-frequency and high-frequency component of an image. In the wavelet sub-
bands, every coefficient at a given scale is related a set of coefficients at the next lower 
scale. This relationship is often referred as the parent-children relationship in the 
literatures. Each node will contain 2 by 2 children at a lower scale. At the highest scale, 
the sub-band is called the LL sub-band (low-low). This LL band will have 3 children 
nodes: the HL band, LH band and the HH band. Due to the nature of the wavelet 
decomposition, the higher scale sub-bands will contain more energy than the lower scale 
sub-bands. Thus, the embedded coding starts with the highest LL sub-band followed by 
HL, LH and HH sub-bands. Figure 2.8 depicts the parent-children dependencies in EZW 
coding, which is also used in the SPIHT. 
HL2
HH2LH2 HL1
HH1LH1
LL
 
Figure 2.8: The parent-children dependencies in EZW and SPIHT (Image extracted and 
redrawn from [151]). 
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Ang et al [11] and Jyotheswar and Mahapatra [165] provided a comprehensive 
description of the SPIHT algorithm. According to Ang et al [11], the SPIHT defines and 
partitions sets using a special data structure called spatial orientation tree (SOT). A 
spatial orientation tree is a group of wavelet coefficients organized into a tree, rooted in 
the lowest frequency (coarsest scale LL) sub-band, with offspring in several generations 
along the same spatial orientation in the higher frequency sub-bands. The pixels in the 
coarsest level of the pyramid are the tree roots. They are grouped into blocks of 2 by 2 
adjacent pixels with one of them in each block. The grouping of the pixel coordinates are 
shown in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6: The groupings of coordinates in SPIHT SOT. 
O(i, j) Holds the set of coordinates of 2 by 2 off-springs of node (i, j). 
D(i, j) Holds the set of coordinates of all descendants of node (i, j). 
L(i, j) 
Holds the set of coordinates of all grand descendants of node (i, j), 
i.e.: L(i, j) = D(i, j) - O(i, j). 
H Holds the set of coordinates of all spatial orientation tree roots. 
 
Jyotheswar and Mahapatra [165] explains that SPIHT maintains three list of 
coordinates: the LIP (List of Insignificant Pixels), LSP (List of Significant Pixels) and the 
LIS (List of Insignificant Sets). A coefficient is considered to be significant is its 
magnitude is equal or larger to the threshold. By using the notion of significance, the LIP, 
LIS and LSP are explained as follows: 
1. The LIP contains the coordinates of coefficient that are insignificant at the 
current threshold. 
2. The LSP contains the coordinates of coefficient that are significant at the current 
threshold. 
3. The LIS contains coordinates of the roots of the spatial parent-children 
representing a set D (i, j) (marked as an entry of type A) or a set of L (i, j) 
(marked as an entry of type B). 
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The SPIHT algorithm can be divided into three stages: initialization, sorting and 
refinement [165]. During the initialization stage, SPIHT first calculates the maximum 
bit-plane level required for the coding due to maximum value in the wavelet coefficient 
pyramid, and sets the start threshold for the maximum bit-plane level coding. It then 
sets the LSP (significant) to an empty list and puts the coordinates of all coefficients in 
the coarsest level of the wavelet pyramid into the LIP (insignificant), and those which 
have descendants also, into the LIS. In the sorting pass, the algorithm first sorts the 
elements of the LIP (insignificant) and then the sets with roots in the LIS. 
For each pixel in the LIP (insignificant), the SPIHT performs a significance test against 
the current threshold and outputs the test result to the output bit stream. The entire test 
results are encoded as either 0 or 1. If a coefficient is significant, its sign is coded and 
then its coordinate is moved to the LSP (significant). During the sorting pass of LIS 
(insignificant), the SPIHT encoder carries out the significance test for each set in the LIS 
(insignificant) and outputs the significance information. If a set is significant, it is 
partitioned to its subsets according to the set-partitioning rules mentioned in the 
previous subsection. 
The sorting and partitioning are carried out until all significant coefficients have been 
found and sorted in the LSP (significant). After the sorting pass for all elements in the 
LIP (insignificant) and LIS, the SPIHT performs a refinement pass with the current 
threshold for all entries in the LSP (significant), except those which have been moved to 
the LSP (significant) during the last sorting pass. And lastly, the current threshold is 
divided by two and the sorting and refinement stages are continued until a predefined 
bit-budget is exhausted. 
Ang et al [11] proposed a modified version of SPIHT using zero-tree coding (which is 
termed the SPIHT-ZTR). The SPIHT-ZTR exploits the relationship among the wavelet 
coefficients. The Zero-tree condition is mentioned previously that this type of SOT is 
encoded with a single symbol which indicates that all the nodes in this particular SOT 
are insignificant. This modified version of SPIHT provides a better implementation 
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advantage for low-memory applications [11]. In the proposed SPIHT-ZTR algorithm, 
significance tests performed on an individual tree node, descendant of a tree node and 
grand descendant of a tree node are referred to as SIG, DESC and GDESC. Three 
significant maps known as SIG_PREV, DESC_PREV and GDESC_PREV are used to 
store the significance of the coefficient. During the stage for upward scanning 
significance data collection (stage 2, after DWT is performed), a significance table is 
generated and stored in STRIP_BUFFER, which is then used for the final stage of 
SPIHT coding. 
Singh et al [166] briefly describes a direct implementation of the SPIHT software 
algorithm. Ritter et al [164] implemented SPIHT on a Xilinx FPGA XC4085XLA, 
consuming 743 logic blocks for the design without arithmetic coding running at 40MHz 
and 1425 logic blocks with arithmetic coding. Jyotheswar and Mahapatra [165] presented 
an efficient FPGA implementation of DWT and modified SPIHT. Jyotheswar and 
Mahapatra’s implementation results show that a total of 7021 slices used, 1439 slice flip-
flop used and a total of 13356 4 input LUTs used. The paper serves as a reference to 
SPIHT hardware implementations. Vipin et al [167] presented their work on SPIHT 
FPGA implementation using a SPARTAN 3E FPGA without model details. The results 
were 1850 / 1920 slices, 2315 / 3840 slices Flip Flop, 2961 / 3840 4 input LUT and 4 / 12 
BRAM utilized.  
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2.3.2. Selective Image Encryption on Compressed Image Data 
When a two dimensional image is transformed into one dimensional data representation 
using scanning patterns, the image data exhibits certain repetitions due to correlation 
with neighboring pixels [168, 169]. Traditional symmetric encryption algorithms are 
ineffective, especially in a grayscale image or an image that has large areas of pixels with 
high redundancy. A direct symmetric encryption on such images results in blocks of 
identical cipher text because of the correlated pixels with the same values in a cipher 
block [89]. Shiguo Lian showed a comparison between an original image and an 
encrypted image using the AES [89]. The encrypted image (right) in Figure 2.9 is still 
perceptually intelligible. The AES encryption yields the same encrypted cipher text if the 
given plain text and key remains the same. 
 
Figure 2.9: Comparison between original image (left) and AES encrypted image 
(right) (Image extracted from [89]). 
 
To solve the image encryption problem, Norcen and Uhl [79] have provided a 
methodology to selectively encrypt around 20% of the compressed bit stream for 
JPEG2000. By using the JPEG2000 codec, images are transformed into different 
frequency bands that represent different fidelity or resolution. Each of the sub-bands is 
partitioned into a number of code blocks. Each of the code blocks is encoded bit-plane by 
bit-plane, from the most significant bit to the least significant bit. In each of the bit-
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planes, there are mapping and refinement bits. By encrypting the mapping bits, an 
image reconstructed from the cipher text is unintelligible. Lian et al [80] suggested that 
only the significant bits are selected for AES encryption.  Figure 2.10 shows the original 
‘Peppers’ JPEG2000 image (a) and the encrypted image (b). And (c) is the JPEG2000 
‘Plane’ image coupled with its encrypted image (d). The encrypted images are 
perceptually unintelligible and therefore secured, showing that the AES symmetric 
cipher is able to work in combination with compression schemes. Figure 2.11 shows the 
general idea of a working selective encryption system, which comprises of encryption and 
decryption processes. 
 
Figure 2.10: The results of encrypting JPEG2000 coded images using AES (Image 
extracted from [89]). 
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Figure 2.11: The illustration of a partial / selective encryption and decryption system. 
a) the encryption process, b) the decryption process. (Image modified from [89]) 
 
Cheng and Li [42] introduced a selective encryption methodology using quad-tree 
compression algorithm. Quad-tree compression is known to be more efficient a lower bit-
rates [41]. Cheng and Li stated that only 14% of the information is encrypted for typical 
low-resolution image with low information. For high bit-rate images, the encryption ratio 
can reach up to 50%. There are currently no known selective encryption systems that 
incorporate the SPIHT technique. 
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2.4. Crypto-processor for RCE Application 
The ideal crypto-processor to face multiple RCE security threats [31], must be capable of 
double or multiple encryption [27, 28], multi-cipher [29], support for cipher mode of 
operation [30], multi-level security [31], key management [32], authentication [33], and 
digital signature. Such a crypto-processor has to have diverse security features and 
functions. 
 
2.4.1. Crypto-processors for Multi-cipher Application 
Multiple security protocols requires multiple cryptographic primitives, leading to the 
need of multiple cryptographic primitive cores [34]. Multiple primitive cores increase the 
hardware area memory requirement due to cipher programs and crypto-specific 
instruction sets. A unified crypto-processor [170] is able to operate and perform multiple 
ciphers, removing the need for separate cryptographic cores and the hardware logic 
needed for those cores. The only cost for this configuration would be the cipher’s program 
that occupies the memory. More cipher programs require more memory. 
‘Multi-level security’ (MLS) or ‘Multi Security Levels’ (MSL) [171] refers to a security 
environment in which there are different communication access and clearance levels, 
which are dependent on the strength of cryptographic algorithm used. Jongdeog et al 
[171] stated that having more powerful algorithms for higher security domains would be 
reasonable as security levels correspond to sensitivity and clearance. Due to the resource 
limitations of RCE sensor nodes, strong cipher algorithms may consume more memory 
and energy. A low level security domain may opt to use a light encryption algorithm 
rather than a heavy one provided that there are multi cryptographic primitives to choose 
from [171]. A stronger crypto-solution would provide a higher clearance (for decryption 
and access) [76, 172]. A multi-level secure framework is able to support secure 
communication between nodes in a network instead of using a static solution to a wide 
spectrum of threats [172]. Afzal et al [172] stated that WSN RCE security protocols 
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achieve secure communication by using digital signatures, authentication schemes, 
symmetric keying and asymmetric keying. To ensure data non-repudiation, timestamps, 
random number generators and initialization vector are used in conjunction with 
security schemes. However, Afzal et al also stated that WSN RCE security schemes are 
static and coarse, that are unable to impose multiple level of clearances to limit access to 
parts or components of the node device. The other proposals on multi-level solutions are 
predominantly on the node cluster level [76, 172, 173], forming frameworks models and 
security topology by enforcing or manipulating information flow. One way to impose 
security and access control is the use of authentication using Cipher Block Chaining 
(CBC) and Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC), which 
requires symmetric key cryptographic functions. The underlying basis for a well-
designed crypto-processor is the ability to provide sufficient cryptographic functions to 
formulate robust protocols and schemes. Regardless of the requirements of a multi-cipher 
or a multi-level system, the apparent solution to a well–designed, flexible crypto-
processor is having multiple cryptographic functions. 
The CryptoManiac [78] processor is a flexible crypto-coprocessor which supports multiple 
cipher algorithms and also multi-mode operations. Lavos et al [174] has stated that the 
ECB (Electronic Cook Book) mode for symmetric ciphers are the most common mode of 
operation used. Lavos et al also states that the more ‘mode of operations’ that one crypto-
system can support, the more robust and more flexible it is to suit the current needs and 
applications. There are a few modes of operations other than the ECB worth mentioning 
and they are: cipher block chaining (CBC), cipher feedback (CFB), counter (CTR), and 
output feedback (OFB). Lavos et al also proposed a reconfigurable crypto processor 
design to accommodate various encryption algorithms and their respective mode of 
operation with the ultimate aim to provide a unified platform with a design that houses 
the configuration for multi-mode applications. Lavos et al presented an inner-
architecture that focuses on the Cipher Block Unit, using loop-rolling architecture for 
smaller code size. Five ciphers were presented by the Lavos et al: AES, IDEA, DES, RC5, 
and SAFER+, showing a great selection of cipher implementations. Figure 2.12 shows 
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Lavos et al’s design that includes three cipher block units. Figure 2.13 shows that within 
each of the cipher block unit, a common full rolling architecture is used. 
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Figure 2.12: The proposed multi-mode architecture by Lavos et al (Image extracted and 
redrawn from [174]). 
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Figure 2.13: Architecture for cipher core (Image extracted and redrawn from Lavos et al  
[174]). 
 
Lisa et al [78] affirmed that a hardware-software mixed approach is preferred. Young et 
al [29, 77] proposed the multi-cipher cryptosystem (MCC) using multiple cipher cores. 
The proposed MCC is able to perform encryption and different modes of operation. A 
total of 3475 slices is required for the proposed FMCT (Fast Multi-Cipher 
Transformation) using AES 128-bits, DES and 3-DES [29]. Chung et al [29] stated that 
the FMCT has reduced number of processors, suitable for applications in wireless sensor 
network (WSN), online communications, hardware network firewall and etc. Both Chung 
et al and Lisa et al concluded that a hardware platform for multi-cipher application is 
viable to provide multi-cipher and multi-operations. Figure 2.14 shows a crypto-processor 
consisting of co-processor blocks (also known as crypto-blocks). Kim and Lee [175] 
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implemented both private and public key primitives with a VLSI chip using 0.5µm 
CMOS and their AES implementation utilizes 1689 logic slices operating at 58 MHz. 
 
Figure 2.14: Architecture of a multiple cryptographic primitives / processors forming a 
robust crypto-processor (Image extracted from [175]) 
 
In a multi-core environment, besides having multiple cipher cores, one advantage having 
identical cipher cores is to improve a system’s throughput [35, 176-178]. Identical cipher 
cores can exist if design is configured to do so with the help of reconfigurable hardware. 
Feng et al [179] concluded that using identical cryptographic functions with different key 
(based on the survey on security FPGA crypto-design by Drimer [180]), the noise 
contributed by the concurrent processes can be removed. Noise from concurrent processes 
enables attackers to obtain a correlation model hence risking the system. The 
architecture proposed by Feng et al [179] uses a NEW key pairing algorithm to create 
new key-pairings (2 sets of keys) instead of injecting 2 different keys directly. Feng et al 
proposed a tweaked version of AES hardware implementation that uses two sets of keys 
(namely the duo key AES). In an encryption process, if a plaintext is encrypted using 2 
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sets of keys with 2 concurrent processes, it implies the encryption is done via 2 keys. As a 
result, the decryption will only be successful if the 2 keys are correct. Having 2 keys in 
the encryption process effectively strengthens the data privacy because the attacker has 
to acquire 2 keys for a successful decryption. 
Figure 2.15 shows the proposed duo-key-dependent AES (DKD-AES). Feng et al utilized 
a total of 32,900 logic elements (LE), using an Altera Cyclone II FPGA.  
 
Figure 2.15: Architecture for block ciphers by Feng e al (Image extracted from [179]). 
 
2.4.2. Hardware Implementation of AES Crypto-Processor 
i. Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) for RCE 
Microcontrollers are used in WSN, WISP, and IoT devices. For RFID devices, an IC or 
normally ASIC is used. The major limitation of these devices are when an operational 
needs changes or new functionality has to be introduced, reconfiguration of individual, 
partial or even the entire network is not feasible. The current trend and solution is the 
employment of field-reconfigurable devices [11, 181, 182], in which the RCE device is 
able to be re-programmed and re-configured in situations such as: replacing a 
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compromised cryptographic primitive, upgrading system’s performance, reconfiguration 
for a new purposes, hardware bug fixes, and updates. Ultimately, RCE devices employing 
field-programmable hardware is the new platform [9, 12, 183, 184]. Complex image, 
video and multimedia processing is feasible using FPGA [185-187]. Thus, allowing visual 
processing and security to co-exists, forming a robust and secure visual sensor network. 
A typical Xilinx FPGA chip contains a fixed amount of resource elements referred to as a 
slice. A slice is made up of look-up tables (LUTs) and D-type flip-flops (FDs). Thus, the 
area utilization of a design using Xilinx FPGA technology is quoted in terms of the 
amount of slices used.  
 
ii. Low-area Architecture for AES Processors 
The AES has four basic steps in each round of encryption. The four steps, in order, are 
called SubBytes (also known as the byte substitution), ShiftRows, MixColumns, and 
AddRoundKey. The description of the four basic steps in AES rounds are: 
 AddRoundKey: A simple transformation performs XOR with the sub key to the 
round state. 
 ShiftRow: Shifts the byte location with the offset from zero to three depending on 
the row location. 
 MixColumns: Column vector is multiplied with a fixed matrix where bytes are 
treated as polynomials. 
 SubBytes: Non-linear byte substitution which is composed of multiplicative 
inverse, affine transformation and inverse affine transformation. 
In terms of hardware design, there are typically three types of AES hardware 
architecture [188]: 
1) Looping Architecture. 
2) Fully unrolled pipelined architecture. 
3) Deep sub-pipelined fully unrolled architecture. 
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Among the three types above, Looping Architecture is known to be efficient on hardware 
area utilization [189-191]. For high throughput applications, the architectural design 
usually inclines towards unrolling the loops within AES with the help of a deeply 
pipelined 128-bit data path [93]. This technique however would require excessive 
hardware area and power which RCE devices unable to afford. Hence, low-area, low-
power designs are preferred in RCE. 
There are numerous AES designs aiming for low-area architectures for constrained 
FPGA environment [189, 191-193]. Among the low-area designs, Rouvroy et al [191] and 
Chodiwiec et al [189] has the best low-area results. Rouvroy et al [191] reported a total of 
146 slices utilized on a XC2S40-6 FPGA and Chodiwiec et al [189] reported a total of 522 
equivalent slices utilized on a Xilinx XC2S30-6 FPGA. Both Rouvroy et al and Chodiwiec 
et al use a fixed-width 32-bit data-path, which leads to a significant drop in terms of 
throughput as compared to a fully-unrolled 128-bit data path. Feldhofer et al [192] was 
the first to propose a design using an 8-bit data-path, claiming to have the smallest area 
to date. Goodman et al [190] proposed using a customized application-specific 8-bit data-
path architecture to further lower the design area and is currently known to have the 
smallest design on FPGA (122 slices using Spartan-II XC2S15-6). 
Goodman et al [190] stated three key design aspects of an AES processor that 
contributed to most of the logic area: 
1) The S-box computation. 
2) The definition of a suitable primitive operation. 
3) Cipher’s programs size. 
From the architectural point of view, Goodman et al ‘s low-area AES has the following 
key features to reduce area: 
a) Generate expanded keys (forward and inverse keys) on the fly using forward 
expansion and a proposed inverse expansion without saving all the expanded 
keys. 
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b) The calculation of the S-box is done via 5 clock cycles (multiplicative inverse 
requires 3 clock cycles, sharing the same multiplier) to reduce hardware area. 
c) A very basic processing architecture that performs primitive operations such as 
moving 8-bit data, finite-field multiply by 2 (ffm2), finite-field division by 2 (ffd2) 
and XOR are used. 
d) Instruction decoder is minimized by including only the required instruction sets 
(15 instructions). 
e) Programming techniques such as sub-routines and iterations are used (two 
levels). 
Goodman et al ‘s design is highly tailored and specific to AES. The use of the most 
fundamental or primitive arithmetic operations is effective in reducing the complexity of 
the processor’s core at the cost of throughput. Hence the term application specific 
integrated processor (ASIP) is used to describe the design. 
However, Goodman et al ‘s design has a few drawbacks when RCE application is consider. 
An ASIP design of AES is rigid and lacks flexibility. The ASIP hardware data-path and 
finite-state machine (FSM) cannot be reused or repurposed because it is designed to 
perform only a single task. Resources in RCE are extremely scarce, forcing system 
designers to reuse or repurpose processors to facilitate adaptation to observed 
environmental changes or to cater to changing priorities [194]. Hence, general-purpose 
processors are more popular in the RCE. Some may argue that RCE devices do not need 
flexibility but the very nature of RCE devices being pervasive and ubiquitous, requires 
flexibility and scalability to face increasing communication and security demands [195]. 
ASIP is a good design for hardware acceleration by doing a single, specific task efficiently. 
RCE application requires improvisation in the face of changing environments where RCE 
devices usually make do with the limited resources given. 
The primitive operations used in ASIP AES are great in reducing computation 
complexity considering that ASIP AES only runs AES. These primitive finite-field 
operations are highly specific to AES. Hardware implementation of ffm2 and ffd2 are 
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static logic, which defines the instruction set architecture. However, the use of 15 
instruction set is a problem because it requires an additional 4 bits of memory address 
and a relatively large instruction decoder. An alternative solution to this problem is to 
use Turing-Complete instruction set [196] to simplify the instruction decoder and also for 
general arithmetic computation. 
 
2.5. Low-Complexity Processor Architecture for RCE 
2.5.1. Comparison of RISC and CISC 
RISC processors use simple low-level instructions that can be executed within one clock 
cycle while CISC processors uses single instructions that are able to execute several low-
level operations. CISC’s complex instructions require instruction decoding circuitry, 
meaning more hardware is needed than RISC. In contrast, RISC processors require less 
hardware because they have reduced instructions but at higher memory cost to replicate 
complex instructions using simple instructions [197]. A side by side summarized 
comparison of RISC and CISC can be found in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7: Comparison of RISC and CISC [198]. 
 CISC RISC 
Platform 
Emphasis 
Emphasis on hardware Emphasis on software 
Clocks Includes multi-clock Single-clock 
Instructions Type Complex instructions Reduced instructions 
Data Transport Memory-to-memory: 
“LOAD” and “STORE” 
incorporated in instructions 
Register to register: 
 “LOAD” and “STORE” are 
independent instructions 
Cycle rate and 
Code size 
High cycles per second, small 
code sizes 
Low cycles per second, large code 
sizes 
 
Both CISC and RISC are abstraction of two contrasting models for different applications. 
For RCE purposes, compact processors are designed to compute data using adequate 
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components. Adapting a CISC or RISC model for a crypto-processor has some trade-offs. 
CISC is not a suitable model for RCE because of the instruction decoder and RISC is not 
suitable for RCE due to larger code size. Both models are relatively complex machines 
that serve general computing purposes. 
 
2.5.2. One Instruction Set Computer (OISC), also known as the Ultimate 
Reduced Instruction Set Computer (URISC) 
A one instruction set computer (OISC), also known as the ultimate reduced instruction 
set computer (URISC) in [196], is an abstract machine that uses only a single instruction. 
Given infinite resources, an URISC is said to be capable of being a universal computer in 
the same manner as traditional computers that have multiple instructions [54]. The 
URISC is also consider Turing-Complete because of its ability to perform all 
computations using a single instruction [55, 59]. 
Currently, there three known URISC categories [199]: 
1) Transport Triggered Architecture Machines 
2) Bit Manipulating Machines 
3) Arithmetic based Turing-Complete Machines 
Arithmetic based Turing-Complete Machines are universal and Turing-Complete [199]. 
They are considered most practical because they consist of a conditional jump operation. 
Tsoutsos et al [60] stated that common Turing-Complete variants such as ‘add and 
branch unless positive’ (ADDLEQ), ‘subtract and branch if negative’ (SUBLEQ) and ‘plus 
one and branch if equal’ (P1EQ) have a common pattern of a simple mathematical 
operation followed by a conditional jump. The SUBLEQ is the oldest and also the most 
efficient and popular arithmetic operation [200]. 
The URISC has two models: ‘Subtract and Branch if Negative’ (SBN) and MOVE [54]. 
The comparison of the URISC SBN and URISC MOVE models can be found in Table 2.8. 
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Chatterjee et al [59] has also concluded that the SBN model is more efficient in terms of 
number of instructions and time required for the execution of a program [59]. 
Table 2.8: The feature comparison of OISC MOVE and SBN models. 
 MOVE SBN 
Orientation Data movement Data processing 
Instruction Format 2-tuple 3-tuple 
Example of Processor RISC CISC 
 
The ‘Subtract and Branch if Negative’ (SBN) processor was first proposed by Van der 
Poel. With this primitive SBN instruction set, a URISC can be built. An SBN instruction 
allows URISC to move operands to and from memory locations, which is the basic 
element of a computer. Arithmetic computations can be performed on data from one 
memory location and the results stored in a second memory location. Similarly, to 
execute URISC instructions, the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) core subtracts the 1st 
operand from the 2nd operand, storing the results in the 2nd operand’s memory location. 
If the subtraction results a negative value, it will ‘jump’ to the target address, Otherwise, 
it proceeds to execute the next instruction in the sequence. For the SBN model, the 
URISC consists of an adder circuit as its sole ALU. Detailed operation of the URISC SBN 
can be found in [54]. Figure 2.16 shows the schematic illustration extracted from [200] of 
the URISC SBN architecture. 
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Figure 2.16: The URISC SBN architecture with Adder (Image extracted from [200]). 
 
In terms of real-world application, URISC was recommended as the material for teaching 
computer architecture to students, giving them the basic understandings of hardware 
and software co-design abstraction [54, 196]. Despite URISC’s sheer simplicity with no 
implication of complex applications, the URISC has been used in ‘homomorphic 
encryption’ systems for cloud computing, namely the Fully Homomorphic Ultimate RISC 
(FURISC) [59]. The justification for security application is that cloud computing requires 
direct computation on encrypted data and also the need to develop secured encrypted 
processors in which both data and instructions are also encrypted. It is logical to assume 
that with only a single instruction, complex processing overhead is high. This is further 
validated by [201, 202]. The Homomorphically Encrypted One Instruction Computer 
(HEROIC) [60] is also a similar processor with the FURISC, showing that URISC is 
gaining popularity because a single instruction architecture is able to offer security for 
the program and data within the system. Both of these designs are rooted on the fact 
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that URISC lacks multiple instructions and opcodes, which is the biggest advantage in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the instruction and algorithm [60]. In the area of 
security, FURISC [59] and HEROIC [60] shows that URISC is feasible thus showing 
potential. 
 
2.5.3. Minimal Instruction Set Computer (MISC) 
Minimal Instruction Set Computer (MISC), differs from URISC, in having multiple 
instructions sets within an Instruction Set Architecture (ISA). A MISC is a computer 
having a minimal amount of instruction sets, sufficient for its purpose. The concept of 
such a computer is to have only the essential computing blocks to form a functional 
computer, without any unnecessary parts or blocks. Hence the term “minimal” is used for 
the basic behavior of such a processor. 
Although URISC with a single instruction is Turing-Complete, the number of 
instructions required for a meaningful operation is staggering, leading to a very high 
overhead as mentioned in the section 2.5.2. A URISC can be configured to become a 
MISC with additional opcodes and ALUs. 
The work by Ting and Moore [203] states that reducing the size of the instruction set is 
effective in reducing the complexity of the process thus improving its performance. Ting 
and Moore understand that there are three important issues when designing a MISC for 
a particular application: 
1) What is the minimum set of instructions required for a processor to be practical 
in solving specific problems? 
2) What will be the performance of the said MISC? 
3) What facilities within a processor are necessary to reduce the complexity and the 
system costs of the said MISC? 
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Understand these three issues will help in producing a minimalist computer. However, 
compared to URISC, the MISC has added complexity. The additional ALUs and 
instructions lead to additional hardware costs hence illustrating point 2) and 3). The 
trade-off between complexity and hardware cost has to be made. 
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2.6. The AES Cipher and the Non-linear S-Box (Sub-bytes) 
In general, the S-Box (also known as Sub-bytes within AES transformations) is unique 
because it is the only non-linear step in the AES encryption. The S-Box functions as 
replacing or substituting an input with another byte. Traditionally, implementation 
approach is preferred to storing the values of the S-Box into a ROM and uses it as a 
Look-up Table. Earlier versions of the S-box circuit are in 8-by-8 Look-up tables and can 
be found in these proposals: [204, 205]. Table 2.9 shows an illustration of the S-box Look-
up Table with 256 values. 
Table 2.9: The lookup table of the 256 substitution values for S-box. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
0 63 7C 77 7B F2 6B 6F C5 30 01 67 2B FE D7 AB 76 
1 CA 82 C9 7D FA 59 47 F0 AD D4 A2 AF 9C A4 72 C0 
2 B7 FD 93 26 36 3F F7 CC 34 A5 E5 F1 71 D8 31 15 
3 04 C7 23 C3 18 96 05 9A 07 12 80 E2 EB 27 B2 75 
4 09 83 2C 1A 1B 6E 5A A0 52 3B D6 B3 29 E3 2F 84 
5 53 D1 00 ED 20 FC B1 5B 6A CB BE 39 4A 4C 58 CF 
6 D0 EF AA FB 43 4D 33 85 45 F9 02 7F 50 3C 9F A8 
7 51 A3 40 8F 92 9D 38 F5 BC B6 DA 21 10 FF F3 D2 
8 CD 0C 13 EC 5F 97 44 17 C4 A7 7E 3D 64 5D 19 73 
9 60 81 4F DC 22 2A 90 88 46 EE B8 14 DE 5E 0B DB 
A E0 32 3A 0A 49 06 24 5C C2 D3 AC 62 91 95 E4 79 
B E7 C8 37 6D 8D D5 4E A9 6C 56 F4 EA 65 7A AE 08 
C BA 78 25 2E 1C A6 B4 C6 E8 DD 74 1F 4B BD 8B 8A 
D 70 3E B5 66 48 03 F6 0E 61 35 57 B9 86 C1 1D 9E 
E E1 F8 98 11 69 D9 8E 94 9B 1E 87 E9 CE 55 28 DF 
F 8C A1 89 0D BF E6 42 68 41 99 2D 0F B0 54 BB 16 
 
From a crypto-processor’s point-of-view, the AddRoundKey, ShiftRow, and MixColumns 
transformations are seen as data movement and logical XORs operations. Other than S-
Box, the other three transformations are considered modulo 2 bit-wise calculations, 
which can be easily implemented. However, while implementing the AES, there are a 
variety of approaches to satisfy certain design criteria. For high throughput applications, 
Satoh et al [206] presented 10 Gbps AES design. On the other hand, [207] proposed low-
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power AES design with energy efficient S-box circuitry. Lastly, for area-constrained 
hardware applications (such as the re-configurable RCE), [68, 189, 208] presented their 
findings in small S-Box circuits. To design a smaller representation of the S-Box, Rijmen 
et al [65, 209, 210] suggested using sub-field arithmetic in computing the inverse in the 
Galois Field of 256 elements of the S-Box. This leads to the reduction of 8-bit calculations 
to several 4-bits ones, which results to smaller circuitry. Therefore, minimizing the S-Box 
circuitry leads low-area hardware implementations [69].  
In [68], the proposed S-Box is derived from the multiplicative inverse over Galois Field 
(28). To avoid attacks based on simple algebraic properties, the S-box is constructed by 
combining the inverse function with an invertible affine transformation (a matching 
inverse affine is included in the decryption). Satoh et al [68] further extended this idea, 
using the tower-field approach of Paar’s [211] by suggesting that breaking up the 4-bit 
calculations into 2-bit variable will result to even smaller circuit blocks. Being derived 
from the multiplicative inverse over Galois Field (28), the S-Box projects good non-
linearity and may have high hardware complexities. This S-Box representation gives a 
higher impact since the implementation is small enough to allow unrolling or parallel 
designs, for higher throughput if necessary. In the next sections, various models and 
implementations of small AES S-box are reviewed. 
 
2.6.1. The Minimized S-box by Boyar et al 
In practice, circuit designs are built using numerous heuristics which potential led to 
exponential time complexity which can only be applied onto small-sized circuits. The 
heuristic approach naturally works fine on circuit function that can be broken down into 
sub-functions, i.e. matrix multiplication, which decomposes into smaller sub-matrix 
multiplications. The initial work from Boyar et al [212] is to propose a new logic 
minimization technique, which can be applied to any arbitrary combinational logic 
problems and even circuits that has been optimized by standard methodologies. Boyar et 
al described their techniques as a two-step process: non-linear gate reduction and linear 
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gate reduction. It is by far the smallest S-box combinational circuit that they have come 
up with. In this section, the Boyar’s first approach in logic minimization is reviewed and 
more details can be found in [212] and his improved work for an even smaller 
bidirectional S-box circuit in [71]. 
Boyar et al explained the circuit produced for the inverse in GF (2m) suggested in [213], 
has a tower fields architecture. Since there is multiple representation of Galois Fields, 
there would be multiple versions of efficient circuits. Boyar’s approach is to focus on the 
technique for GF (24) inversion computation and then further perform linear-circuit’s 
reduction with the inversion circuit placed in a suitable position within the S-box. The 
first step consists identifying the non-linear components and reducing the AND gates. 
Boyar et al choses to focus on reducing only the GF (24) circuit since it would be 
significantly beneficial. At the end, an inversion in GF (24) with only five AND gates 
poses as a highly plausible improvement than Paar’s [211].  
The second part would be focusing on minimizing linear components with their newly 
proposed heuristics. Hence, Boyar et al presented two matrices U and B for linear-
minimization. The AES's S-box is S(x) = B * F(U * x) + [11000110]T, where * is matrix 
multiplication and x is the 8-bit S-box input. Note that the initial linear expansion and 
the linear contraction (matrix U and B) were defined to contain as much of the circuit as 
possible while still maintaining linearity. Thus, Boyar et al explained that the portion of 
the circuit defined by U, overlaps with the GF (28) inversion. So, the true aim in the 
second part is to minimize the circuits for computing U and B. The matrix U and B is 
shown in Equation [6.1] and Equation [6.2]. 
60 
Chapter 2 
 𝑈 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [6.1] 
 
 
 𝐵 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [6.2] 
 
The Boyar’s technique has yielded a circuit for the AES S-box composed of three primary 
parts: the top-linear transformation, the middle non-linear block and the bottom-linear 
transformation [212]. The top-linear transformation is a result of the minimized matrix 
U, a total of 23 XOR gates used and at depth 7, consisting 8 inputs and 22 outputs. The 
middle non-linear block is block with 22 inputs and 18 outputs, having a total of 30 XOR 
and 32 AND gates. And lastly the bottom-linear block converts the 18 inputs from the 
middle non-linear block to become 8-bits output, having 26 XOR and 4 XNOR gates. All 
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these 3 blocks together forms the final circuit of the S-box. Boyar et al [212] presented 
the forward version of the S-box, with a total gate count of 115 gates. The Figure 2.17 
illustrates of the proposed S-box by Boyar et al [212]. 
δ (matrix U) δ-1(matrix B) GF-1 
The Original Proposed SBOX (forward)
 (115 gates)
Middle non-linear block
Bottom Linear 
BlockTop Linear Block
23 gates 62 gates 30 gates
 
Figure 2.17: The illustration of Boyar’s minimized S-box. 
 
To further improve the work, the Boyar et al have presented their extensively improved 
work in [71]. The Boyar’s work has proposed a more complete S-box example, by 
incorporating the reversed version of the S-box. This time, Boyar attempts to apply a 
greedy heuristic approach for linear-minimization and several depth reduction 
techniques.  
The largest circuit component is the top and bottom linear-circuits. As explained 
previously, the top and linear components contain more than just the linear operations in 
the definition of the complete AES S-box. The reason is that the matrices include some of 
the field inversion operations. This shows that there would be some amount of AND 
gates within the U and B matrices. In addition, Boyar et al stated that circuits with 
fewer AND gates will have larger linear components. This part of the work is optimized 
on top of the previously minimized circuit (115 gates). 
Boyar et al ‘s technique is to modify a greedy heuristic approach by Paar’s [211]. Paar’s 
technique keeps a list of XOR computed variable. Then the steps are repeated to search 
for the XOR pair of the input which results to the most occurrences in the output. This 
result is added as a new set of variable to the next stage and repeated until all the most 
occurred pairs are found. Hence, the Low_Depth_Greedy algorithm only allows the 
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Paar’s greediness as long as the circuit’s depth is not increased unnecessarily. Boyar et al 
performed the three types of depth-reduction optimizations: 1) applying a greedy 
heuristics to re-synthesize linear components into lower-depth construction of circuits, 2) 
using techniques from automatic theorem proving to re-synthesize non-linear 
components and 3) doing simple depth-reduction along critical paths. 
The optimization results have yielded a forward S-box with 128 gates and an inverse S-
box with 127 gates. This is considered a significant improvement since the total gate 
count for a complete bi-directional S-box is amounted to 192 gates, which is less than the 
total gate count of the two circuits combined. From our understandings, the only tradeoff 
is; to combine both circuits, a multiplexer would be required to switch between 
encryption and decryption since there is a middle-shared component. Figure 2.18 shows 
the illustration of the bi-directional S-box in block diagram form [71]. 
δ δ-1 
GF-1 
The Latest Proposed SBOX (bi-direction)
 (192 gates)
Middle non-
linear block 
(shared)
Bottom Linear 
Block
Top Linear 
Block
δ 
MUX
MUX
27 gates
27 gates
38 gates
37 gates
63 gates
forward forward
inverse inverseδ-1 
 
Figure 2.18: The illustration of Boyar’s recent minimized S-box (both forward and 
inverse S-box). 
 
2.6.2. The Optimized S-Box by Satoh and the Model Implementation by 
Edwin 
The Rijndael architecture presented by Satoh et al [68] has been a benchmark for 
compact AES design for quite a period. Satoh et al proposed further optimization of the 
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S-box by introducing a new composite field. Satoh et al adopted the three stage 
methodology: extension field – composite field – extension field. Satoh et al suggested 
that the composite field can be constructed without applying a single degree-of-8 
extension to GF (2), but by applying multiple extensions of smaller degrees. Satoh et al 
built the composite field by repeating the degree-of-2 extensions under the polynomial 
basis with the irreducible polynomials shown in Equation [6.3] and hence, proposed a 
compact architecture with the introduction of a new composite field of GF (((22)2)2) and 
has shown improvement over proposals using the GF ((24)2) field approach. 
  
 
 {
GF(22)               ∶ x2 + x + 1
GF((22)2)         ∶ x2 + x + ∅
GF(((22)2)2)   ∶ x2 + x + λ
 [6.3] 
 
Figure 2.19 shows the overview of the composite field S-box. Satoh et al stated that the 
isomorphism functions are located at both ends of the S-box function (both encryption 
and decryption). Satoh et al [68] have shown the 8-by-8 matrix for the isomorphic 
mapping into the composite field in Figure 2.20 and the inverse isomorphic mapping in 
Figure 2.21. 
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Figure 2.19: The illustration of the composite field S-box transformation. 
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Figure 2.20: Illustration of isomorphic mapping. 
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Figure 2.21: Illustration of inverse isomorphic mapping. 
 
 
Edwin [92] has presented the complete break down the S-box and the multiplicative 
inverse GF (28). The individual blocks within the composite field S-box are shown in 
Figure 2.22. A circuit excluding the isomorphic transformations and only the circuit 
layout of the multiplicative inverse in the GF (28) is shown in Figure 2.23. Figure 2.23 
shows five GF (24) multiplier used and Figure 2.22 shows that each of the GF (24) 
multiplier blocks uses three GF (2) multipliers. The total gate count for the bi-directional 
circuit (excluding the MUX and including the inverse isomorphism circuit) is a total of 
261 gates, with inverse isomorphism 23 gates (Figure 2.24).  
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Figure 2.22: Individual blocks within the composite field S-box. 
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Figure 2.23: The schematic circuit for the Multiplicative Inverse of GF (28) of the Sub-
Bytes. 
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Figure 2.24: The complete schematic circuit for the forward SubBytes with a total gate 
count of 238. 
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2.6.3. The Very Compact S-Box by D.Canright 
D. Canright [69] proposed a method to compute the S-box function by comparing and 
investigating the normal basis and the polynomial basis inverter. Table 2.10 shows the 
known S-box’s implementation comparison table. 
Table 2.10: The comparison of S-boxes (table extracted from [69]). 
Basis Type XOR NAND NOT MUX Total Gates 
Canright [69] 
Merged 107 36 2 16 253 
S-box 91 36 0 0 195 
Inv S-box 91 36 0 0 195 
Mentens [214] 
Merged 118 36 0 16 271 
S-box 96 36 0 0 204 
Inv S-box 97 36 0 0 206 
Satoh [68] 
Merged 119 36 3 16 275 
S-box 100 36 0 0 211 
Inv S-box 99 36 0 0 209 
Worst 
Merged 131 36 0 16 293 
S-box 107 36 0 0 223 
Inv S-box 106 36 0 0 222 
 
 
2.6.4. Other Small S-Boxes 
Xinmiao et al [93] used the composite field arithmetic approach for small S-boxes. 
Xinmiao et al also applied the sub-pipelining architecture on the top-level AES design. 
This dramatically improves the throughput with a trade-off of larger design size. In 
Rouvroy’s design [191] SubBytes was combined with MixColumns to form a 32-bit “T-box” 
LUT (18 kbit). This has produced superior throughput however still occupied a relatively 
68 
Chapter 2 
large area when the size of the LUT was taken into account. For many applications, 
throughputs in hundreds of megabits per second would be considered excessive and 
therefore, not suitable for resource constrained environment. And another S-box worth 
mentioning, is the work proposed by Renfei et al [215]. Renfei et al presented various 
critical path delays within the composite field S-box and attempts to minimize the design. 
Renfei et al concluded their findings with improved critical path at the expense of a 
larger design. 
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CHAPTER 3  
LOW-COMPLEXITY, LOW-AREA FPGA ENCRYPTION 
ARCHITECTURE USING A LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHER, THE 
SKIPJACK CIPHER 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
3.1. The Proposed Two Instruction Set Computer (TISC) for 
Skipjack Cipher 
3.1.1. The Design of the Proposed TISC Architecture 
The new proposed architecture aims to create a low-complexity Skipjack cipher processor 
using the URISC architecture. The proposed TISC architecture modifies the original 
URISC for cryptographic applications. The modifications are: an additional operation 
code (opcode) decoder, an XOR block, and a new data path. The original URISC [196] has 
a single Adder ALU and processes a single fixed-length instruction. This feature does not 
require an opcode field. To define new instruction sets, an opcode decoder circuitry has to 
be designed for the architecture.  
Skipjack cipher involves the use of bit-wise XOR [63]. Processors in extreme RCEs are 
able to compute simple operations such as the XOR [216]. The information given above 
and the suitability of Skipjack for low-resource environment [19], the existence of a 
dedicated XOR block within the processor is justified. Additionally, with the XOR 
operation, the architecture is able to process data movement operations (MOV) with one 
less instruction comparing to the URISC’s primitive SBN instruction. The URISC’s SBN 
instruction is retained for the conditional instruction branching while the XOR is used 
for data memory movement and Skipjack operations. Figure 3.1 depicts the proposed 
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TISC architecture with the dashed brackets depicting the components added to the 
modified URISC. 
PC
TISC ALU
PC_WRITE
0
MEMORY
MEM_READ
MEM_WRITE
INV
R R_WRITE
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MDR MAR MAR_WRITEMDR_WRITE
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N_WRITE[9] OP
MUX0 1
OP_SEL
0
OP_WRITE
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Figure 3.1: The illustration of the TISC data-path architecture3. 
 
3.1.2. Developing the Modified SBN URISC for the Proposed TISC 
Architecture 
A processor has to have basic operations in order to perform computing tasks. Basic 
operations such as data movement, copying, deletion, instruction jumping and No 
Operation (NOP) are required. Gilreath and Laplante [54], stated and proved that the 
                                                     
3 Published in: Kong Jia Hao, Ang Li-Minn, Seng Kah Phooi, Ong Fong Tien, “Low-complexity Two 
Instruction Set Computer architecture for sensor network using Skipjack encryption”, 
Proceedings of the 25th of the International Conference on Information Networking (ICOIN 
2011), pp. 472-477, ISBN: 978-1-61284-661-3, 2011, Figure 3. 
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SBN instruction set that can implement LOAD, STORE, INC and GOTO, is therefore 
functional and equivalent to a realization of a Turing-Complete machine.  
 The instruction format and pseudo-code for SBN is shown in Figure 3.2. The Operand A 
is subtracted from the Operand B. If the result is a negative value, the execution 
proceeds to the Jump-Address. If the result of the subtraction is a non-negative, the next 
instruction is executed.  
SBN (Operand A), (Operand B), (Jump-Address Y)
B = B + (- A)
If B < 0 GOTO (Program Counter + Y)
Else GOTO (Program Counter + 1)
 
Figure 3.2: The SBN instruction format and pseudo-code. 
 
To achieve Turing-Complete, the SBN is used to construct more complex macro-
instructions by either “instruction parameterization” or “instruction sequencing”. 
Instruction parameterization is a method of choosing the parameters of the instruction so 
that the instruction behaves as another instruction. Two instructions that can be created 
by the parameterization method are shown in Figure 3.3. 
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B = B – 0; (No Operation : NOP)
NOP: SBN 0, B, Y;
0 = B – B; (Memory Wipe : CLR)
CLR: SBN B, B, Y;
; 
Figure 3.3: Two examples of instruction parameterization creating the NOP and CLR 
instruction. 
 
Mathematically, to make a variable retain its value, a subtraction or an addition of zero 
would suffice. Figure 3.3 shows by setting the Operand A to a value of zero, the SBN of 
Operand A and B yields a value of B, which is equivalent to a NOP. Similarly, to clear a 
memory, the SBN of Operand B with itself creates a CLR operation. Jump-Address Y can 
be changed to other addresses if a branch is desired or a specific part of the program has 
to be reused. To achieve this, an instruction can be parameterized to do ‘conditional 
branching’ branching towards the targeted program counter. In programming terms, a 
‘conditional branching’ or a “JUMP”, is akin to a finite loop within a program. A “JUMP” 
is essentially a “GOTO” in this context. An SBN instruction takes in two parameters and 
subtracts them both. The resultant of this computation has to yield a negative number 
for a fixed number of times, in order to achieve a fixed number of loops. For example, if 
the Operand B has a value of ‘-7’, then Operand B has to be subtracted with ‘-1’ for 7 
times to reach a non-negative value, which is a zero. If the resultant is no longer a 
negative number, the program automatically exits the loop. If the resultant remains a 
negative number, the ‘conditional jump” will be triggered and the targeted program 
counter is being executed again. Figure 3.4 shows two examples of parameterizing the 
Operand A to a value of L3 or L8 to create a program finite loop. 
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Loop = L3 – (-1); (GOTO to Y, 3 times : LOOP3)
LOOP3: SBN (-1), L3, Y;
Loop = L8 – (-1); (GOTO to Y, 8 times : LOOP8)
LOOP8: SBN (-1), L8, Y;
 
Figure 3.4: Two examples of instruction parameterization creating the conditional 
branching instruction, with finite loops of 3 and 8. 
 
On the other hand, instruction sequencing is a method of choosing an instruction 
sequence to create or emulate the behaviour of a macro-instruction. As an example, to 
create two variations of the CLR instruction, the SBNs shown in Figure 3.5 can be 
sequenced as such: 
CLR X:
SBN 0x00, X, Y;
SBN X, X, Y;
SBN 0x00, X, Y;
CLR Y:
SBN 0x00, Y, Z;
SBN 0x00, Y, Z;
SBN Y, Y, Z;
 
Figure 3.5: The illustration of two variations of CLR instruction via instruction 
sequencing. 
 
With the NOP, CLR, and LOOP operation, in addition to the LOAD, STORE, INC and 
GOTO operation, this shows that URISC is truly capable of the essential computing 
operations. Despite being Turing-Complete, the memory overhead for URISC macro-
instructions is very high and requires a large number of SBN instructions [201, 202]. In 
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the area of cryptography, the XOR operation is very common for key and cipher text 
intermediate value addition because it allows easy encryption and decryption on a 
plaintext [217]. On the other hand, extreme RCEs such as the RFID has the ability to 
compute simple bit-wise operations such as OR and XOR [216]. Low-complexity means 
less instructions sets. In this case however, Skipjack cipher requires XOR operations, 
which means that a processor has to support the XOR operation. XOR operation can be 
synthesized from SBN according to Gilreath et al [54] but it requires two SBN 
instructions to synthesize an XOR.  This means that twice as much memory is required 
without an XOR ALU for computing Skipjack cipher. An additional XOR ALU has to be 
added for crypto-purposes and therefore, a set of op-codes and op-code decoder are 
required. With ADD and XOR operations, an Op-code decoder is required and the new 
processor is no longer a URISC, but a Two Instruction Set Computer (TISC).  
According to Laplante [53], a simple Half Adder digital logic circuit can be used to 
implement the SBN URISC and any arithmetic or data movement instruction processors. 
However, problem arises when a conditional jump occurs after the Negative flag is 
triggered. During this event, it is either the incremented PC value or the new JUMP 
address from the memory has to be written into the PC register. Mavaddat’s URISC [196] 
only has a RESET function but not a Specific Address JUMP. A slight modification of the 
original URISC is able to allow Specific Address JUMP operation. Without a specific 
address JUMP, macro-instructions cannot be reused, which ultimately costs more 
memory for programming. While keeping the processor complexity to a minimal (two 
instruction sets), memory overhead required for Skipjack can be reduced. Hence 
complying to the criteria of a compact design like a MISC processor [203]. 
The new modified URISC (Figure 3.6) consists of five registers, three multiplexers (MUX), 
an Adder and a single memory. The PC register stores the program counter (PC), which 
indicates the next location of program code in the memory that will be read. The R 
register will store the first read data ‘A’ from the memory. Memory Address Register 
(MAR) will provide the address for reading or writing data to the memory. The Memory 
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Data Register (MDR) will store the result produced from the arithmetic subtraction (‘B’ - 
‘A’). The result will then be written back to the memory, replacing the value of B. 
Whereas Z and N registers, both holds the output of the zero and negative flags from the 
Adder. The size of architecture is determined by the size of the words used.  
ADDER
PC
Z N
R
MDR
MAR
PC out PC in
R in
Z in
N 
in
MDR out MDR in
MAR in
C in
MEMORY
READ
WRITE
COM
P
A) B)
PC
MODIFIED URISC
ADDER
PC_WRITE
0
MEMORY
MEM_READ
MEM_WRITE
INV
R R_WRITE
N
Z_WRITE
MDR MAR MAR_WRITEMDR_WRITE
MUX0 1 MAR_SEL
MUX0 1ALU_B
ALU_A
Z
CIN
N_WRITE
MUX00 01 10 11
 
Figure 3.6: The illustration of the modification from A) URISC to B) Modified URISC, to 
suit RCE applications.  
 
Besides having both Adder and XOR instruction sets, the TISC architecture has the 
following URISC modification: 
1) MDR is no longer used for storing memory addresses. MAR is used instead. This 
allows self-modifying codes for better macro-instruction re-usage. 
2) The data or memory addresses are directly read instead of written into MDR. 
MDR is used only when a new data is produced.  
3) Three multiplexers (MUXs) are added at data path intersection points of multiple 
inputs and outputs for micro-operation flexibility and variable jump address 
execution. 
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4) Op-code decoder and an output multiplexer are included to enable the 
architecture to produce the appropriate output with respect to the op-codes. 
 
3.1.3. Developing the New TISC Skipjack Instruction Set and Opcodes 
To develop the TISC for Skipjack, the two instructions sets used are the SBN and XOR.  
Figure 3.7 shows the two instruction sets in pseudo-code form. 
SBN
Mem_B = Mem_B + (- Mem_A)
If Mem_B < 0 Goto (PC + C)
Else Goto (PC + 1)
XOR
Mem_B = Mem_B XOR Mem_A
 
Figure 3.7: Pseudo-codes for the two TISC Skipjack instruction sets4. 
 
The instruction set format shown in Table 3.1 shows that an Op-code occupies one bit 
space as the MSB (Most Significant Bit) of the memory address. The SBN is used for 
branching and XOR is used for Skipjack processes. There are no unused instruction sets 
or ALUs. The MUX in Figure 3.8 is used to select which output of the ALU should be 
taken. 
 
 
                                                     
4 Kong Jia Hao, “Low-complexity Two Instruction Set Computer architecture for sensor network 
using Skipjack encryption”, Figure 2. 
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Table 3.1: The TISC Skipjack instruction sets. 
Operation 
Function Code / Op-code 
(1-bit MSB) 
Instruction Set Format 
SBN 0 (0 @ address A), address B, Target 
XOR 1 (1 @ address A), address B, Target 
 
N
Z_WRITE Z
N_WRITE
XOR
[8:0] [8:0]
0 @ [8:0]
Mem_B Mem_A
XOR_Out
Adder
[9:0] [9:0]
[9:0]
Mem_B Mem_A
Adder_Out
OP 
Code ALU Output Mux
ALU_Out
TISC Skipjack ALU
 
Figure 3.8: TISC Skipjack ALU components5. 
 
The Adder block performs a 10-bit addition, taking in two 8-bit data item and 
concatenating two zeros to become the MSBs. By inverting the second data, a subtraction 
can be performed by the addition of both data and a carry in (2’s complement). In order to 
branch to a certain memory location, the target address may hold a value that provides a 
summation value to the Program Counter (PC) The value of PC is able to reach to an 
address that is located anywhere within the memory block which can go from 0 up to 
1023. As for XOR block, the circuit performs a 9-bit two input XOR operation on the two 
data items. Due to the addressing value of 9-bits (10 – 1 bit op-code), the effective 
addressable memory location is a total of 512 bytes. Figure 3.9 shows the schematic of 
the 10-bit Adder and Figure 3.10 show the schematic of the 10-bit XOR. 
                                                     
5 Kong Jia Hao, “Low-complexity Two Instruction Set Computer architecture for sensor network 
using Skipjack encryption”, Figure 5. 
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Figure 3.9: TISC Skipjack ALU Adder (10 bit). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: TISC Skipjack ALU XOR (10 bit). 
 
3.1.4. Skipjack Program Structure and Memory Mappings 
The Skipjack’s F-box is implemented in the Look-up Table form, which is 256 bytes in 
total. There is no known combinational logic representation for the Skipjack F-box. To 
determine the size of the architecture (i.e.: size of the data-path registers), the Skipjack 
program was written beforehand to find the suitable memory width size. The F-box Look-
up Table occupies 256 bytes and the data section is reserved to 64 bytes. The program 
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codes written occupied a total of 707 bytes. Therefore, the memory size for TISC Skipjack 
architecture is a 1024 x 10-bit single memory. The program and data memory break 
down can be seen in Figure 3.11.  
 
Figure 3.11: The illustration of the TISC Skipjack’s code and memory mapping 
organization6. 
 
 
Figure 3.12 shows a section of the written program codes for the stepping rule A and B. A 
total of 129 instructions were used in the complete 32 rounds of Skipjack encryption 
(including the SBN JUMP instructions). 
 
                                                     
6 Kong Jia Hao, “Low-complexity Two Instruction Set Computer architecture for sensor network 
using Skipjack encryption”, Figure 8. 
Data Section
Program Section
256
319
Plain Text (272 – 287)
Crypto Variable (256 – 271)
Cipher temp, G temp and Fbox 
temp (288 – 303)
Counter value and loops (304 –
319)
Go to Rule A1 (512 – 514)
Rule A (524 – 559)
G Permutation (320 – 511)
Go to Rule A1 (515 – 517)
Go to Rule A1 (518 – 520)
Go to Rule A1 (521 – 523)
Rule B (560 – 592)
Reset (593 – 703)
706
320
Loop (704 – 706)
F Box LUT Values
0
255
NOP
707
1023
80 
Chapter 3 
 
 
//Rule A
Address Instruction
524 XOR 0x312, 0x124, 0x000 // mov w2.1 to ctemp 3.1
527 XOR 0x313, 0x125, 0x000 // mov w2.2 to ctemp 3.2
530 XOR 0x314, 0x126, 0x000 // mov w3.1 to ctemp 4.1
533 XOR 0x315, 0x127, 0x000 // mov w3.2 to ctemp 4.2
536 XOR 0x329, 0x122, 0x000 // mov g1 to ctemp 2.1
539 XOR 0x32A, 0x123, 0x000 // mov g2 to ctemp 2.2
542 XOR 0x316, 0x129, 0x000 // xor w4.1 to g1 
545 XOR 0x317, 0x12A, 0x000 // xor w4.2 to g2
548 XOR 0x33E, 0x12A, 0x000 // xor master round counter to g2
551 XOR 0x329, 0x120, 0x000 // mov g1 to ctemp 1.1
554 XOR 0x32A, 0x121, 0x000 // mov g2 to ctemp 1.2
557 SBN 0x131, 0x136, 0x021 // goto reset
//Rule B
Address Instruction
560 XOR 0x316, 0x120, 0x000 // mov w4.1 to ctemp 1.1
563 XOR 0x317, 0x121, 0x000 // mov w4.2 to ctemp 1.2
566 XOR 0x314, 0x126, 0x000 // mov w3.1 to ctemp 4.1
569 XOR 0x315, 0x127, 0x000 // mov w3.2 to ctemp 4.2
572 XOR 0x329, 0x122, 0x000 // mov g1 to ctemp 2.1
575 XOR 0x32A, 0x123, 0x000 // mov g2 to ctemp 2.2
578 XOR 0x310, 0x112, 0x000 // xor w1.1 to w2.1 
581 XOR 0x311, 0x113, 0x000 // xor w1.2 to w2.2
584 XOR 0x33E, 0x113, 0x000 // xor master round counter to w2.2
587 XOR 0x312, 0x124, 0x000 // mov w2.1 to ctemp 3.1
590 XOR 0x313, 0x125, 0x000 // mov w2.1 to ctemp 3.2
 
Figure 3.12: Example instructions of Rule A and B within the Skipjack Program7. 
 
By using SBN JUMP instructions, macro-instruction program codes can be reused and 
reiterated. By reusing codes, the program size reduced instead of duplicating the same 
codes that performs the same operations. Figure 3.13 shows the program flow of the 
TISC Skipjack. In order to execute the complete 32 rounds Skipjack encryption program, 
the program flow has to be suited to the location of the instructions in the memory due to 
the continuous increment of the PC. 
                                                     
7 Kong Jia Hao, “Low-complexity Two Instruction Set Computer architecture for sensor network 
using Skipjack encryption”, Figure 6. 
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Rule A
Rule B
Reset
Loop = 32?
If Loop is 
Negative, jump 
to End.
Else, G 
Permutation.
G Permutation
Go to Rule A1 (8)
END
Program Start
Go to Rule B1 (8)
Go to Rule A2 (8)
Go to Rule B2 (8)
Check Loop (loop 
increment)
yes
no
 
Figure 3.13: Skipjack program flow8. 
 
3.1.5. The Finite State Machine (FSM) 
An FSM with control signals is required to control the registers, multiplexers, and 
memory within the data-path during each clock cycles. Figure 3.14 shows the Boolean 
expressions that generates the required control signals. A total of 9 clock cycles are 
required to execute one instruction within the program. The control signals are produced 
by a combinational logic circuit. The combinational logic circuit is driven by a counter 
that will count from 0 to 8. 
During each clock cycles, the control signals for a particular control inputs are different. 
During clock cycle 0, the program counter (PC) is set to a fixed address initially and 
                                                     
8 Kong Jia Hao, “Low-complexity Two Instruction Set Computer architecture for sensor network 
using Skipjack encryption”, Figure 7. 
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loaded into the memory address register (MAR). The zero register (Z) will be set by the 
adder’s output to determine whether the PC has restarted to 0x00. Using this initial PC 
value, a set of memory value is read and written to the MAR. Now, the current MAR 
value holds the memory location of the first operand (A). Next, the PC value is then 
increased by 1 in order to access the address of the second operand (B). At clock cycle 2, 
the value of A is then read and then store to R register temporary. 
During clock cycle 3, the current PC+1 value is loaded into MAR. During clock cycle 4, 
the memory location of the second operand B is then read and store back to MAR again. 
The PC value is also increased by 1 during the same clock cycle. At the clock cycle 6, the 
value of B, which will be used in arithmetic operation, is read. The adder perform the 
arithmetic operation (B-A). The N register is used to determine whether the result or the 
arithmetic calculation is negative via a negative flag to. During the same clock cycle, the 
PC value is again increased by 1 (which is now PC+2) which will locate the jump 
program memory address for the next clock cycle. 
After the TISC arithmetic operations are performed, clock cycle 7 will load the jump 
address from memory. The jump address will then be added into the PC value during the 
same clock cycle. The jump address value will only be added to the PC value, provided 
that the arithmetic (B-A) produced negative result (subtract and branch if negative). The 
last clock cycle 8 will have the PC value increased by 1 again and thus, a single TISC 
instruction (regardless of which instructions) completed.  
Equations (1) to (14) shown in Figure 3.15 are the Boolean expressions for each control 
signals generated via a 4-bit counter. As for the PC_WRITE control signal, the N 
register’s value affects to whether the architecture decides to branch or not. During the 
7th clock cycle, PC_WRITE will be 1 if the arithmetic summation of the adder, (B-A), 
produced negative result. This enables the jump address for that instruction to be added 
into the PC register and thus, resulting to a branch. If the N register is 0, there would 
not be any branching off to another program location. The PC register would continue to 
increase by 1. Then, the following instruction in the written program code will be 
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executed normally. The summary of the data movement with respect to each clock cycles 
is shown in Table 3.2. Data_A and Data_B shown are the first operand (A) and second 
operand (B) respectively. The OP_reg mentioned is referring to the OP register in Figure 
3.1. The TISC is derived from the proposed modified URISC and therefore Figure 3.1 and 
Figure 3.6 B is the TISC and modified URISC respectively. Figure 3.14 also shows that 
there are some FSM signals are only applicable to TISC due to the two instruction set 
architecture. 
0123
0123
0123
0123013023123
0123
013023023
0123
0123
0123
0123012301230123
013123
0123013123
0123
0123
0301223
0301223
CCCC  = Op_SEL (14)
CCCC  =  Op_Write (13)
CCCC  =  Mem_Write (12)
CCCC CCC CCC   CCC  =  Mem_Read (11)
CCCC  =  MDR_Write (10)
CCC CCC CCC  =  MAR_Write (9)
CCCC  =  N_Write (8)
CCCC  =   Z_Write(7)
CCCC  =  R_Write (6)
CCCC CCCC CCCC NCCCC  =  PC_Write (5)
CCC   CCC  =  MAR_SEL (4)
CCCC  CCC  CCC  =  CIN (3)
CCCC =  COMP_SEL (2b)
CCCC =  ALU_A0 (2a)
CCCCCCC =  ALU_A1 (2a)
CCCCCCC =  ALU_B (1)






 (Also known as PC_OUT_SEL in 
TISC)
(2b is used only in TISC)
(2a is used only in the primitive 
modified URISC model)
 
Figure 3.14: The Boolean expression of the FSM controller used in TISC. 
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MDR_WRITE
MEM_WRITE
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Figure 3.15: The FSM combinational logic circuit. 
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Table 3.2: The summary of the data movement with respect to each clock cycles of the 
TISC architecture. 
Clock 
Cycle 
Data_A Data_B Additional Remarks FSM Signals 
0 Address of 
Data_A is 
loaded into 
MAR. 
- (PC) to MAR. Z_WRITE, 
MAR_WRITE 
1 Data_A is 
loaded to 
R_reg 
- Opcode (if available) from the 
instruction to OP code 
register. 
PC_OUT_SEL, 
MAR_WRITE, 
MEM_READ, 
OP_WRITE, 
MAR_SEL 
2 - Address of 
Data_B is 
loaded into 
MAR. 
(PC + 1) to MAR R_WRITE, 
C_IN, 
PC_OUT_SEL, 
MEM_READ 
3 - Data_B is 
loaded out 
- C_IN, 
PC_WRITE, 
MAR_WRITE  
4 Data_A is 
read from 
R_reg 
Data_B is 
read from 
memory 
directly 
The output of the arithmetic 
calculation for both Data_A 
and Data_B is selected via 
MUX 
PC_OUT_SEL, 
MAR_WRITE, 
MEM_READ, 
MAR_SEL 
5 - - The computed data is stored 
in MDR 
C_IN, 
N_WRITE, 
PC_OUT_SEL, 
MDR_WRITE, 
MEM_READ 
6 - - PC + 2 to MAR C_IN, 
PC_WRITE, 
MAR_WRITE, 
MEM_WRITE  
7 - - Branch code loaded. If -ve 
branch occurs, PC + 2 + 
'branch_address' is the new 
PC value. 
PC_OUT_SEL, 
PC_WRITE, 
MEM_READ 
 
8 - - PC + 3 (instruction cycles 
reset) 
C_IN, 
PC_WRITE 
 
3.1.6. The Memory Readdressing Modes (Programmable Addresses and 
Self-Modifying Codes) 
In URISC programming, there is a unique way of coding that allows the code itself to 
‘self-modify’. This is a very unique feature in instruction set programming and is used 
very frequently in the proposed architecture and therefore, the intricate details of the 
applied self-modifying code techniques have to be explained. Self-modifying code is code 
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that alters its own instruction in the process of execution. This method is usually used to 
improve the codes’ performance or to simply reduce repetitively similar code and helps 
reducing memory usage. Reducing memory usage is crucial towards designing a 
minimalistic TISC. This term is usually applied to code where the self-modification is 
intentional, not in situations where the code accidentally modifies itself due to 
programming error.  
In URISC programming, if the architecture is in 8-bits, then the self-modifying addresses 
are a total of 256 addresses, provided that there is no op-code to be filtered via the MAR. 
Presumably is an op-code is forced upon the URISC. This would make the 8-bit 
architecture to be a 7-bit architecture because 1 MSB would have to be occupied for op-
code. On top of that, an op-code decoder would have to present. This would the effective 
word width to 7-bit. A 7-bit architecture will provide 2 ^ 7 addressing spaces. For 
example, 27 = 128 addresses. This would mean that there will be only 128 memory 
addresses available for programming. Note that each SBN instructions consist of 3 words, 
meaning 3 memory locations will be occupied for a single SBN instruction. To identify 
the programmable memory section, the 1-bit op-code has to be accounted for. So, the 
programmable address for an 8-bit architecture and a 1-bit op-code is 7-bits address, 
meaning there are 128 addresses that are capable of ‘self-modifying’. The addressable 
memories and the self-modifying code are mentioned here because they play an 
important role in making URISC programming capable of complex operations which is 
used in this work presented in the latter chapters. 
Figure 3.16 illustrates the visual explanation of the self-modifying addresses. The 
question may arise that, why a ‘0’ is concatenated as an MSB? This is because when a 
single bit op-code exists, that op-code that to be taken out and decoded via op-code 
decoder circuitry.  Once the op-code is taken out of the 8-bit address, the 1-bit space has 
to be filled. So, a ‘0’ is concatenated and this indirectly alters the value of the address. In 
other words, this ‘new’ address is still the same address if it were to be view as a 7-bit 
address, no change to that. If the address were viewed as an 8-bit address, the address is 
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incorrect and may cause erroneous self-modifying codes. This technique is used to 
program loops and counters within the programs for the proposed architectures. 
Programmable Addresses (capable of 
self-modifying)
Common Memory Addresses
0 (MSB) @ 7-bits
127
128
255
0
7-bit 
addresses
8-bit 
addresses
0 (MSB) @ 7-bits
The concatenation of 
an 8th bit at MAR 
rendered the original 
8-bit addresses useless. 
Hence, 8-bit addresses 
are not capable of self-
modifying.
The concatenation of 
an 8th bit at MAR has 
not alter the addresses 
since the address value 
is still within the 7-bit 
window.
  
Figure 3.16: The illustration of the memory section capable of ‘self-modifying’. 
 
3.2. Results and Discussions 
The design and simulation of the TISC Skipjack is done using the Xilinx ISE 11.1 ISIM 
and the target FPGA is set to Xilinx Spartan-3L [218]. Xilinx Spartan-3 is marketed for 
applications that require high logic density for data processing applications. Xilinx 
Spartan-3L offers identical functions, timing, and features  of the original Spartan-3 
family with power-saving benefit. The Spartan-3L power-saving feature lowers the 
device power consumption to very low levels, which is suitable for RCE applications. 
Additionally, the Spartan-3 FPGA was released around the year 2008 during the time of 
the TISC’s development. The Behavioral and Post-Route simulation were performed onto 
the TISC and waveforms of the FSM control signals are presented in this section. The 
Behavioral and Post-Route simulation were also performed on the SBN and XOR 
instructions. The TISC design’s behavioral simulation were verified using standard 
Skipjack test vector provided by NIST [63]. 
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3.2.1. Behavioral Simulation Waveforms 
This section presents the behavioral waveforms of the FSM, the SBN instruction and the 
XOR instruction. Figure 3.17 depicts the behavioral simulation of the FSM to ensure that 
the FSM functions accordingly. The logical behavior of the FSM is presented in section 
3.1.5. A small change onto the MUXes is made to the modified URISC model (comparing 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.6 B) because the TISC only requires 2 instructions: SBN and 
XOR. Both SBN and XOR instructions are differentiated using the function code. The 
function code for SBN is ‘0’ and XOR is ‘1’. Figure 3.17 also highlights the tb_pc_write, 
tb_mdr_write, tb_mar_write, tb_mem_read, and tb_mem_write signals (labels 1 to 5). 
Labels 1 to 5 are used to indicate the crucial FSM signal outputs creating the correct 
data flow which can be verified via comparison to Table 3.2. In Figure 3.17, the 
highlighted signals are respectively the FSM signals: PC_WRITE, MDR_WRITE, 
MAR_WRITE, MEM_READ, and MEM_WRITE. During clock cycle 0, tb_mar_write 
triggers the MAR register to save the current PC value. During clock cycle 1, 
tb_mem_read triggers the block RAM to read the address of the DATA_A while during 
the same cycle, that address is saved again with the signal tb_mar_write at 1. During 
cycle 2, tb_mem_read triggers the block RAM once again to read the actual DATA_A and 
tb_r_write secures the data within the R register. Clock cycle 3 is similar to cycle 0 and 
tb_pc_write ensures the newly incremented PC value is loaded into the PC register. 
Clock cycle 4 is similar to cycle 1 but the address of DATA_B is loaded instead. During 
cycle 5, tb_mdr_write ensures that the calculated data is saved into the MDR register. 
Cycle 6 writes a new PC value into the PC register, tb_mem_write triggers the block 
RAM to save the newly computed data. Cycle 7 writes into the PC with a new PC value if 
a jump occurs. And lastly, cycle 8 increments the new PC value and the whole instruction 
is therefore completed.  
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Figure 3.17: TISC FSM Control Signals Behavioral Waveforms. 
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Figure 3.18 shows the behavioral waveform for SBN and Figure 3.19 shows the 
waveform for XOR. Both Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19 show distinctive difference in the 
function codes (via signal tb_function_code). As mentioned previously, a function code of 
0 is an SBN instruction and a 1 means it is an XOR instruction. Figure 3.18 in particular, 
shows how an SBN instruction works. In clock cycle 0, the initially PC value is 0x80 and 
tb_mar_input shows the same 0x80 value. During clock cycle 1, tb_mar_output shows the 
updated 0x80 value, meaning that the block RAM will use 0x80 as the address and thus 
the output is 0x7C. During clock cycle 2, 0x7C is the new MAR value and the block RAM 
output is 0x01 and which 0x01 is the real DATA_A. During clock cycle 3 and 4, the 
similar steps are taken to retrieve DATA_B. But during clock cycle 5, the calculation and 
the data calculated is loaded into the MDR register. Now that we have DATA_A = 1, 
DATA_B = 0, SBN = DATA_A + (inverse of DATA_B) = 0x01 + 0x7F = 0. A negative 
value in SBN will trigger a jump however; a ZERO output will not trigger the jump. In 
the subsequent clock cycles, the jump address is read but is not added into the PC value 
because the jump condition was not fulfilled. Both Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19 are very 
similar in nature and the only difference is still the function code (0 for SBN and 1 for 
XOR). In an XOR instruction, there is not jump condition and it is basically a very 
straight forward XOR calculation on two variables. Figure 3.19 also shows an XOR of 
0x11 and 0x01 resulting to a value of 0x10. The DATA_A was initially 0x101. The MSB is 
a 1 and it indicates that it is an XOR instruction. During calculation and computation of 
the XOR, the MSB is ignored. 
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Figure 3.18: Behavioral Simulation Waveforms of the SBN instruction for TISC Skipjack.  
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Figure 3.19: Behavioral Simulation Waveforms of the XOR instruction for TISC Skipjack
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3.2.2. TISC Instruction Post-Route Simulation Waveforms 
The Post-Route simulations for TISC Skipjack were performed to determine the 
maximum time delay for each of the instructions executed. TISC consists of low-
complexity components such as registers and multiplexers thus the largest delay would 
originate from the computation blocks and block memories. Figure 3.20 shows the 
outcome of the Post-Route simulation for the SBN instruction and Figure 3.21 shows the 
Post-Route simulation for the XOR instruction. Figure 3.20 shows that the longest delay 
for the SBN instruction occurred at clock cycle 5, requiring 39373 ps delay (2212873 – 
2173500 = 39373) for a stable output. Figure 3.21 shows that the longest delay for the 
XOR instruction occurred at clock cycle 5, requiring 38283 ps delay (699783 – 661500 
=38283) for a stable output. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 present the TISC SBN and XOR 
instruction delays. The int_clk is the clock cycle generated from the system clock. The 
mem_out is the time taken to read a data from the block RAM. alu_out (SBN or XOR) is 
the time delay for the instruction to produce the desired result. alu_out (SBN or XOR) 
takes consideration of the time taken from a clock triggers the Adder or XOR circuit, to 
the correct output at the end of the Adder or XOR circuit. To calculate the circuit delay, 
the time marker at point 1 is subtracted from the time marker at point 2 at cycle 5, 
which can be found in Figure 3.20 and Figure 3.21. 
The Celoxica RC10 development board houses the Spartan-3L FPGA (XC3S1500L-4-
FG320). RC10 fits the requirement of the research of having a Spartan-3 FPGA. The 
system clock the fixed clock of the Celoxica RC10 development board (48MHz). Hence the 
system clock was set to a period of 21000 ps, which is approximately 48MHz. The longest 
delay of 39316 ps suggests that a clock with a period larger than 39316 ps or 39.316 ns 
has to be used. A divided clock, running at 24 MHz and has a period of 42000 ps or 42 ns, 
is suitable for the TISC architecture’s timing requirements. Both SBN and XOR 
instruction delays justifies the operating frequency of 24 MHz.  
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Figure 3.20: Post-Route Simulation Waveforms of the SBN instruction for TISC Skipjack.
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Figure 3.21: Post-Route Simulation Waveforms of the XOR instruction for TISC Skipjack. 
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Table 3.3: TISC Skipjack SBN instruction delay at clock cycle 5. 
Clock 
Delay (ps) 
int_clk alu_out (SBN) mem_out 
0 9317 - - 
1 9317 39316 32371 
2 9317 39373 34103 
3 9317 - - 
4 9317 39373 34103 
5 9317 39373 34103 
6 9317 - - 
7 9317 39373 34103 
8 9317 - - 
 
 
Table 3.4: TISC Skipjack XOR instruction delay at clock cycle 5. 
Clock 
Delay (ps) 
int_clk alu_out (XOR) mem_out 
0 9317 - - 
1 9317 - 33767 
2 9317 - 33909 
3 9317 - - 
4 9317 - 34103 
5 9317 38283 34103 
6 9317 - - 
7 9317 - 34103 
8 9317 - - 
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3.2.3. Design Behavioral Verification 
The TISC Skipjack’s behavioral simulation is done using a test bench running at 24 MHz 
(Period = 42 ns). The output of the encryption is compared to the output of the standard 
Skipjack test vector. The test vector used was “33221100DDCCBBAA” as the input 
plaintext in hexadecimal and a key value (also known as the crypto-variable [63]) of 
“00998877665544332211” in hexadecimal. The TISC Skipjack produces the correct cipher 
text at 1363855500 ps with a value of “2587CAE27A12D300” in hexadecimal. Figure 3.22 
shows the waveform of the encrypted cipher text and Figure 3.23 shows the correct 
ciphertext at 1363971794 ps in a Post-Route Simulation. The standard test vector used 
in Figure 3.24 is provided by NIST, showing the cipher states with the corresponding key 
and plaintext. 
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Figure 3.22: Waveform output for the TISC encrypted cipher text starting at 1363855500 
ps 
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Figure 3.23: Post-Route waveform of the TISC encrypted cipher text starting at 
1363971794 ps
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Figure 3.24: Test vector provided by NIST for Skipjack ECB [63]. 
 
3.2.4. Hardware Utilization and Comparison 
Hardware utilization simulation for the TISC Skipjack is done using Xilinx Spartan-3L 
XC3S1500L-4-FG3203L as the target device. Table 3.5 show the device utilization report.  
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Table 3.5: Hardware utilization of TISC Skipjack using Spartan-3L XC3S1500L-4-FG320. 
FPGA Components (Spartan-3L (XC3S1500L-4-
FG320)) 
Quantity 
Utilization 
Percentage 
Total 
Logic 
Utilization 
No. of Slice Flip Flops 70 1% 26,624 
No. of 4 Input LUTs 94 1% 26,624 
Logic 
Distribution 
No. of Occupied Slices 71 1% 13,312 
No. of Slices containing only 
related logic 
71 100% 71 
Total  No. of 4 Input LUTs 104 1% 26,624 
No. of  LUTs used a logic 94 ~90% 104 
No. of  LUTs used a route-
thru 
10 ~10% 104 
No. of  LUTs used a Shift 
Registers 
0 0% 0 
No. of Bonded IOBs 99 44% 221 
No. of LOCed IOBs 0 0% 28 
No. of  RAMB16s 1 3% 32 
No. of BUFGMUXs 2 25% 8 
 
Eryilmaz et al [219] presented an implementation of Skipjack using Xilinx Spartan-3 
XC3S500E with the result of 780 slices utilized. Huang et al [220] present a design using 
Xilinx Virtex-4 XC4VLX200 with a total of 56822 slices occupied. Table 3.6 shows the 
comparison with other reported Skipjack processors. 
Table 3.6: Hardware utilization comparison with other Skipjack processors. 
 
TISC 
Skipjack 
 
Eryilmaz et 
al [219] 
TISC 
Skipjack 
 
Huang et 
al [220] 
FPGA  
Xilinx Spartan-3 
XC3S500E 
Xilinx Virtex-4 
XC4VLX200 
Logic 
Utilization 
No. of Slice 
Flip Flops 
71 / 9312 271 / 9312 
71 / 
178176 
- 
No. of 4 Input 
LUTs 
99 / 9312 1399 / 9312 
110 / 
178176 
- 
Logic No. of 58 / 4656 780 / 4656 61 / 89088 56822 / 
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TISC 
Skipjack 
 
Eryilmaz et 
al [219] 
TISC 
Skipjack 
 
Huang et 
al [220] 
FPGA  
Xilinx Spartan-3 
XC3S500E 
Xilinx Virtex-4 
XC4VLX200 
Distribution Occupied 
Slices 
89088 
 
No. of 
RAMB16s 
1 / 20 - 1 / 336 - 
 
3.2.5. Throughput Calculation 
TISC Skipjack implementation is based on the Skipjack ECB mode. Equation [3.4] 
describes the throughput calculation. 
 
Throughput
= [
(total amount of bits encrypted)
(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)
] [3.4] 
 
The total clock cycles required for the data to be encrypted have to be calculated 
according to the number of instructions executed for the complete Skipjack operation. 
Each TISC instructions take nine clock cycles to complete.  The total instructions 
executed are: 
For the throughput of TISC Skipjack, the calculations are: 
 G Permutation: (192 bytes / 3) = 64 instructions 
 Rule A: [(153 bytes / 3) + G Permutation] * 16 rounds = 1840 
 Rule B: [(153 bytes / 3) + G Permutation] * 16 rounds = 1840 
 Total clock cycles = (1840 +1840) * 9 = 33120 
 Throughput: (64-bit / 33120 clocks) x 24MHz = 46.38 kbps 
The completion time for encrypting 64bits of data is 1363971794 ps or approximately 
1.364 ms (Figure 3.23). The throughput of the simulated system is 46.92 kbps. This 
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calculation shows that the expected throughput and the calculated throughput of the 
TISC Skipjack is correct with both results indicating a throughput of approximately 46 
kbps. Table 3.7 show the comparison of TISC throughput with other Skipjack processors. 
Table 3.7: Throughput comparison with other Skipjack processors. 
 TISC Skipjack Eryilmaz et al [219] Huang et al [220] 
Throughput (kbps) 46.92 19393.9 1136000 
 
 
3.3. Summary 
A low-complexity, low-area TISC for Skipjack is designed and presented in this chapter.  
To summarize, this chapter presents the following: 
1) Modified URISC is used as a simplistic processor for lightweight cipher Skipjack. 
2) TISC Skipjack occupies 71 slices using a Spartan3 XCS1500L-4 FPGA. 
3) The TISC achieved a throughput of 46.92 kbps. 
4) The TISC Skipjack is the smallest known design with a trade-off in terms of 
throughput. 
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CHAPTER 4  
LOW-COMPLEXITY, LOW-AREA FPGA ENCRYPTION 
ARCHITECTURE USING A MODERN CIPHER, THE 
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
4.1. Method of the Proposed Improvement on the current S-Box 
4.1.1. The Design of the Proposed Minimized S-Box 
This proposed method aims to produce a bi-directional S-box with a gate count less than 
the total of 192 gates from Boyar’s work [71, 212], which is the smallest know bi-
directional S-box. Figure 4.1 shows the proposed method uses Boyar’s forward S-box [212] 
with additional identical circuit added before the input and after the output. This 
modification makes a bi-directional S-box (similar to a composite field representation). A 
forward S-Box in the composite field has the affine transformation in the process while 
the Boyar’s three stage S-Box [71] represent the affine transformation embedded within 
as a part of the circuit derived from matrix B (Chapter 2, figure 2.17). An inverse affine 
circuit is the only circuit that determines the character of the inverse S-Box. Adding an 
inverse affine transform at the end of the composite field S-box effectively cancels out the 
transformation done by the affine transform in the forward S-Box. To complete the 
Boyar’s Forward S-box circuit [212], another inverse affine transform has to be present 
at the front-end as the completing component for the inverse S-box. This results to a 
complete bi-directional S-Box. MUXs are required to choose the path of the data from 
encryption and decryption mode selection. 
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Figure 4.1: The illustration of the placement of the proposed inverse-affine circuit in the 
Boyar’s Forward S-box9. 
 
4.1.2. The Minimization of Inverse Affine Circuit for a Complete Straight-
line Bidirectional S-box 
In the composite field forward S-box, an affine and inverse affine transformation are 
placed at the input and output of the circuit respectively. Figure 4.2 shows the inverse 
affine transform matrix. The number of XOR points amounts to a total of 24 XORs. 
Equation [4.5] shows the expanded equations. 
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Figure 4.2: The matrix for inverse affine transform. 
                                                     
9 Published in: Jia Hao Kong, Li-Minn Ang, and Kah Phooi Seng, “A Very Compact AES-SPIHT 
Selective Encryption Computer Architecture Design with Improved S-Box,” Journal of 
Engineering, vol. 2013, Article ID 785126, 26 pages, 2013, DOI: 10.1155/2013/785126, Page 11, 
Figure 11. 
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[4.5] 
 
Bernstein’s [221] work addresses the computation redundancy in two-dimensional linear 
XOR functions. Given a linear matrix, To reduce the computation redundancy, Bernstein 
proposed a method to optimizing linear matrix mapping. Similarly, the Affine 
Transformation Matrix is a linear matrix. Using Bernstein’s method will able to 
minimize the initial gate counts of the Affine Transform Matrix. A .cpp file [222] on 
Bernstein’s website, which is a direct implementation of his algorithm is to used evaluate 
a given matrix for a p-bit-to-q-bit linear function and computes the matrix output. 
Running the Bernstein’s optimization algorithm [221], a linear map of modulo 2 can be 
optimized to give an output with lesser number of XOR steps to produce the same output. 
For instance, the total number of XORs required for a complete inverse affine transform 
is 24 XORs and each output ‘A’ has a minimum of 3 XOR chains. By breaking down the 
chains to low two-operand complexity form, intermediate values for the output ‘A’ 
(namely ‘a’) are formed with an XOR chain of 1. 
By putting in the linear matrix value of the inverse affine transform into the algorithm 
designed by [221], the results obtained using Bernstein’s optimization onto the inverse 
affine matrix are shown in a straight-line layout, yielding a minimized number of XORs 
less than the manual hand-calculation of the inverse affine matrix (24 XORs). Equation 
[4.6] shows the straight-line XOR calculations obtained from the optimization algorithm 
by [221]. The gate count at this stage (by counting the XOR signs) is 18 XOR gates. Note 
that the variable ‘a’ in Equation [4.6] can be considered ‘intermediate’ values are 
depending on its position in the circuit branches. 
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[4.6] 
 
This initial form of the minimized circuit uses a total of 18 XOR gates (which is less than 
the initial count of 24 gates). By sorting out the variables, Equation [4.6] can be 
minimized by expanding the equations shown in Equation [4.7]. The equations mapped 
out show that there are only eight outputs at the end. Points shown below explain the 
Equation [4.6] and Equation [4.7]. 
1.  The variables: 𝑥0, 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5, 𝑥6, 𝑥7  are the inputs to the inverse affine 
matrix.  
2. The final variables identified (the tip end of the circuit branches) are: 
𝑎9, 𝑎10, 𝑎12, 𝑎13, 𝑎14, 𝑎15, 𝑎16, 𝑎17. 
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[4.7] 
 
Equation [4.8] shows the alternate representation of Equation [4.7]. The current gate 
count is 16 XOR gates. Note that from this point onwards, the minimization is done by 
factor grouping since the circuit is small. 
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[4.8] 
 
From here, minimization is done via factor grouping. In Equation [4.9] shows the 
common bases that are first acquired from the expanded equations into their respective 
outputs and Equation [4.10] shows the ‘intermediate’ XORs using ‘y’ representations, 
which is eventually represented by ‘A’ as the final output. 
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The new reduced gate circuit was designed for the lower-gate count S-box following this 
minimization process (Figure 4.3). There are two constant additions at the end of the 
inverse affine transform, and this requires two extra XOR gates (refer to Figure 4.2). The 
final circuit in Figure 4.3 amounts to a total of 14 gates. 
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Figure 4.3: The minimized inverse affine circuit (14 XOR gates)10. 
                                                     
10 Published in: Jia Hao Kong, “A Very Compact AES-SPIHT Selective Encryption Computer 
Architecture Design with Improved S-Box”, Page 12, Figure 13 
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By using the new circuit shown in Figure 4.3 and the original Boyar’s S-Box (Chapter 2 
Literature Review, section 2.6.2, Figure 2.17), the final standalone S-Box is illustrated in 
Figure 4.4, with built-in multiplexers (MUXs) with a total of 143 gates (Boyar (115 gates) 
+ 2 * inverse affine circuit (which is 2*14 gates) excluding MUX 16 gates). Boyar [71] did 
not include the MUX circuits. The final circuit is a straight line straight line circuit (with 
one inverse affine circuit at both ends each). 
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Figure 4.4: The complete gate layout of the proposed S-box configuration for bi-
directional setting11
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4.2. Development of the Compact Instruction Set Architecture for 
the AES 
To design a low-area, low-complexity system, mixed software-hardware architecture has 
to be adopted and configured to a most desirable combination of compact code and 
compact hardware. For this, the URISC is used to create a customized architecture called 
the compact instruction set architecture (CISA). The reason it is called a CISA is due to 
the minimized, and compacted instruction sets that the architecture accommodates. 
There is no need for any additional instruction sets in order to complete all the AES 
transformations, and, therefore, the computer architecture is ‘compact’. The latter part of 
this section further explains and dissects the CISA AES architecture into the following 
sub-sections: architecture, function codes and instruction sets, memory, FSM control 
signals and cipher algorithm program code. 
 
4.2.1. The New Data-path Architecture and Arithmetic –Logic Unit (ALU) 
In the AES transformations, there are two specific circuits required: a circuit for 
SubBytes and MixColumns. As for the ShiftRow and AddRoundKey, a simple XOR and 
memory readdressing would suffice. As for the SubBytes, a combinational circuit has to 
be present. In this part of the work, the proposed S-box in Section 4.1 is used as a one of 
the computation blocks. As for MixColumns, kindly refer to [65] for the xTime dedicated 
four XOR hardware because of the simplistic nature and compatibility . Unlike URISC, 
which uses only one instruction, the proposed CISA AES uses four minimized 
instructions (including SBN) to perform the complete AES encryption process. The CISA 
ALU includes: Adder, XOR, xTime, and S-box.  
The novel CISA data-path is shown in Figure 4.5. It has a single memory unit to store 
both program and data for the AES algorithm. With the SBN instruction (similar to 
URISC), the CISA can branch to any PC values within the memory unit and execute any 
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instructions in any location of the memory unit. With seven registers, five multiplexers, 
one memory unit and four ALU blocks, the CISA is complete and functional. Similar to 
the structure of URISC, the CISA data-path loads in the first memory address and 
subsequently loads in the first data item. This operation is repeated for the second data 
item. Once both data are loaded into the CISA, they are sent to the ALU for computation 
and the outputs will be chosen regarding the function code embedded in the first address 
loaded. The function code is a 2-bit value, concatenated to the first data address in the 
memory unit. With the 2-bit MSB value, the architecture can determine which 
instruction is used for the current processor cycle and what data are stored back to the 
memory. 
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The Compact Reconfigurable ALU Design Space 
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Figure 4.5: The novel CISA architecture, data-path and the ALU121314. 
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The architecture has two input parameters into the CISA: Input_A and Input_B. Like a 
URISC, the architecture is also controlled by an FSM, the data movement and processing 
are fixed within nine clock cycles. The Adder and XOR block takes in two data items and 
perform bit-wise addition and XOR onto their respective inputs. The xTime block is a 
part of the MixColumns transformation. In [93], by using the sub-structure computation 
of a byte and between the computations of four bytes in an array of bytes, the derivation 
of the MixColumns transformation can be defined. In [191], the implementation of an 
‘xTime’ function is used to complete the multiplication of with ‘02’, modulo the irreducible 
polynomial m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1. It is known that the MixColumns transformation 
is a process involving several XOR processes and xTime processes. The xTime is a bit-
wise XOR operation that yields the constant multiplication by (02). By concatenating two 
xTime blocks in serial, constant multiplication by (04) can be achieved. The MixColumns 
circuit in [93] can be used for both MixColumns and Inverse MixColumns. In Figure 4.7, 
part 1 of the circuit is the Mix Columns Transformation. Part 1 together with part 2 of 
the circuit yields the Inverse MixColumns Transformation. The xTime circuit is shown in 
Figure 4.6. The circuit in Figure 4.7 is translated to soft-codes, using the xTime circuit to 
reproduce the exact output of the complete MixColumns operation.  
To standardize the width of the register and data-path for the best design at the 
architecture level, a unified and shared bit-wise XOR block will be used to perform a 
XOR MOVE operations instead of the SBN MOVE to improve program memory efficiency 
(XOR MOVE requires one less instruction less than SBN MOVE). The xTime circuit uses 
three independent XORs. 
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Figure 4.6: The xTime circuit (Image redrawn from [223]). 
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Figure 4.7: The MixColumns Transformation Process using the xTime Circuit (Image 
redrawn from [223]). 
 
4.2.2. Application Specific Function Codes and Instruction Sets 
To perform AES computations onto the plaintext, byte-oriented operations are adopted 
from the AES algorithm. To perform tasks such as SubBytes and MixColumns, a new set 
of instructions is developed. The CISA instruction sets shown in Table 4.1 are 
differentiated using the two MSB of each of the instructions. The four instruction sets 
used to perform different operations are showed in the Figure 4.8. These pseudo-codes 
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represent the characteristic of the instructions set used in CISA. From the Table 4.1, 
each of the instruction formats uses 3 bytes in the program memory. The first byte holds 
the Op Code and the address of Mem_A, the second byte holds the address of Mem_B and 
the last byte holds the target address. With four different op codes embedded in the first 
byte of the instruction, the CISA selects the appropriate output from the corresponding 
processor block.  
Table 4.1: The CISA AES (specifically for AES application) instruction sets. 
Operation 
Function Code / Op-code 
(2-bit MSB) 
Instruction Set Format 
SBN 00 (0 @ address A), address B, Target 
XOR 01 (1 @ address A), address B, Target 
xTime 10 10 @ 0[n:0], address B, Target 
Sub Bytes 11 11 @ 0[n:0], address B, Target 
 
SBN
Mem_B = Mem_B + (- Mem_A)
If Mem_B < 0 Goto (PC + C)
Else Goto (PC + 1)
XOR
Mem_B = Mem_B XOR Mem_A
xTime
Mem_B = xTime(Mem_B)
Sub Bytes
Mem_B = Sub_Bytes(Mem_B)
 
Figure 4.8: The pseudo-codes (algorithm) for CISA instruction sets. 
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4.2.3. Memory Mapping and Program Structure 
The CISA AES architecture includes a 1024 x 10-bit memory unit. The size of the 
memory is determined by the size of the AES program and the data. The total available 
memory is 1024 x 8-bit (512 bytes), which accommodates both the data and program 
codes. The data section is located at the address location of 0 to 127, whereas the 
program section takes the location of 128 to 1024. In the program section, instructions 
are sorted in a sequence as the CISA executes in accordance. In the data section, the 
breakdown of the memory allocation the plain text, master key and other temporary 
variables are shown in Figure 4.9. 
Data Section
Plain Text
Temporary Data Locations
Original Cipher Key
Temporary Data Locations
Rcon[i]
Cipher Text
Temporary Mix Column Data
Temporary Variables
Sub Keys (Expanded Keys)
Program Section
Shift Row
Add Round Key (Enc / Dec)
Key Expansion
Sub Bytes (Enc / Dec)
Mix Columns (Part 1)
Mix Columns (Part 2)
Loop
END
Inverse Shift Row
 
Figure 4.9: The Memory Mapping for CISA AES15. 
 
For the program design of the CISA AES, functions and modules of a set of the written 
instructions can be reused for code efficiency. During the decryption round, the Key 
Expansion algorithm has to be executed, and the sub keys are stored inside the memory 
unit. During encryption mode, the program sequence has to start by producing all the 
sub keys and then proceed to the AddRoundKey function. Loop1 and Loop2 are used to 
branch to any designated memory locations in the memory unit if the resultant value is 
less than zero of negative. In loop1 and loop2, the addressed memory stores a number 
                                                     
15Published in:  Jia Hao Kong, “A Very Compact AES-SPIHT Selective Encryption Computer 
Architecture Design with Improved S-Box”, Page 19, Figure 20.  
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that enables the SBN instruction to be executed and hence, the results will be check by 
the CISA FSM controller in order to decide whether a branch instruction has to occur 
depending on the output of the Adder and the function code of the instruction. The 
function code tells the data-path that the current instruction performed is an SBN 
instruction. With the two SBN loops for branching, the AES encrypt mode can be 
completed.  
Figure 4.10 illustrates the encryption and decryption program flow for the CISA AES. In 
decrypt mode, similar to the AES encrypt mode, the decryption process involves an initial 
pre-whitening transformation of AddRoundKey. The sub keys are stored in the memory 
unit after encrypt were done previously. A one-time loop is implemented in order for the 
CISA to execute the ‘AddRoundKey’ once at the start of the decrypt sequence. This is due 
to the reason that the initial pre-whitening step does not have a flow pattern to the 
programming sequence. In decrypt mode, the data transformation after AddRoundKey is 
the Inverse MixColumns. The initial Add Round Key is a one-time process, so the one-
time loop is applied. With another SBN loop applied, the decrypt mode can execute the 
four inverse transformations with ten iterations.  
Shift Row
Sub Bytes
Check Loop1
If Loop1 is 
Negative, jump 
to Add Key.
Else, proceed.
Mix Column
Add Key
If Loop2 is 
Negative, jump 
to END.
Else, proceed.
END
Program Start
(ENCRYPT)
Key Generation
Check Loop2
Inv Shift Row
Inv Sub Bytes
Check Loop1
If Loop1 is 
Negative, jump 
to END.
Else, proceed.
Inv Mix Column
Add Key
END
Program Start
(DECRYPT)
One Time Loop
Go to Inv Shift 
Row after 1
st
 
key added
 
Figure 4.10: The CISA AES encryption and decryption program flowchart and structure16. 
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4.3. Results and Discussions 
The design and simulation of the CISA AES is done using the Xilinx ISE 11.1 ISIM and 
the target FPGA is set to Xilinx Spartan-3L [218]. The CISA AES has the same 
architecture as TISC but with additional xTime and S-box components. The Behavioral 
and Post-Route simulation for the FSM, SBN instruction and XOR instruction can be 
found in Chapter 3 (Results and Discussions). The Behavioral and Post-Route simulation 
were performed on the xTime and S-Box instructions. The CISA design’s behavioral 
simulation were verified using standard AES test vector provided by NIST [63]. 
 
4.3.1. Behavioral Simulation Waveforms 
This section presents the behavioral waveforms of the AES specific xTime instruction 
and the S-box instruction. Both xTime and S-box instructions are differentiated using the 
function code. The function code for xTime is ‘2’ and S-box is ‘3’. Figure 4.11 shows the 
behavioral waveform for xTime and Figure 4.12 shows the waveform for S-box. 
Figure 4.11 shows the xTime instruction set with same instruction format where 
DATA_A, DATA_B, and the jump address are read from the block RAM. However, 
DATA_A is not used for the xTime calculation because DATA_B is the real target data 
for processing.  Address jumping is irrelevant in this instruction because the purpose of 
xTime is a logical calculation of a single byte without negative values. Figure 4.6 shows 
the xTime circuit with the following calculation: b7 = a6 (MSB), b1 = a0 XOR a7, b6 = a5, b0 
= a7, b5 = a4, b4 = a3 XOR a7, b3 = a2 XOR a7, b2 = a1 (LSB). Figure 4.11 shows DATA_B 
with the value of 0xC7, which is a value of 11000111 in binary. Using the value 
11000111, the xTime result is 10010101, which is 0x95 in hexadecimal. Thus, the correct 
calculation is completed and is saved into the block RAM. 
Figure 4.12 shows the S-box instruction set with same instruction format where DATA_A, 
DATA_B, and the jump address are read from the block RAM. However, DATA_A is not 
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used for the S-box calculation because DATA_B is the real target data for processing. 
Address jumping is irrelevant in this instruction because the purpose of S-box is a byte 
substitution of a single byte without negative values. Figure 4.12 shows DATA_B with 
the value of 0x60. Using the value 0x60 to refer to the S-box table shown in Table 2.9, the 
S-box substitution result is 0xD0. Thus, the correct calculation is completed and is saved 
into the block RAM. 
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Figure 4.11: Behavioral Simulation Waveforms of the xTime instruction for CISA AES.
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Figure 4.12: Behavioral Simulation Waveforms of the S-Box instruction for CISA AES. 
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4.3.2. CISA Instruction Post-Route Simulation Waveforms 
The Post-Route simulations for CISA AES were performed to determine the maximum 
time delay for each of the instructions executed. The SBN and XOR instruction was 
simulated in the Chapter 3. This section focuses on the AES specific instructions, which 
are the xTime and S-box. Figure 4.13 shows the outcome of the Post-Route simulation for 
the xTime instruction. Figure 4.14 shows the Post-Route simulation for the CISA using 
Boyar’s S-box and Figure 4.15 shows the Post-Route simulation for the CISA using the 
proposed S-box. Figure 4.13 shows that the signal delay for the xTime instruction 
occurred at clock cycle 5, with 24195 ps delay (409303695 – 409279500 = 24195) for a 
stable output. Figure 4.14 shows that the signal delay for the Boyar’s S-box instruction 
occurred at clock cycle 5, with 21769 ps delay (32813269 – 32791500 = 21769) for a stable 
output. Figure 4.15 shows that the signal delay for the proposed S-box’s instruction 
occurred at clock cycle 5, with 20901 ps delay (32812401 – 32791500 = 20901). 
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Figure 4.13: Post-Route Simulation Waveforms of the xTime instruction for CISA AES. 
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Figure 4.14: Post-Route Simulation Waveforms using Boyar’s S-box. 
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Figure 4.15: Post-Route Simulation Waveforms using the proposed S-box. 
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Table 4.2 present the CISA xTime delays. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 and S-box instruction 
delays using Boyar’s S-box and the proposed S-box respectively. The int_clk is the clock 
cycle generated from the system clock. The mem_out is the time taken to read a data 
from the block RAM. alu_out (xTime or S-box) is the time delay for the instruction to 
produce the desired result. alu_out (xTime or S-box) takes consideration of the time 
taken from a clock triggers the xTime or S-box circuit, to the correct output at the end of 
the xTime or S-box circuit. To calculate the circuit delay, the time marker at point 1 is 
subtracted from the time marker at point 2 at cycle 5, which can be found in Figure 4.13, 
Figure 4.14, and Figure 4.15. 
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Table 4.2: CISA AES xTime instruction delays. 
Clock 
Delay (ps) 
int_clk alu_out (xTime) mem_out 
0 9700 - - 
1 9700 - 31778 
2 9700 - 35667 
3 9700 - - 
4 9700 - 37417 
5 9700 24195 35667 
6 9700 - - 
7 9700 - 37417 
8 9700 - - 
 
 
Table 4.3: CISA AES Boyar’s S-box (forward) instruction delays. 
Clock 
Delay (ps) 
int_clk alu_out (S-box) mem_out 
0 9588 - - 
1 9588 - 32163 
2 9588 - 37339 
3 9588 - - 
4 9588 - 37339 
5 9588 21769 35369 
6 9588 - - 
7 9588 - 35919 
8 9588 - - 
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Table 4.4: CISA AES proposed S-box (bidirectional – set to decrypt mode) instruction 
delays. 
Clock 
Delay (ps) 
int_clk alu_out (S-box) mem_out 
0 9677 - - 
1 9677 - 36903 
2 9677 - 37463 
3 9677 - - 
4 9677 - 37463 
5 9677 20901 37463 
6 9677 - - 
7 9677 - 37463 
8 9677 - - 
 
The system clock was set to a period of 21000 ps, which is approximately 48 MHz. The 
longest delay of 37417 ps (reading block memory) suggests that a clock with a period 
larger than 37417 ps or 37.417 ns. Similar to the TISC, a 24MHz clock has a period of 
42000 ps or 42 ns is suitable for the CISA architecture’s timing requirements. Both 
xTime and S-box instruction delays justifies the operating frequency of 24 MHz.  
 
4.3.3. Design Behavioral Verification 
The CISA AES behavioral simulation is done using a test bench running at 24MHz 
(Period = 42 ns). The output of the encryption is compared to the output of the standard 
AES test vector. The test vector used was “00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF” as 
the input plaintext in hexadecimal and a key value of 
“0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F” in hexadecimal. The CISA AES produces the 
correct cipher text at 1034911500 ps with a value of 
“69C4E0D86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A” in hexadecimal. Figure 4.16 shows the 
waveform of the encrypted cipher text and Figure 4.17 shows the correct ciphertext at 
1034676642 ps in a Post-Route Simulation. The standard test vector used in Figure 3.24 
is provided by NIST, showing the cipher states with the corresponding key and plaintext. 
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Figure 4.16: Waveform output for the CISA encrypted cipher text starting at 1034911500 
ps. 
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Figure 4.17: Post-Route waveform of the CISA encrypted cipher text starting at 
1034676642 ps 
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Figure 4.18: Test vector provided by NIST for AES ECB [224]. 
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4.3.4. Hardware Utilization and Comparison 
a) Using Boyar’s (Forward Direction) S-box 
Table 4.5 shows the CISA AES using Boyar’s forward S-box is implemented and the 
utilization results on a Spartan-3L XC3S1500L-4-FG320. For a single CISA AES 
architecture, only a total of 1024 kilobytes memory used for the AES program and the 
data and temp variables. This design only supports the forward encryption (the 
decryption can be done within the sink of an RCE application).  
Table 4.5: Hardware utilization of CISA AES using Spartan-3L XC3S1500L-4-FG320. 
FPGA Components (Spartan-3L (XC3S1500L-4-
FG320)) 
Quantity 
Utilization 
Percentage 
Total 
Logic 
Utilization 
No. of Slice Flip Flops 69 1% 26,624 
No. of 4 Input LUTs 187 1% 26,624 
Logic 
Distribution 
No. of Occupied Slices 116 1% 13,312 
No. of Slices containing only 
related logic 
116 100% 116 
Total  No. of 4 Input LUTs 197 1% 26,624 
No. of  LUTs used a logic 187 ~95% 197 
No. of  LUTs used a route-
thru 
10 ~5% 197 
No. of  LUTs used a Shift 
Registers 
0 0% 0 
No. of Bonded IOBs 115 52% 221 
No. of LOCed IOBs 0 0% 28 
No. of  RAMB16s 1 3% 32 
No. of BUFGMUXs 2 25% 8 
 
b) Using The Proposed S-box (Bi-directional, Boyar’s forward S-box + 
dual-inverse affine) 
Table 4.6 shows the utilization results using the proposed S-box. The results show higher 
utilization of 4 Input LUTS which is expected for the added function for decryption, 
which the Boyar’s forward S-box lacks. 
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Table 4.6: Implementation Results of CISA AES using the proposed S-box. 
FPGA Components (Spartan-3L (XC3S1500L-4-
FG320)) 
Quantity 
Utilization 
Percentage 
Total 
Logic 
Utilization 
No. of Slice Flip Flops 69 1% 26,624 
No. of 4 Input LUTs 265 1% 26,624 
Logic 
Distribution 
No. of Occupied Slices 157 1% 13,312 
No. of Slices containing only 
related logic 
157 100% 157 
Total  No. of 4 Input LUTs 275 1% 26,624 
No. of  LUTs used a logic 265 ~96% 265 
No. of  LUTs used a route-
thru 
10 ~4% 265 
No. of  LUTs used a Shift 
Registers 
0 0% 0 
No. of Bonded IOBs 116 52% 221 
No. of LOCed IOBs 0 0% 28 
No. of  RAMB16s 1 3% 32 
No. of BUFGMUXs 2 25% 8 
 
4.3.5. Throughput Calculation and Comparison 
CISA AES implementation is based on the AES ECB mode. The total clock cycles 
required for the data to be encrypted have to be calculated according to the number of 
instructions executed for the complete AES operation. Each CISA instructions take nine 
clock cycles to complete.  The total instructions executed (including the key expansion for 
AES) are: 
 Key expansion: (90 bytes / 3) * 10 rounds = 300 instructions 
 Shift Rows: (48 bytes / 3) * 10 rounds = 160 instructions 
 Sub Bytes: (48 bytes / 3) * 10 rounds = 160 instructions 
 Add Key: [((48 bytes / 3) * 10 rounds) + 16 ] + 1 ins = 176 instructions 
 Mix Column: (288 bytes / 3) * 9 rounds+ = 864 instructions 
   136 
Chapter 4 
 
 Total AES instructions used for a 128-bit / 16-byte encryption = (300 + 160 + 160 
+ 176 + 864) = 1660 instructions 
 Total bytes used in programming: (1012-128+1) = 884 bytes 
 Total bytes used for AES operations = 525 bytes 
 Total bytes used for other operations =  360 bytes 
 Total instructions used for other operations in complete 10 rounds of AES: (360 / 
3) * 10 rounds = 1200 instructions 
 Grand total amount of instructions used for a complete 128-bit encryption: 1660 
+ 1200 = 2860 instructions 
 The total amount of time period for the complete AES encryption is: 2860 x 9 
cycles = 25740 clock cycles.  
 The total amount of time taken to complete the AES 128-bit encryption = 25740 x 
(1/24MHz) = 25740  x 0.0416µs = 1073 µs 
 CISA AES’s throughput is 128 bits / 1073 µs = 119.3 kbps (@ 24 MHz) 
 The total amount of time taken to complete the AES 128-bit encryption = 25740 x 
(1/20MHz) = 25740  x 0.05µs = 1287 µs 
 CISA AES’s throughput is 128 bits / 1287 µs = 99.45 kbps (@ 20 MHz) 
The completion time for encrypting 128bits of data is 1034676642 ps or approximately 
1.035 ms (Figure 4.17). The throughput of the simulated system is 132.7 kbps. 
 
4.3.6. Comparison with Other Small AES Processors 
Rouvroy et al [191] and Chodowiec et al [189] opted to use a reduced fixed-width 32-bit 
data-path, trading-off throughput to yield smaller circuits. Rouvroy et al ‘s [191] AES 
design uses Spartan-III XC3S50-4 as the target device. Good and Benaissa’s [190, 225] 
and Chodowiec & Gaj [189] uses Spartan-II FPGA for their development. Despite 
Spartan-II being obsolete at the time of writing this thesis, comparisons are made using 
the same platform to justify and compare the work. Table 4.7 shows the comparison of 
CISA AES to Rouvroy et al ‘s [191] AES design. Table 4.7 shows that CISA is smaller in 
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terms of slices utilized at the cost of throughput. This is due to the 10 bit architecture 
used and the 9 clock cycle instruction set used. 
Table 4.7: Comparison with Rouvroy et al ’s [191] AES processors using Spartan-III 
XC3S50-4. 
Design & FPGA (Device) 
Rouvroy et al [191] Spartan-III 
(XC3S50-4) 
CISA AES 
Spartan-III (XC3S50-
4) 
CISA AES 
Spartan-III (XC3S50-
4) 
Encryption Algorithm AES AES (Boyar Forward) AES (Proposed S-box) 
Datapath Bits 32 10 10 
Max. Clock Freq. (MHz) 71.5 24 24 
Data-path Bits 32 10 10 
Slices Used 163 116 157 
Registers Used 126 69 69 
LUT Used 293 197 275 
No. of Block RAMs used 3 1 1 
Throughput (Mbps) 208 0.133 0.133 
Summary Fastest Smallest Smallest 
 
Good and Benaissa’s [190, 225] work on AES ASIP was claimed to be the smallest AES 
processor design on a Spartan-II XC2S15-6 FPGA. In terms of instruction set 
architecture complexity, CISA AES uses 4 instruction sets and Good and Benaissa [190] 
(including two unused instructions) uses 16 instruction sets. Table 4.8 shows the 
comparison between the CISA and ASIP on instruction count. 
Table 4.8: Instruction count with other small AES processors. 
Designs CISA AES Good and Benaissa [190] 
Instruction Set Count 4 16 
 
Good and Benaissa [190] suggested a way to calculate equivalent slices for their ASIP 
design. The total number of bits Good and Benaissa used for the AES program were 4480 
bits. One slice of the Spartan-II FPGA consists of 2 LUTs and each LUT can provide 16 x 
1 bit synchronous RAM. Thus, one slice of Spartan-II FPGA can store 32 bits of memory. 
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Good and Benaissa [190] stated that their program uses 12 bit instructions, resulting to 
an equivalent calculation of 1 single LUT storing 2 instructions. A total of 4480 bits were 
used in the form of BRAM can be converted to equivalent slices via: (4480 / 16) / 2 = 140 
equivalent slices. The total area in terms of slices for Good and Benaissa’s design is 140 + 
122 = 262 slices, with 0 BRAM. Table 4.9 shows Good and Benaissa’s design in 
comparison to CISA AES using Spartan-II FPGA simulated using Xilinx 8.2i. 
Table 4.9: Comparison with Tim et al ‘s [190] AES processors using Spartan-II XC2S15-6. 
Design & FPGA 
(Device) 
Chodowiec & 
Gaj [189] 
Spartan-II 
(XC2S30-6) 
Good and 
Benaissa 
[190] Picoblaze 
Good and 
Benaissa 
[190] AES ASIP 
CISA AES 
Spartan-II 
 
CISA AES 
Spartan-II 
 
FPGA 
Spartan-II 
(XC2S30-6) 
Spartan-II (XC2S15-6) 
Encryption 
Algorithm 
AES AES AES 
AES (Boyar’s S-
box) 
AES (Proposed 
S-box) 
Datapath Bits 32 8 8 10 10 
Max. Clock Freq. 
(MHz) 
60 90 72.3 24 24 
Data-path Bits 32 8 8 10 10 
Slices 222 119 122 145 175 
No. of Block 
RAMs used 
3 2 2 3 3 
Block RAM size 
(kbits) 
4 4 4 4 4 
Bits of block 
RAM used 
9600 10666 4480 9910 9910 
Equiv. slices for 
Memory 
300 333 140 310 310 
Total Equiv. 
Slices (Est.) 
522 452 262 455 485 
No. of 4 input 
LUT used 
- - - 247 307 
Ave. Throughput 
(Mbps) 
Average 
encryption-
decryption 
including key 
expansion 
166 0.71 2.18 0.13 0.13 
Performance, 
Typical 
throughput per 
slice (kbps/slice) 
- 1.6 8.3 0.3 0.27 
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Design & FPGA 
(Device) 
Chodowiec & 
Gaj [189] 
Spartan-II 
(XC2S30-6) 
Good and 
Benaissa 
[190] Picoblaze 
Good and 
Benaissa 
[190] AES ASIP 
CISA AES 
Spartan-II 
 
CISA AES 
Spartan-II 
 
FPGA 
Spartan-II 
(XC2S30-6) 
Spartan-II (XC2S15-6) 
Summary 
Large area, 
high speed 
Software based 
Smallest 8 bit 
architecture 
Smallest 10 bit 
architecture 
Smallest 10 bit 
architecture 
 
The CISA AES is not the smaller design compared the Good and Benaissa’s [190] ASIP. 
Good and Benaissa’s ASIP has an advantage of using a very simple processing core that 
performs primitive operations such as moving 8-bit data, finite-field multiply by 2 (ffm2), 
finite-field division by 2 (ffd2) and XOR. The primitive operations used in ASIP AES are 
great in reducing computation complexity considering that ASIP AES only runs AES. 
The ASIP primitive finite-field operations are highly specific to AES. Hardware 
implementation of ffm2 and ffd2 are static logic, which defines the instruction set 
architecture. The CISA is expected to be smaller than 32 bit architectures because of the 
register size. Good and Benaissa’s ASIP has the better results in terms of area but CISA 
has the flexibility to operate other programs due to its Turing-Complete nature and not 
highly specific to only a single cipher. The CISA is also expected to utilize more memory 
for the program because of the URISC’s nature for larger program memory. 
 
4.3.7. Comparison with Other Small S-boxes 
To compare S-box implementations, the S-box by Boyar et al [212] is chosen to be a 
benchmark as it is the smallest known S-box. The total gate count for the Boyar et al ‘s 
S-box is 115 gates. The comparisons with different S-boxes and the comparison of gate 
counts are shown in Table 4.10.  
Table 4.10: The comparison of different S-boxes. 
Basis Type XOR XNOR NAND / AND NOT MUX Total Gates 
Proposed CISA AES S-Box 
(bi-directional) 
 
Merged 107 4 32 - 16 159 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
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Basis Type XOR XNOR NAND / AND NOT MUX Total Gates 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
Boyar [212] (Forward S-box) 
- - - - - - - 
S-box 79 4 32 - - 115 
- - - - - - - 
Boyar [71] 
(Complete, bi-directional) 
Merged 144 14 34 - 16 208 
S-box 90 4 34 - - 128 
Inv S-box 83 10 34 - - 127 
Edwin [92] 
(schematic gate count) 
Merged 217 - 45 - 16 279 
S-box 193 - 45 - - 238 
Inv S-box 177 - 45 - - 222 
Canright [69] 
Merged 107 0 36 2 16 253 
S-box 91 0 36 0 0 195 
Inv S-box 91 0 36 0 0 195 
Mentens [214] 
Merged 118 0 36 0 16 271 
S-box 96 0 36 0 0 204 
Inv S-box 97 0 36 0 0 206 
Satoh [68] 
Merged 119 0 36 3 16 275 
S-box 100 0 36 0 0 211 
Inv S-box 99 0 36 0 0 209 
Worst 
Merged 131 0 36 0 16 293 
S-box 107 0 36 0 0 223 
Inv S-box 106 0 36 0 0 222 
 
Assuming a multiplexer cost eight gates, the proposed S-box configuration uses 2 MUXes, 
which costs 16 gates total. Canright [69] assumes an 8-bit MUX is equivalent to 8 gates 
hence 16 gates is used in the calculations for the total gate count [69]. The proposed S-
box configurations had shown gate count improvement in the merge category. Merged S-
box is more popular in designing an RCE system that performs both on-node encryption 
and decryption. A forward S-box has smaller gate count and an encryption-only program 
can reduce the amount of logic and memory required when only encryption is required 
on-node.  
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4.4. Summary 
In this chapter, an improved S-box with lower gate count, implemented together with a 
low-complexity CISA AES processor is presented.  
To summarize, this chapter presents the following: 
1) TISC is used as the basic platform for CISA AES application. 
2) Novel S-Box improvement (smaller gate-count than existing work is presented). 
3) Minimization of the inverse affine circuit, from 24 gates to 14 gates. 
4) CISA AES using Boyar’s forward S-box utilizing 116 slices using Spartan3 
XCS1500L-4 FPGA. 
5) CISA AES using the proposed bi-directional S-box utilizing 157 slices using 
Spartan3 XCS1500L-4 FPGA. 
. 
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CHAPTER 5  
LOW-COMPLEXITY MULTI-CIPHER CRYPTO-PROCESSOR 
ARCHITECTURE FOR VISUAL SENSOR RESOURCE 
CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENTS – A NOVEL SOLUTION 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1. The Proposed Multi-level, Multi-cipher Architecture (MMA) 
The proposed MMA is a global architecture that utilizes the features of TISC Skipjack 
and CISA AES, creating a system that allows multiple ciphers to co-exist within the 
same crypto-system. The instruction sets for TISC Skipjack are sub-set of the CISA AES 
instruction sets. Therefore, the TISC Skipjack and CISA AES share the same ALU (or 
crypto-blocks). A single CISA AES processor can operate both Skipjack and AES because 
both ciphers can be operated within the same CISA framework. In the context of a 
crypto-processor, hardware accelerated ciphers are treated as ‘crypto-cores’. Hence TISC 
Skipjack, CISA AES, or CISA in general are treated as ‘crypto-cores’ within the same 
context. 
Figure 5.1 shows the MMA dual crypto-processor block design with reconfigurable data 
path around the cores. Two models of MMA are proposed. The first model is a multi-
cipher configuration with the coupling of a CISA Skipjack core and a CISA AES core, 
forming the multi cipher architecture (MCA). The second model consists of two 
independent AES processors and is referred to as the NAES in this thesis.  
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Figure 5.1: The overview of the generic MMA model. 
 
The pairings of the AES and Skipjack crypto-processors are presented in Table 5.1. The 
implementation of the crypto-processors can be referred to the TISC Skipjack (Chapter 3) 
and CISA AES (Chapter 4). Within the CISA AES ALU, there are 4 logic circuits: Adder, 
XOR, xTime and Sub Bytes. The TISC Skipjack ALU only has Adder and XOR. 
Comparing the two ALUs shows that the Adder and XOR are common to both. Therefore 
these two blocks can be shared between the processors. This sharing between the AES 
and Skipjack can be referred to as ‘ALU Sharing’ or ‘Crypto-block Sharing’ of the CISA. 
The MMA dual crypto-processor design allows the AES cipher can be substituted with 
Skipjack cipher and vice versa since both share common ALUs.  Figure 5.2 illustrates 
idea of MMA models being able to interchange since ALUs can be shared. 
Table 5.1: The illustration of configuration settings for MMA model 1 and 2, by pairing 
AES and Skipjack. 
MMA Crypto-processor 1 Crypto-processor 2 
Model 1 (MCA) CISA AES CISA Skipjack 
Model 2 (NAES) CISA AES CISA AES 
 
   144 
Chapter 5 
 
xTime
xTime_Out
XOR
XOR_Out
Sub 
Bytes
Sub Bytes_Out
Adder
Adder_Out
FUNC 
Code ALU Output Mux
ALU_Out
Skipjack ALU
Adder & XOR
AES ALU
 
Figure 5.2: The selection of ALU with in the cores in determination of the core behaviour. 
 
 
5.2. The Proposed MMA Models 
5.2.1. The MCA (MMA model 1) 
The MCA is a design that consists of two independent CISA processors: the CISA AES 
and the CISA Skipjack. Using a cipher switch, the plaintext data is sent to the selected 
crypto-core for encryption. The MCA setting fits nicely in a reconfigurable MMA dual 
crypto block design as the crypto-cores can be simple redefined by changing the memory 
unit. Figure 5.3 show the CISA Skipjack and CISA AES within a same configuration of 
the CISA architecture.  
The MCA crypto-cores run on ECB (Electronic Cook Book) mode. Figure 5.3 illustrates 
example scenarios and factors for the cipher switching. For instance, the stronger AES is 
used when system battery is sufficient and switches to the Skipjack when the battery is 
low, sustaining the system’s operation by coping to the power factors. Other factors such 
as the threat detection, bandwidth traffic and security clearance can be used as a 
‘decision factors’ for the cipher switching. Figure 5.4 shows the switch is programmed to 
be triggered by 1 or 0. In a scalable crypto-system, the bit-length for the switch is 
increased in proportion to the number of crypto-cores within the system. In this chapter, 
only the pairing of the AES and Skipjack is introduced. Figure 5.5 shows the overview of 
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the multi-cipher global architecture, to choose between using a TISC Skipjack or CISA 
AES or any other cipher processors via a cipher switch. 
Memory Unit
(forward encrypt)
CISA Skipjack 
Processor
(Core 1)
Memory Unit
(forward encrypt)
CISA AES 
Processor
(Core 2)
Cipher Switch
Cipher 
Output
Data
Switch 
Control
0 1
 
Figure 5.3: The overview of MCA with AES and Skipjack. 
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Figure 5.4: An illustration of example ‘decision factors’ to determine a cipher switch. 
 
   146 
Chapter 5 
 
Image 
Processing
Input Image
Transmission 
to sink / server
Unsecured 
Medium
Compromised 
routing nodes
Eavesdropping
Unsecured 
Environment
Global Architecture
AES
(forward 
encrypt 
ECB)
Skipjack
(forward 
encrypt 
ECB)
Cipher Output
Level 2Le
ve
l 
1
Cipher 
Switch
The proposed Multi-cipher model
Multi-cipher Architecture
 
Figure 5.5: The overview of a multi-cipher architecture (MCA) by coupling AES and 
Skipjack algorithm. 
 
5.2.2. The NAES (MMA model 2)  
The second model termed the NAES, consists of two individual CISA AES processors. 
Figure 5.6 depicts the NAES global data path in comparison with a typical Feistel 
structure. The construction of the global Feistel structure [226] states that the exchange 
of intermediate values, also known as a permutation,  takes place at the end of each 
encryption round to inject diffusion property [227]. Figure 5.6 (a) illustrates the Feistal 
structure [228, 229]. The proposed NAES comprises two AES processors running 
standard AES ECB mode encryption with a 128-bit key size. The cross-swapping 
exchanges the results of the current cipher state at the end of each encryption round. To 
complete the NAES, the swap is executed the end of each Mix-Column operation.  
Each CISA AES round has its own key and key schedule. The keys can be identical or not 
depending on the application. During NAES decryption, the normal AES decryption 
applies with the original key schedule used in the reverse order. Figure 5.6 (b) illustrates 
the idea of a global symmetric structure for NAES and Figure 5.7 illustrates the 
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proposed NAES global rounds. A small box with a ‘plus’ sign is used to illustrate the key 
addition in Feistal-like ciphers. 
 
Block1 Block2
Block1 Block2
+
a)
AES Block1 AES Block2
AES Block1 AES Block2
+ +
b)
Key 2Key 1
 
Figure 5.6: The difference between a typical Feistal structure (left, (a)) and the global 
symmetric structure for NAES (right, (b)). A small box with a ‘plus’ sign is used to illustrate 
the key addition in Feistal-like ciphers. 
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Figure 5.7: The illustration of a NAES using two separate AES processors, cross-
swapping the ciphers at the end of each round17. 
 
                                                     
17 Figure published in: Kong, J. H., L.-M. Ang, et al. (2013). "Minimalist security and privacy 
schemes based on enhanced AES for integrated WISP sensor networks." Int. J. Commun. Netw. 
Distrib. Syst. 11(2): 214-232, Figure 4. 
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In a standard AES round function, Sub-Bytes, Shift Rows and Mix Column are applied to 
the cipher. While designing NAES, the involvement of two keys occurs when the 
intermediate values are swapped at the end of a round. When two keys are involved in 
the encryption, a single wrong key added will result to the failure to decrypt the cipher. 
The cipher cross-swapping has to be symmetrical and both AES processors have to be 
run concurrently. Parallel AES execution will ensure that both cipher states are in the 
same round. 
The Shift Rows, Sub-Bytes and Mix Column are byte oriented operations, there are no 
limitations as when and where the cross-swapping should occurs. The only issue 
regarding the cipher’s complete round functions is that the cross-swapping has to either 
occur before or after a key is XOR into the cipher concurrently. This is to ensure that the 
cipher is in the correct state. A wrong round key added will result to a total decryption 
failure. Figure 5.7 shows two AES round functions executed in parallel and the ciphers 
are exchanged at the end of every round functions. 
Within the NAES, the independent cores are the made up of two CISA AES processors. 
Both CISA AES processors are driven by independent controllers and have their own 
memory units. The illustration of the NAES is shown in Figure 5.8. The Global PC acts 
as the reset mechanism to drive the CISA AES processors to start to program at a 
specific memory location, in order to run the AES to a complete 10 rounds. Figure 5.9 
shows the overview of the global architecture with two AES processors as cores in a 
system. 
 
 
   150 
Chapter 5 
 
Memory Unit
(forward encrypt)
CISA AES 
Processor
(Core 1)
Memory Unit
(forward encrypt)
CISA AES 
Processor
(Core 2)
Global PC
Cipher 1 Cipher 2
Cipher 1Cipher 2  
Figure 5.8: The overview of NAES supported by two CISA AES processors18. 
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Figure 5.9: The overview of NAES dual-key architecture supported by two CISA AES 
processors. 
                                                     
18 Figure published in: Kong, J. H., L.-M. Ang, et al. (2013). "Minimalist security and privacy 
schemes based on enhanced AES for integrated WISP sensor networks." Int. J. Commun. Netw. 
Distrib. Syst. 11(2): 214-232, Figure 5. 
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5.3. Minimalist Security and Privacy Schemes 
A cryptographic processor for RCE has to possess the necessary security functions and 
primitives, making it adequate for formulating secure protocols. Using MMA, simple, 
minimalist security schemes can be formulated. This section presents a simple 
authentication method and key exchange scheme for tag-node networks based on the 
MMA model 2 designed to solve the communication issue of newly injected eRCE devices. 
Section 5.3.1 introduces an authentication method that incorporates a level of encryption 
to the target payload thus offering the function to identify the original sender of the data. 
Section 5.3.2 introduces a minimalist approach for a tag-node network to securely 
exchange secret keys. 
In MMA model 1, several pre-existing conditions have to be established for the security 
keys to be used. Figure 5.10 illustrates the keying conditions. 
Security key conditions for use: 
1) The Tag has its own secret private key19 for encryption.  
2) The Nodes have two set of secret private keys (as NAES requires two private 
keys with 2 key schedules.). 
3) The Sink holds all the keys (node keys and the tag keys). 
4) The security depends on the secrecy of these private keys. 
                                                     
19 The ‘private key’ terminology used in this thesis is to describe the nature of the keys. A private 
key is the key which is kept privately to within the system and the key holder is the sole owner 
of such key. 
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Figure 5.10: The illustration of a WSN with the stored keys in the system. 
 
Two schemes to be presented are: 
1. A tag authentication scheme using the NAES model. 
2. A secure key exchange and renewal for non-synchronized platforms 
1`1 
5.3.1. Tag Authentication using NAES 
The proposed authentication methodology involves encrypting and authenticating the 
data from the tags, effectively using the tag ID as a ‘public key’20. In a WSN, the sensor 
nodes hold the responsibility to gather and route the sensor data all the way back to the 
server sink for post-processing. The important data extracted from the tags are prone to 
theft and tampering and there is no way of securing the data if the encrypting cipher is 
weak. The tags have a unique identification number like any other eRCE tags. With a 
standard compliant RF reader, the ID info can be extracted out of the tags. Here are 
some of the assumptions made before realizing the privacy scheme. 
                                                     
20 In the context of PKC, a ‘public key’ is a key made publicly available and not a secret. The tag ID 
can be read with any compliant reader and therefore the tag ID is considered public knowledge. 
Using the tag ID as a key is akin to using the ‘public key’ in the PKC context. 
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Assumptions: 
 The tag ID is not a secret and can be extracted.  
 The tag is not clone-able, not forge-able and tags IDs are unique. 
 The tag has a pre-deployed encryption (block cipher) for secrecy. 
 The data transfer from tag to sensor node is assumed secured (no man-in-the-
middle attack). 
In an environment where the sensor node has to monitor tens and hundreds of tags, 
source identification is required to verify that from which source the data originated. 
Since the data transferred from the tag to the node is assumed secured, then the next 
step would be to digitally 'sign' the extracted data with the tag's ID. By using NAES, the 
data encryption process takes in two key inputs: the node's private secret key and the 
tag's ID. Figure 5.11 illustrates the proposed authentication process. 
NAES
Data
(from 
WISP)
Node’s Secret Key
- as Key 1
Tag ID
- as Key 2
Cipher-text 
(signed and 
encrypted with 
Tag ID)
NAES
Node’s Secret Key
- as Key 1
Tag ID
- as Key 2
Encryption
(Sensor Node)
Decryption
Sink (Server)
Data
(from 
WISP)
 
Figure 5.11: The overview of the authentication process using NAES. 
 
Figure 5.11 shows the authentication the encrypted data by decrypting it with the tag ID 
as one of the keys. For a successful NAES decryption, both keys have to be correct. A 
single wrong key will not result to the data decryption hence, the data is ‘signed’ with the 
tag ID and protected with encryption. Even if the Tag ID can be easily extracted, the 
decryption of the data is not possible because the NAES involves two keys.  Verification 
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of the data can be deduced from the correctness of the decrypted data. The preliminary 
security analysis of the proposed authentication scheme will be discussed in the section 
5.4.2. 
 
5.3.2. Secure Key Exchange and Renewal  
One of the biggest problems in symmetric encryption is key management. In order to 
securely exchange secret keys, the system has to adopt the public key cryptography for 
public key generation using the private key with complex computation. For secure 
communication to take place, each party has to have the same encryption or decryption 
key. Keys are usually transferred to the other party in a secure manner via some public 
key encryption. But since the existing system is using a symmetric cipher primitive, the 
PKC and block ciphers are not practical to coexist in the same system, weighing down 
the system’s resources [228]. Shamir et al devised a protocol called the Three-Pass Key 
Exchange Protocol [228, 230, 231]. The protocol is highly dependent on a commutative 
cipher. A simple XOR is such a commutative cipher. 
An XOR cipher is one in which the order of encryption and decryption is interchangeable, 
just as the order of multiplication is interchangeable, for example: A * B * C = A * C * B 
= C * B * A. In order to use this commutative cipher, an XOR block function has to be 
provided by the computing engine. The ALUs in the CISA architecture consists of an 
XOR block which is perfectly fine for the implementation. By using this XOR block, the 
architecture is able to perform the XOR cryptography. Lightweight tags are capable of 
executing XOR operations [141], so this is practically feasible for both RCE and eRCE. 
For the key exchange to work, the key setup and the secure padlocking phase has to be 
laid out. The proposed steps are shown below. 
Key exchange steps: 
1) The sink is to issue a new private key for the tag, namely Key X. 
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2) The sensor node treats the Tag ID as a plaintext and encrypts it using the NAES, 
with its 2 original secret private keys. The output of the encrypted Tag ID is 
named the ‘session key 1’. (Key A) 
3) On the tag’s side, the tag will use its private key to encrypt its own ID, resulting 
‘session key 2’. (Key B) 
4) By using XOR, the node XOR the key A with key X.  (A * X) 
5) The node sends it over to the tag, and the tag ‘XORs’ its key B to the product. (A * 
X * B) 
6) After sending it back to node will apply the XOR with Key A onto the product 
again. (A * X * B) * A = X * B 
7) And finally at the tag side, the tag XOR its Key B onto the product. (X * B) * B = 
X 
8) Therefore, X is securely transferred to the tag’s side. 
With the steps above, the Key X is transferred to the tag’s side, the tag is able to update 
its private key to this Key X, and therefore, key exchange is complete. Figure 5.12 
illustrates the overall process of this padlocking. 
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Figure 5.12: The overviews of the key exchange scheme using the Three-Pass method 
and NAES21. 
  
                                                     
21 Figure published in: Kong, J. H., L.-M. Ang, et al. (2013). "Minimalist security and privacy 
schemes based on enhanced AES for integrated WISP sensor networks." Int. J. Commun. Netw. 
Distrib. Syst. 11(2): 214-232, Figure 7. 
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5.4. Study and Analysis of NAES 
5.4.1. Simulation Results for MMA model 1 (Effects on Images)   
The effects of the proposed NAES direct encryption onto image data is simulated and 
discussed in this section. JPEG images are encrypted directly as it is without additional 
image processing in order to observe the perceptual degradation effect of NAES. The 
dual-key dual channel NAES is simulated using the Matlab 2012a. An ideal cipher-image 
histogram has to approximate the uniformly balanced distribution of cipher text values. 
Each two adjacent encrypted pixels should be statistically non-correlated [232]. To test if 
the NAES is able to encrypt highly-correlated images to produce uniform distributed 
cipher texts, a sample image with dimensions of 512 by 512 pixels and in grayscale is 
used. The data path scanning for both images are set to ‘ROW’ as in the encryption is 
done row by row and via forward encryption ECB mode. Figure 5.13 shows the 
comparison between NAES and AES encrypting an image directly using an image with a 
fair amount of highly-correlated pixels. The effect of the encryption shows that both AES 
and NAES perform similarly with an output of uniform distribution of cipher text. The 
AES and NAES encrypted image shows acceptable perceptual confusion. Figure 5.14 
shows the same experiment but with another scanning method. The effect of the 
encryption with 4 by 4 block scanning shows both AES and NAES perform similarly with 
an output of uniform distribution of cipher text. 
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Figure 5.13: The comparison of AES and NAES (row input) on pixel distribution of 
encrypted images and histogram. 
 
 
Figure 5.14: The comparison of AES and NAES (4 x 4 pixels per block input) on pixel 
distribution of encrypted images and histogram. 
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A portrait image with a simple and uniform background is used for the next experiment. 
AES is known to perform poorly when encrypting image directly with highly correlated 
neighbouring pixels. The results in Figure 5.15 showed improvement over the AES with 
uniform distributed cipher text using NAES and also shows that the AES performs 
poorly when encrypting an image that has a large amount of strong-correlated pixels. 
Figure 5.16 shows the 4 x 4 block scanning encryption and the NAES shows slight 
improvement over the AES.  Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 shows that the AES encrypted 
image has subtle imagery of certain pattern portraying a shape. The NAES shows that 
improves in for both row and 4 by 4 scanning path. 
 
Figure 5.15: The comparison of AES and NAES (row input) on pixel distribution of 
encrypted images and histogram. 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
ix
e
ls
 
Pixel Colour Depth in 8-bit Grayscale (Decimal 0 – 255) 
160 
Chapter 5 
 
 
Figure 5.16: The comparison of AES and NAES (4 x 4 pixels per block input) on pixel 
distribution of encrypted images and histogram. 
 
Figure 5.17 shows the 4 by 4 ‘even and odd’ block path scanning methodology is used for 
the experiment. The 4 by 4 ‘even and odd’ block path scanning method is method to sort 
the image blocks into a 4 by 4 pixel blocks and labelling them with ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ and etc. 
subsequently and encrypt the block-pairs (even-odd pairing input to the NAES). This 
method of scanning showed slight improvement over the normal 4 x 4 block scanning. 
Figure 5.18 shows the comparison of AES, NAES and AES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) 
mode, which is a stream cipher mode. It is observed that the AES-CBC performs the best 
for direct image encryption. The simulation results presented in the section shows that 
the NAES is capable of performing perceptual image encryption and showed 
improvements of direct AES encryption on image with high pixel correlation.  
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Figure 5.17: The comparison of NAES using even and odd block input. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.18: The comparison of AES, NAES and AES-CBC. 
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5.4.2. Discussions on NAES Security Issues 
The NAES key schedule involves 2 different keys. If a set of NAES encrypted data is 
divided into two for transmission via different route paths, the adversary will not be able 
to decrypt the data with only half of the data set and 1 stolen key unless both the 2 keys 
and 2 data parts are compromised. This further increases the complexity for the attacks. 
The proposed authentication scheme is a technique that takes the advantage of providing 
encryption and signing the data with the origin tag ID. By assuming that the private 
keys are secured and secret, the adversary known the tag’s ID will not benefit the 
attacks as the NAES architecture requires 2 keys for a complete decryption. The 
proposed authentication scheme only benefits the sink server for verifying the origins of 
this data set. 
Menezes et al [228] stated the XOR cipher is vulnerable to the known-plaintext-attack. 
The ‘plaintext’ in the context of NAES key exchange, is the new key distributed from the 
sink server. The key is only known to the involved parties and there is no way that the 
key will be known by any other parties prior to the successful key exchange. Hence, the 
XOR cipher is secured. 
For systems that require a Random Number Generator (RNG), the tag ID can be used. 
Tag ID encrypted using both NAES private keys resulting to a random number 
(encrypted ID) provided that the NAES private keys are replaced as this session. 
Encrypting the Tag ID using the same private key pairs will result to the same value and 
the random number will no longer be random after first generation. On the tag reader’s 
side, the tag’s own ID can also be encrypted using its own private key, resulting to 
another new random number (encrypted ID). This two sets of encrypted ID can be used a 
“session” or “partner” keys, without the need for key assignment from network sink. This 
is an alternative solution to creating random numbers without the need for dedicated 
RNG. The partner keys from both sides are secured using their own respective private 
keys unless the private keys of both sides are compromised. Vernam Cipher [228] stated 
that a key used for encryption is safe if it is used for only once. In the case of renewing 
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keys using NAES, the tag’s private key is only used for once in the events of key renewal 
(XOR operation), after the new key is received, the old private key will be discarded. This 
is a good solution for a quick key exchange when threat is suspected and the thus 
providing difficulty for adversaries to access sensitive data as the data value drops over 
time. To formulate meaningful schemes using NAES, the strength and secrecy of the 
system relies heavily on the secrecy of the secret keys used, not the publicly-know Tag ID. 
In a deployed RCE, a single compromised sensor device would lead to the whole 
communication network exposed to adversaries. The simplest method of key distribution 
is to pre-load a single common key or hard-code pre-defined keys to all the nodes before 
they are deployed. This method does not require after-deployment key distribution 
because they are capable of exchanging messages with that existing key but the major 
drawback for this method is that, even a single compromised node would compromise the 
security of the whole system. Another obvious method for a shared-key distribution 
scheme is to pre-load distinct pair-wise key pairs in every node. This method poses 
another major problem as it lacks scalability which RCE requires. The number of keys 
that must be stored in each node is proportional to the total number of nodes in the 
network. Since sensor nodes are resource constrained, this brings overhead which limits 
the scheme’s applicability except for it can An alternative solution is to use key 
management schemes. But a key management scheme would further increase the 
systems’ processing load and communication delay. The proposed NAES is to use two 
encryption blocks with two keys method and the keys are presumed to be pre-loaded into 
the system without key distribution operations overhead. When a visual RCE device 
processes an input image and attempts to send the vital information back to the sink, it 
has to relay the information from node to node until it reaches the sink. When the data 
reaches to a compromised node, the secrecy of the data would be revealed and hence the 
security mechanism fails. Data re-routing is usually used to solve the issue [61] but with 
the proposed method, compromised nodes will not hinder the transmission and 
jeopardize the secured data. When an image is traditionally encrypted, blocks of bit 
streams are usually the input for the cipher. When there are two ciphers used, two blocks 
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have to be fed into the cipher. Figure 5.19 illustrates the sample selection of even and 
odds blocks to be encrypted. 
1
Image captured from 
sensor node
4
4
Alternate 4x4 byte 
blocks are chosen to be 
encrypted
1 2 1 2 2
Key 2
Key 1
 
Figure 5.19: The illustration of the selection of even and odd blocks in an image to be 
encrypted together using two separate keys. 
 
There are three ways NAES can secure information: 
 Encrypt a single data block using two separate keys (replicating data, doubling 
its size to fit the length of two keys). 
 Encrypt two data blocks (even and odds tagged blocks) using the same identical 
key. 
 Encrypt the data two blocks using two separate keys. 
To complete the NAES decryption, the two same keys have to be present. The only 
weakness, like any other key-based security, is the dependence on the secrecy of the two 
keys. For instance, when a node using NAES, together with the secret keys are captured 
by adversaries, the NAES will be broken. But if one of the encrypted data blocks are 
captured via routing nodes, there is no way to decrypt it because during the encryption 
process, each cipher round has two alternate keys involved, effective doubling the key 
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length (key length doubled due to the total length of two keys). Unlike the direct 
encryption of using even and odd data block illustrated in Figure 5.19, NAES uses cipher 
state swapping, having 2 key and schedules involved in the encryption. There is no way 
for the correct NAES decryption when only 1 block and 1 key is captured. Both data 
blocks and keys have to be acquired for full decryption. 
Another advantage of the proposed method is that the decryption is not only key 
dependent, but also data / plaintext dependent. For maximum security, the two 
encrypted blocks can be sent separately thru the unsecured medium to the sink. Figure 
5.20 shows that by sending the two encrypted blocks via different routes hence, further 
increasing the difficulty to decipher the data because both data has to be present and 
treated as a single big block of data. 
Routing Node
Sensor Node
Sink / 
Base Station
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
Tampered 
Node
 
Figure 5.20: The illustration of one block of data and secret key being compromised and 
the encrypted data is being sent separately via 2 different routes. 
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5.5. Summary 
A novel unified architecture for multi-level security application, based on CISA 
processors is presented. Two models: MCA and NAES are proposed as a solution to the 
increasing security challenges of RCE application. These are the following features: 
1) MMA model 1 can be used encrypt with variable security levels by choosing 
crypto-primitives, depending on the application. 
2) MMA model 1 is aimed to be scalable and only ALUs and program memories are 
required for additional primitives. 
3) MMA model 2 is a dual-channel cipher configuration that has shown direct image 
encryption has improved perceptual degradation against normal AES. 
4) The mirrored CISA cores in MMA have shown configurability to become model 2 
with the help of instruction set programming and ALU sharing. 
5) The proposed simple authentication and key exchange and renewal scheme is 
based on the usage of CISA and uses the re-configurability of FPGA to offer these 
simple schemes. 
6) The proposed authentication method uses the Tag ID as a form of ‘public key’ and 
the Tag ID is not a secret. 
7) The proposed key exchange and renewal scheme, based on the Three-Pass 
method, requires only XOR. 
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CHAPTER 6  
HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTIVE 
ENCRYPTION ARCHITECTURE USING CISA AES AND 
SPIHT 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
6.1. The Proposed Selective Encryption Architecture (SEA) - using 
SPIHT coder and CISA AES 
The newly proposed selective encryption architecture (SEA) aims to provide both image 
processing and security features to RCE devices. SPIHT reduces the spatial redundancy 
of input images, decreasing the amount of data stored and low-complexity CISA utilizes a 
smaller logic area, adding security to the processed data. The SEA demonstrates the 
practicality and feasibility of the CISA AES, SPIHT and SEA in real-world applications, 
using the Celoxica RC203 board which houses the Vertex XC2V3000 FPGA. Figure 6.1 
illustrates the overview of selective encryption concept, encrypting important bit-streams 
before transmission over an unsecured communication channel. 
Compression
Pa
rti
al 
Bi
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s
Decompression
Encrypt
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Decrypt
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s
Unsecured 
Communication 
Channel
Input Output
  
Figure 6.1: The overview of selective encryption architecture, securing important bit-
streams before transmission over an unsecured communication channel. 
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A typical visual sensor RCE device is equipped with a camera sensor as an input to the 
system. Image is captured via camera sensor and sent to the proposed SEA for visual 
processing and encryption. Figure 6.2 shows the overview of a SEA design for visual 
sensor RCE device. 
Camera Sensor
Input Image
CISA 
AES
MIPS 
SPIHT
Memory
Selective Encryption Architecture
Visual Sensor Device
 
Figure 6.2: The overview of a selective encryption design for a visual sensor RCE device. 
 
There are two data processing components within the SEA: SPIHT coder and CISA AES. 
The SPIHT coder decomposes input images and creates two separate bit streams: the 
refinement bits and the mapping bits. Figure 6.3 depicts the mapping bits being sent to 
the CISA AES core for encryption whereas the refinement bits are passed through the 
system without additional processes. The result of the selective encryption process yields 
an encrypted mapping stream and an un-encrypted refinement stream. Both encrypted 
mapping stream and un-encrypted refinement stream pose no security threats because 
image reconstruction will hampered by the unusable encrypted mapping stream. The 
refinements bit stream alone has no meaning without the tree structures within the 
encrypted mapping bits. The CISA AES is used as the crypto-core for SEA. Figure 6.3 
illustrates both the SPIHT and CISA AES in both ends of RCE: node and sink. The 
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compression and encryption is done on-node and the decompression and decryption is 
done within the network sink. 
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Figure 6.3: The illustration of the SEA system using SPIHT and the CISA AES in both 
ends of RCE22. 
 
The SPIHT coder is realized using Million Instruction per Second (MIPS) processor. 
Together with CISA AES, both the encryption and compression module is designed using 
                                                     
22 Figure published in: Kong, J. H., L.-M. Ang, et al. (2013). "A Very Compact AES-SPIHT Selective 
Encryption Computer Architecture Design with Improved S-Box." Journal of Engineering 2013: 
26, figure 32. 
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FPGA environment to emulate an RCE device. The SPIHT decoder and CISA AES 
decryption module is realized in PC software environment to emulate an RCE sink.  
 
6.2.1. RCE Device Component - SPIHT Encoder and AES Encryption  
The Celoxica RC203 board (APPENDIX II) which houses the Vertex XC2V3000 FPGA is 
used for the implementation of the SEA. The codes are compiled using the Agility Design 
Suite 5.0 software environment and Handel-C hardware description language. The 
Celoxica RC203 board is equipped with a 330 Line CCD camera, connected via the on-
board camera port. FPGA programming is done via parallel port and communication to 
the FPGA can be establish and accessed via serial port. The results of the data 
processing are received via USB port on a personal computer. Figure 6.4 shows the 
overview of the SEA design. Encrypted and refinement data are transferred to the PC 
environment via wired connection of RS232 to USB standard.  
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Figure 6.4: The illustration of the internal SEA components and workflow. 
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a) MIPS SPIHT 
MIPS SPIHT processor is made up of three code blocks: Discreet Wavelet Transform 
(DWT) module, SPIHT-ZTR encoder, and lastly the MIPS. Figure 6.5 shows the core 
DWT and SPIHT-ZTR functions embedded within the main loop. Line 1380 shows the 
CaptureFrame function called to read the image from the camera. Line 1390 runs the 
DWT Spatial Module and line 1393 runs the DWT Temporal Module. And lastly, line 
1400 runs the SPIHT-ZTR algorithm. In each of the DWT and SPIHT-ZTR function calls, 
the RunCustomMIPS is executed. 
 
Figure 6.5: The MAIN function within the MIPS SPIHT. 
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After the DWT and SPIHT-ZTR coding are complete, mapping and refinement bits are 
generated. The mapping bit stream generated is a long stream of data that can be 
grouped into ‘blocks’ of data. The AES is block cipher and mapping data stream is 
encrypted in ‘blocks’. A ‘block counter’ is used to count the amount of refinement bits 
passed through the AES block cipher. The number of counted blocks is required in order 
to correctly decrypt the stream. Bit-filling (concatenating the last block with either ‘1’s or 
‘0’s) is used to fill the remaining bits of the mapping-stream to a full 128-bit block, with 
‘0’s or ‘1’ as LSBs. Figure 6.6 shows the code part for counting bit blocks and filling up 
mapping bits for a full 128-bit block. Concatenating most significant bits (MSBs) will 
alter the meaning of the mapping bits in the last data block. LSBs are concatenated 
instead. 
 
Figure 6.6: Handel C-code for bit-filling to create a complete block. 
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After the blocks are counted and grouped, the encryption can therefore begin. Figure 6.8 
line 1503 shows the Run_AES_CISA pseudo-code, which is the function call for 128-bit / 
16 byte block encryption. Mapping bit blocks are read and encrypted within the CISA 
processor and saved in RAM before transmission to the sink for decoding and decryption. 
 
Figure 6.7: Handel C-code for bit-filling to create a complete block. 
 
b) CISA AES 
To design a CISA AES, encryption variables, architectural and data-path description 
have to be defined and initialized The CISA AES code can be found in APPENDIX I. 
Figure 6.8 depicts a section of the block RAM initialized with the initial key value and 
plaintext. The first line of the memory is reserved for the actually data block for 
encryption. The second line is loaded with the secret key value of “00 11 22 33 44 55 66 
77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF”. The same secret key value has to be used in the 
decryption counterpart to ensure a correct data reconstruction. The RAM address in 
hexadecimal value 0x070 to 0x07F stores the intermediate values, constants and loop 
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numbers. Figure 6.9 shows the code part for CISA FSM. Figure 6.10 shows the definition 
of the four ALU components within the CISA AES. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: An illustration of the Handel-C code for CISA AES encryption secret key 
values and variables. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: An illustration of the Handel-C code for CISA AES FSM definitions. 
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Figure 6.10: An illustration of the Handel-C code for CISA AES ALU components. 
 
Figure 6.11 shows the data-path register for the CISA AES. All the registers are driven 
by the FSM states. The description of the CISA AES architecture can be found in 
Chapter 4. 
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Figure 6.11: An illustration of the Handel-C code for CISA AES data-path registers. 
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c) RS232 to USB Connctivity 
The RC203 board provides an RS232 interface to computer connectivity. To properly 
interface with a PC, the RC203 has to be programmed to initialize the port. Within the 
SEA design, the function “SendGroupBitsDigi” is defined and the partial codes are shown 
in Figure 6.12 shows the configuration for the RS232 port and the baud-rate is set to 
115200. Figure 6.13 shows the physical RS232 to USB converter used to connect the 
RC203 board to the PC. A header is used to help the receiver to differentiate the mapping 
stream and the refinement stream.  
 
Figure 6.12: An illustration of the RS232 module initialization on RC203. 
 
 
Figure 6.13: A picture of the RS232 to USB converter. 
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6.2.2. RCE Sink Component - SPIHT MATLAB Decoder and AES 
Decryption 
When the encrypted mapping stream and the unencrypted refinement stream are sent to 
the sink for decoding and decryption, the MATLAB environment is used emulate the 
RCE sink component. To achieve the target behavior, three components has to be defined 
within the MATLAB environment: the data receiver, the decoder, and the decryption 
module. To receive the incoming bits sent from the SEA, a virtual serial port has to be 
initialized and the baud-rate has to set to the same value with the transmitting module. 
Figure 6.14 shows the configuration of the virtual serial port and RS232 interfacing via 
the MATLAB environment. 
 
Figure 6.14: An illustration of the Matlab-code for virtual serial port initialization. 
 
The headers of each stream are read and identified to differentiate mapping and 
refinement stream. Figure 6.15 shows the headers used to identify the received bit 
stream. If the header read is a value of 12, the receiver halts the data reading from the 
RS232 port and the data reception is complete. If the header value of 10 is received, the 
bit stream is identified as a mapping stream. And finally, if the header read is a value of 
11, the stream is identified as a refinement stream. Once all these data is received, they 
are stored in four separate .mat files. This procedure is repeated for four times to receive 
a total of four frames through a single transmission. 
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Figure 6.15: An illustration of the Matlab-code for virtual serial port initialization. 
 
After the bit streams are received, the next step is to perform decryption. Figure 6.16 
shows the decryption function  “inv_cipher” in line 76. The AES MATLAB code used was 
acquired from Jörg J. Buchholz’s website [233]. After the mapping streams are decrypted, 
the SPIHT-ZTR is executed to decompress and reconstruct the data streams into the 
original images. 
 
Figure 6.16: An illustration of the MATLAB-code for bit-stream AES decryption. 
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6.2. Hardware Implementation 
This section presents the hardware implementation results using real FPGA hardware. 
Crypto-processors TISC Skipjack and CISA AES are implemented using Celoxica RC10 
development board, housing Spartan-3L (XC3S1500L-4-FG320). The codes are compiled 
using Handel-C and Agility Design Suite 4.0 software environment. 
 
6.2.1. The Hardware Implementation of TISC Skipjack (Forward 
Encryption) 
Table 6.1 shows the hardware utilization of TISC Skipjack. The verification of the 
encryption is done using the test vector provided by NIST and the correct output of the 
cipher was displayed onto the 7-segment display. 
Test Vector: 
- Plaintext: 33221100ddccbbaa 
- Key:  00998877665544332211 
- Cipher text: 2587a1d300 
Table 6.1: Hardware implementation results for TISC Skipjack using RC10. 
FPGA Components (Spartan-3L (XC3S1500L-4-FG320)) Quantity Total Usage 
Logic Utilization 
No. of Slice Flip Flops 76 26,624 1% 
No. of 4 Input LUTs 177 26,624 1% 
Logic 
Distribution 
No. of Occupied Slices 116 13,312 1% 
No. of Slices containing only related 
logic 
116 116 100% 
Total  No. of 4 Input LUTs 195 26,624 1% 
No. of  LUTs used a logic 176 195 ~90% 
No. of  LUTs used a route-thru 18 195 ~9% 
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FPGA Components (Spartan-3L (XC3S1500L-4-FG320)) Quantity Total Usage 
No. of  LUTs used a Shift Registers 1 195 ~1% 
No. of External IOBs 21 221 9% 
No. of LOCed IOBs 21 21 100% 
No. of  RAMB16s 1 32 3% 
No. of BUFGMUXs 3 8 37% 
No. of DCMs 1 4 25% 
 
 
6.2.2. The Hardware Implementation of CISA AES (Forward Encryption) 
Table 6.2 shows the hardware utilization of CISA AES. The verification of the encryption 
is done using the test vector provided by NIST and the output of the cipher was 
displayed onto the 7-segment display.  
Test Vector: 
- Plaintext: 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF 
- Key:  000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F 
- Cipher text: 69C4E0D86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A 
 
Table 6.2: Hardware implementation results for CISA AES using Boyar’s Forward S-box. 
FPGA Components (Spartan-3L (XC3S1500L-4-FG320)) Quantity Total Usage 
Logic Utilization 
No. of Slice Flip Flops 100 1% 26,624 
No. of 4 Input LUTs 342 1% 26,624 
Logic 
Distribution 
No. of Occupied Slices 201 1% 13,312 
No. of Slices containing only related 
logic 
201 100% 201 
Total  No. of 4 Input LUTs 361 1% 26,624 
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FPGA Components (Spartan-3L (XC3S1500L-4-FG320)) Quantity Total Usage 
No. of  LUTs used a logic 341 ~94% 361 
No. of  LUTs used a route-thru 19 ~6% 361 
No. of  LUTs used a Shift Registers 1 ~0% 361 
No. of Bonded IOBs 28 12% 221 
No. of LOCed IOBs 28 100% 28 
No. of  RAMB16s 1 3% 32 
No. of BUFGMUXs 4 50% 8 
No. of DCMs 1 25% 4 
 
To validate the robustness of the CISA, 10 test vectors were used to test the design for 
potential encryption errors. Table 6.3 shows the 10 test vectors used and the encrypted 
texts are verified using “AES – Symmetric Cipher Online” [234]. 
Table 6.3: The 10 test vectors used to test the CISA AES and their respective cipher texts. 
Plaintext Cipher text 
Key = 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 A0 B0 C0 D0 E0 F0 
00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC 
DD EE FF 
30 34 AD CB A1 67 ED C3 87 16 4F 44 F0 
95 50 F2 
12 23 34 45 56 67 78 89 9A AB BC CD DE 
EF F1 00 
56 DA 6E 2B 62 FF D0 5E 1B 45 C7 8E FB 
95 A7 77 
00 11 99 22 88 33 77 44 66 55 AA FF BB 
EE CC DD 
D8 24 E7 D1 9C C7 13 AB 3F C1 24 B1 8B 
81 76 D2 
FF EE DD CC BB AA 99 88 77 66 55 44 33 
22 11 00 
2D 47 D1 48 4A 79 25 FE 2A D2 1A 42 3F 
21 E5 0C 
22 99 33 88 44 77 55 66 11 00 EE FF DD 
CC AA BB 
2D D9 C3 E3 BA 7D CF 0F B8 5C 4D B9 96 
70 91 FB 
66 77 88 99 22 33 44 55 11 00 AA EE FF 
DD BB CC 
40 0D F1 83 23 7C 8A 8B B7 FA 13 03  5E 
84 D0 0B 
12 21 34 43 56 65 78 87 90 09 AB BA CD 
DC EF FE 
29 C1 3F B0 C9 19 5F 06 D0 1A 09 D9 0A 
58 AD C0 
12 34 65 78 90 AB CD EF 12 34 65 78 90 
AB CD EF 
56 D6 F8 F0 F6 E2 5A EF 80 0E B1 59 CD 
6F 07 E3 
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Plaintext Cipher text 
Key = 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 A0 B0 C0 D0 E0 F0 
FE DC BA 98 76 54 32 10 FE DC BA 98 76 
54 32 10 
16 87 C5 28 12 76 04 3D AD F7 0B 7F 94 
91 C6 F4 
AF BD EA 46 81 68 41 88 12 34 89 75 24 
90 88 99 
15 67 DA 8E 48 F0 0E DC 08 A8 2B B8 F7 
09 8C 9F 
 
 
6.2.3. The Hardware Implementation of SEA 
The Celoxica RC203 board which houses the Vertex XC2V3000 FPGA is used for the 
implementation of the SEA. The codes are compiled using the Agility Design Suite 5.0 
software environment and Handel-C hardware description language. A complete system 
of selective encryption with a CISA AES processor working side-by-side with a MIPS 
SPIHT coder is implemented. A still-portrait image is displayed on a HP 17 inches LCD 
monitor is used as an image input to the video camera to the SPIHT AES setup. The SEA 
design was powered up for 24 hours to capture live images and the images were 
encrypted and decrypted without errors. Figure 6.17 depicts the experimental setup for 
the proposed SEA. 
 
Figure 6.17: The experimental setup for the development of SEA. 
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Four 128 x 128 image frames are captured, encrypted on-board, and sent to another 
computer for decryption. The CISA AES is programmed to encrypt only the mapping bits 
and both mapping and refinement bits are sent out to the host computer once the 
encryption has completed. The received bits are then processed in MATLAB environment 
and the last 2 frames are chosen for decryption to verify the correct encryption and 
decryption. Figure 6.18 shows the four images capture from the SEA. Note Figure 6.19 
shows an example of the selective-encrypted on the Lena image, capture via the 330 line 
CCD camera. From perceptual observation, the encrypted frames are unintelligible. 
 
Figure 6.18: The four selectively encrypted frames with the last two frames decrypted. 
 
 
Figure 6.19: Selective encryption on Lena image. 
 
The logic utilization results for the complete SEA can be found in Table 6.4. The number 
of slice flip-flops occupied is 3692 at 12% utilization. The number of 4 input LUTs 
occupied are 8793 at 30% utilization. As for the logic distribution results, Table 6.5 shows 
a total of 6251 slices occupied. As for the LUT utilization report, Table 6.6 shows a total 
of 10176 4 input LUTs were used, at 35% utilization. Table 6.7 shows other FPGA 
components utilized by the FPGA implementation of SEA. 
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Table 6.4: Logic utilization of SEA. 
Logic Utilization Quantity Total Usage 
No. of  Slice Flip Flops 3692 28672 12% 
No. of 4 Input LUTs 8793 28672 30% 
 
Table 6.5: Logic distribution of SEA. 
Logic Distribution Quantity Total Usage 
No. of  occupied Slices 6251 14336 43% 
No. of  Slice containing only related logic 6251 6251 100% 
No. of  Slice containing  unrelated logic 0 6251 0% 
 
Table 6.6: LUT utilization of SEA. 
Components Quantity Total Usage 
Total No. 4 input LUTs 10176 28672 35% 
No. used as logic 8793 8793 86% 
No. used as a route-thru 1257 1257 12% 
No. used for dual-port RAMs 64 64 ~1% 
No. used as 16x1 ROMs 30 30 ~0.5% 
No. used as Shift Registers 32 32 ~0.5% 
 
Table 6.7: Other components utilized by SEA 
Components Quantity Total Usage 
No. BUFGMUXs 4 16 25% 
No. DCMs 1 12 8% 
No. External IOBs 199 484 41% 
No. LOCed IOBs 199 199 100% 
No. of RAMB16s 66 96 68% 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
This thesis presents low-complexity, low-area cryptographic processors based on URISC. 
RCE systems security requirements can be fulfilled using cryptographic primitives. 
Cryptographic primitives suitable for RCE are concluded to be the AES and Skipjack. To 
implement a low-complexity, low-area cryptographic processor for AES and Skipjack, the 
Turing-Complete URISC is used as a foundation of the processor. By modifying the 
URISC for cryptographic application, the low-complexity two instruction set computer 
operating the full 64-bit Skipjack lightweight cipher is designed. The logic utilization for 
TISC Skipjack on a Spartan-3L XC3S1500L-4-FG320 FPGA shows a total of 71 slices 
occupied, 70 slice flip-flops and 94 4-input LUTs utilized. Using the TISC as a foundation, 
the second design, CISA, operating the full 128-bit AES cipher is designed. The logic 
utilization for TISC Skipjack on a Spartan-3L XC3S1500L-4-FG320 FPGA shows 157 
slices occupied, 69 slice flip-flops and 275 4-input. The proposed AES S-box’s gate count 
is decreased from Boyar’s [71] count of 208 to 159. The CISA AES is the smallest known 
design FPGA compared to other designs on a Spartan-3 family FPGA.  
The proposed TISC and CISA are rooted on a Turing-Complete architecture, which 
allows them to be able to compute other arithmetic operations with additional 
computation blocks. This feature enables the architecture to be scalable in a 
reconfigurable environment. The behavior of the CISA depends on the program memory 
loaded into the architecture. With multiple cipher programs loaded in CISA, the same 
architecture is able to perform multiple ciphers. Unlike an ASIP which can only perform 
a single specific task, a CISA can perform multiple ciphers in a single architecture with 
the help of additional crypto-blocks. This feature is suitable for RCE applications to face 
increasing security challenges by providing multiple security solutions in the form of 
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cryptographic primitives while utilizing the same processor with just additional program 
memories. 
Other RCE security applications of the CISA were investigated for multi-cipher 
cryptosystems, simple security schemes and direct encryption on images. By using CISA, 
two models of multi-level, multi-cipher architecture (MMA) was proposed to provide 
flexibility between resource overhead and encryption level required by the application. 
MMA model 1 enables choice between cipher primitives deployed by switching between 
cipher programs and sharing crypto-blocks. MMA model 2 enables simple authentication 
and key exchange schemes. Direct image encryption using MMA model 2 shown 
improvements compared to a direct AES encryption.  
The final phase of the development is to implement a selective encryption architecture 
(SEA) using MIPS SPIHT visual processor and CISA AES. A real hardware 
implementation of the SEA is realized to emulate a working RCE, from on-node 
processing and encryption to back-end data processing on a server computer. The Turing-
Complete nature tends to increase the memory utilization by large program sizes. An 
SEA complements the CISA perfectly by reducing the memory storage by compressing 
input image. Memory overhead is further decreased by selectively encrypting parts of the 
compressed data. Four image-frames are captured, compressed, and selectively 
encrypted on the FPGA and sent to a personal computer for decompression and 
decryption. The design of SEA embodies the concept a secured RCE device of using CISA 
as the security solution for visual sensor RCE. The subsequent sections present some of 
the diverging areas of research to further improve the work presented in this thesis. 
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7.1. Future Work 
7.2.1. Design a complete TISC Suffix-Sort BWCA Security Architecture  
Having a data compressor and encryption within extreme RCE has been a challenge. 
Menezes et al [235] proposed a tweak on the block-sorting lossless data compression 
algorithm (also known as the Burrow Wheeler Compression Algorithm –BWCA), to 
provide a simple form image security. This proposal is beneficial for RCE because image 
data can be compressed and encrypted at the same time. Heng et al [236] suggests that 
the LZSS lossless compression can be used in RFID tags. Heng et al ‘s motivation is to 
explore the possibility of RFID tags storing more data in future and using compression to 
save memory in the tags. Kankonsae et al [237] mentioned that the tag’s cost and size 
are related to the amount of data and information being carried, which would lead to the 
need for low-complexity and high compression rate data compression implementation in 
extreme RCEs. 
Implementing the BWCA component, Burrow-Wheeler Transform (BWT), is memory 
demanding because it endorses the lexicographic sort (also known as the suffix sort) 
[238]. Sorting algorithm requires a Comparator. Therefore, a Compare and Branch if 
Larger (CBL) instruction set has to be introduced. Together with the Turing-Complete 
SBN, Figure 7.1 presents the pseudo-code of the CBL and SBN instructions. Similar to 
the TISC Skipjack, the ALU configuration for TISC Suffix-Sort uses the SBN for 
branching and CBL for comparison and no other unused instruction set or ALUs are 
required. As for the conditional data swapping in sorting, SBN MOV is used to move data 
from one location to another. 
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SBN
Mem_B = Mem_B + (- Mem_A)
If Mem_B < 0 Goto (PC + C)
Else Goto (PC + 1)
CBL
Mem_A COMPARE Mem_B
If Mem_A > Mem_B Goto (PC + C)
Else Goto (PC + 1)
 
Figure 7.1: Pseudo-codes for TISC Suffix Sort instruction sets. 
 
Martinez et al ‘s [239] parallel sorting scheme uses seven ‘compare and swap’ blocks and 
a total of 4 levels are used. Based on the worst case of number of sorts that will occur, 
using the parallel sorting strategy for 8 data requires 4 rounds of even and odd adjacent 
comparators. To perform the same operations, instruction sets can be synthesized to 
create a macro-instruction, to mimic Martinez et al ‘s parallel sorting scheme. The Figure 
7.2 and Figure 7.3 show the pseudo-code of the sorting program. 
 
Figure 7.2: The program codes written to execute the seven ‘compare and swap’ operation. 
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Figure 7.3: The program code performs the data swapping from one memory to another 
in the event of branching. 
 
The notion of ‘compare and swap’ is divided into two separate actions: ‘compare’ and 
‘swap’. With the first condition met, only then a ‘swap’ would occur. The pseudo-code in 
Figure 7.2 represents the 7 comparisons made within the parallel sorting strategy (even 
and odd adjacency comparison). The CBL instructions are used to point to the respective 
memory locations for data comparisons. Firstly, the CBL instruction is called to compare 
the first and second data (out of the 8). If data A is larger than data B, a branch will 
occur hence, the comparison operation is completed. The second step would be the data 
swapping. After JUMP operation is done, the new PC value will be starting point of the 
architecture thus the data swapping operation begins. The program written covers all 7 
comparisons. Once all the comparisons are made, a loop is injected to fulfill the N = 4 
worst case iteration. The flowchart of the BWT lexicographical sort program is described 
in the Figure 7.4. 
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END
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Figure 7.4: The flowchart of the 8 bytes sorting program. 
 
 
7.2.2. Improvement on MixColumn and Power, Area and Delay Analysis 
for CISA AES 
The MixColumn is the largest code block in CISA AES. One improvement that can be 
identified is the breakdown of MixColumn to smaller building blocks. The work by 
Fischer et al [240] and Chitu et al [241] has given great insight in terms of suggesting a 
MixColumn independent ALU. Within that ALU, a switch can be used to choose either 
MixColumn or InvMixColumn. This is very similar to a bidirectional S-box, triggered by 
a switch. This method will reduce the code size at the expense of a slightly larger ALU, 
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dedicated for MixColumn. On the other hand, proper power, area and delay analysis 
against other similar designs are considered vital to further validate the CISA AES 
simulation results and to provide in depth analysis of the proposed methods. 
 
7.2.3. Improvement on MMA Models   
Figure 7.5 illustrates the possibility to mix with other symmetric ciphers within the 
NAES architecture. In this thesis, the work based on mirrored AES cores is presented. 
The next level of work would be to identify more suitable ciphers for this configuration. 
As shown in Figure 7.5 a) and b), the MMA model 1 is depicted to use paired-cipher X 
and Y. As for Figure 7.5 c), the diagram shows non-matching cipher’s matchup.  
CIPHER
X
CIPHER
X
Global PC
CIPHER
Y
CIPHER
Y
Global PC
CIPHER
X
CIPHER
Y
Global PC
a) b) c)
 
Figure 7.5: a) Mirrored cipher X pairing, b) Mirrored cipher Y pairing, c) Cipher X and Y 
paired in MMA model 1. 
 
As for the MMA model 2, the future work would be to investigate the possible 
configurations for other ciphers, other than the AES and Skipjack. This would greatly 
increase the choice of ciphers and provide more flexibility, making the MMA scalable. 
The proposed idea is illustrated in Figure 7.6. The feasibility of combining MMA with 
mode 1 and 2 can be further investigated, creating a hybrid system with multiple levels 
of cipher strength. Figure 7.7 depicts the pairings of NAES, AES and possibly the Anubis 
cipher, which is a variant of the AES cipher. 
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Figure 7.6: The overview of MMA model 2 with various ciphers. 
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Figure 7.7: The overview of a complete multi-level architecture with NAES, AES and 
Anubis. 
 
7.2.4. Compact Crypto- processor - ANUBIS (Extension of MMA model 1) 
Following the MMA model 2, a good addition would be to include an AES-similar cipher 
as a line-up since the adder and XOR block can be re-used. Hence, the ANUBIS cipher is 
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implemented. The MISC ANUBIS is presented in this section because it is considered as 
unfinished work. Figure 7.7 shows a complete system includes 3 different ciphers. The 
hardware implemented MISC ANUBIS is presented in this section as an additional 
component and supplementary work.  
The MISC ANUBIS processor together with 4 customized ALU consists of 4 basic 
hardware blocks as the ALU: Adder, XOR, xTimeAnu and Non-linear block (similar to 
the S-Box in AES, and in this case it is the tweaked s-box with P and Q boxes). The 
implemented MISC ANUBIS data-path is shown in Figure 7.8. 
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READ WRITE
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Z
N_IN
M
U
X
0
0
0
1
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0
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MUX0
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R_WRITE
MEM_OUT
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Figure 7.8: The illustration of the MISC Anubis architecture. 
.  
In the Anubis cipher, the linear diffusion and non-linear layer is very similar to the Mix 
column and sub-bytes in the AES. The only difference is that the linear diffusion is an 
involution operation and the values of the matrix are different comparing with the mix 
column. The s-box in AES has the same size as the non-linear component in Anubis (8 
bits in, 8 bits out). Since the Anubis is an involution cipher, the non-linear component for 
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decryption is non-existent. The Anubis ALU consists of the 4 main logic circuits: the 
Adder, XOR, xTimeAnu, and the non-linear block. 
Goodman et al [190] stated that the Xtime block used and designed was a reference to 
the GF(28) reduction polynomial in AES. When designing this similar block for Anubis, 
the XOR points for the bit locations have to be re-routed. Figure 7.9 shows the 
redesigned xtime block specifically for ANUBIS namely the xTimeAnu. 
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Figure 7.9: The xTimeAnu circuit for the polynomial of  x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1 (0x11D) 
 
The implementation results for MISC ANUBIS are shown below: 
Table 7.1: Implementation results for MISC ANUBIS. 
Components Quantity Total Usage 
No. of  Slice Flip Flops 132 26,624 ~1% 
Total  No. of 4 Input LUTs 192 26,624 ~1% 
No. of  LUTs used a logic 159 192 ~83% 
No. of  LUTs used a route-thru 32 192 ~17% 
No. of  LUTs used a Shift Registers 0 192 0% 
No. of Bonded IOBs 44 221 19% 
No. of  BRAMs 1 32 3% 
No. of DCMs 1 4 25% 
No. BUFGMUX 4 8 50% 
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7.2.5. Hardware implementation and benchmark of MMA (Model 1 and 2) 
The hardware implementation of MMA is important to provide a model of comparison 
with other multi-cipher, multi-level systems. However, in a multi-cipher environment, 
not all systems or applications use the exact same cryptographic primitives and ciphers. 
The choice of cryptographic primitives is dependent on the design purpose and area of 
application. There are no identical crypto-systems with the proposed MMA that employ 
the exact same set of cryptographic primitives and therefore meaningful comparisons 
cannot be made. Comparison of cryptosystems can only be made when the exact same 
framework and architecture is used OR the exact same primitive combinations are used. 
The MMA model 1 (MCA) and model 2 (NAES) are implemented on Spartan-3L as a 
benchmark. Future work involves implementing the 2 proposed models into other FPGAs 
OR using the exact same cryptographic primitive combinations for meaningful 
comparison, justifying the resource utilization against other similar small crypto-systems.  
Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 show the hardware implementation results of MCA and NAES 
respectively. 
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Table 7.2: Implementation results for multi-cipher architecture MMA mode 1 (MCA - 
AES and Skipjack coupling) on Spartan-3L. 
Components Quantity Total Usage 
No. of  Slice Flip Flops 196 26,624 ~1% 
No. of Occupied Slices 315 13,312 2% 
Total  No. of 4 Input LUTs 588 26,624 2% 
No. of  LUTs used a logic 519 588 88% 
No. of  LUTs used a route-thru 68 588 12% 
No. of  LUTs used a Shift Registers 1 588 ~0% 
No. of Bonded IOBs 44 221 19% 
No. of  BRAMs 3 32 9% 
No. of  GCLKs 4 8 50% 
No. of DCMs 1 4 25% 
 
Table 7.3: Implementation results for multi-cipher architecture MMA mode 2 (NAES - 
AES and AES coupling) on Spartan-3L. 
Components Quantity Total Usage 
No. of  Slice Flip Flops 706 26,624 2.65% 
No. of Occupied Slices 1117 13,312 8% 
Total  No. of 4 Input LUTs 1270 26,624 4% 
No. of  LUTs used a logic 1161 1270 ~91% 
No. of  LUTs used a route-thru 106 1270 9% 
No. of  LUTs used a Shift Registers 3 1270 ~0% 
No. of Bonded IOBs 36 221 16% 
No. of  BRAMs 6 32 18% 
No. of  GCLKs 4 8 50% 
No. of DCMs 1 4 25% 
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7.2.6. The Proper Hardware Validation and Verification of the Proposed 
SEA 
The final objective of the research development presented in this thesis is the 
implementation of selective encryption architecture (SEA). The objective is achieved 
through the combination a MIPS SPIHT visual processor and the proposed CISA AES. 
The proposed SEA is intended to demonstrate real-world practicality by employing one of 
the proposed architecture and an image processor to form a joint encryption system. The 
hardware implementation of SEA and the implementation results are presented in 
Chapter 6. The whole system is able to demonstrate a four-frame image capture, on-
board image processing and compression, encryption, and transmission to a local 
connected computer. The transmitted data is then received, decrypted, decompressed on 
the connected computer and displayed onto a display monitor. 
Despite having the main objective achieved by designing low-area, low-complexity 
crypto-processors, the final product of the joint encryption system is yet to be 
benchmarked. The SEA is difficult to be benchmarked with other works mainly because 
there are no known other works to compare the design with as a whole. To achieve fair 
comparison, the point of comparison has to be a single system with both a crypto-
processor and an image processor. The SEA can be a benchmark of its own by setting an 
example of any other SEA related future works and thus, the proposed SEA also has to 
be properly validated through behavioural and post-route simulations in the future. 
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APPENDIX I: CELOXICA 
HANDLE-C CODES 
CISA AES 
// AES processor (12bit arch) part ENC 
 5 
#define RC10_TARGET_CLOCK_RATE 
 20000000 
//#define RC10_TARGET_CLOCK_RATE 
 25175000 
//#define PAL_TARGET_CLOCK_RATE  10 
 20000000 
 
#define ENCRYPT 1 
#define DECRYPT 0 
 15 
#include "stdlib.hch" 
//#include "pal_master.hch" 
//#include "pal_console.hch" 
#include "rc10.hch" 
 20 
#define RegWidth 8  // 8 bit long 
#define RegWidth_10b 10  // 
10 bit long 
#define RegWidth_12b 12  // 
11 bit long 25 
 
 
macro expr ClockRate = 
RC10_ACTUAL_CLOCK_RATE; 
//macro expr ClockRate = 30 
PAL_ACTUAL_CLOCK_RATE; 
 
 
 
static ram unsigned RegWidth_12b Memory[4096] 35 
= { 
 
//example of XOR instruction 
//0x301, 0x112, 0x000, // 99 xor 11 = 88 
 40 
//example of SBN instruction 
//0x101, 0x112, 0x000, // 99 + 11 = AA 
 
 
//---------------AES ENCRYPTION / DECRYPTION 45 
PROGRAM-----------------// 
 
//PC starts at xxx 
0x000, 0x001, 0x002, 0x003, 0x004, 0x005, 0x006, 
0x007, 0x008, 0x009, 0x00A, 0x00B, 0x00C, 50 
224 
 
 
0x00D, 0x00E, 0x00F, //000 - 00F //Original Key (0 
- 15) 
0x000, 0x011, 0x022, 0x033, 0x044, 0x055, 0x066, 
0x077, 0x088, 0x099, 0x0AA, 0x0BB, 0x0CC, 
0x0DD, 0x0EE, 0x0FF, //010 - 01F //Plain text (16 5 
- 31) 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //020 - 02F //Data for shift row 
round 1(32 - 47) and for mix column 10 
0x000, 0x001, 0x002, 0x004, 0x008, 0x010, 0x020, 
0x040, 0x080, 0x01B, 0x036, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x009, //030 - 03F //Data for constants (48 - 
63) 
//0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 15 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //040 - 04F //Cipher (64 - 79) 
0x069, 0x0C4, 0x0E0, 0x0D8, 0x06A, 0x07B, 
0x004, 0x030, 0x0D8, 0x0CD, 0x0B7, 0x080, 
0x070, 0x0B4, 0x0C5, 0x05A, //040 - 04F //Cipher 20 
(64 - 79) 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //050 - 05F //temp Data for 
Mixcolumn (80 - 95) 25 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //060 - 06F //temp Data for 
Mixcolumn (95 - 111) 
0x000, 0x001, 0xFFF, 0xFF5, 0x009, 0xFF6, 30 
0x008, 0xFF0, 0xFF5, 0x800, 0x010, 0xFFE, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //070 - 07F //temp 
Data and temp key (112 - 127) 
 
/* 35 
//expanded keys 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //080 - 08F //Original Key (128 - 143) 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 40 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //090 - 09F //Key round 1 (144 - 159 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //0A0 - 0AF //Key round 2 (160 - 175 45 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //0B0 - 0BF //Key round 3 (176 - 191)  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 50 
0x000, 0x000, //0C0 - 0CF //Key round 4 (192 - 207) 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //0D0 - 0DF //Key round 5 (208 - 223) 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 55 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //0E0 - 0EF //Key round 6 (224 - 239) 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //0F0 - 0FF //Key round 7 (240 - 255) 60 
225 
 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //100 - 10F //Key round 8 (256 - 271) 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 5 
0x000, 0x000, //110 - 11F //Key round 9 (272 - 287) 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, //120 - 12F //Key round 10 (288 - 
303) 10 
*/ 
 
 
//Reference Keys for all 10 rounds// 
 15 
0x000, 0x001, 0x002, 0x003,  
0x004, 0x005, 0x006, 0x007,  
0x008, 0x009, 0x00A, 0x00B,  
0x00C, 0x00D, 0x00E, 0x00F, //080 - 08F 
//Original Key (128 - 143) 20 
 
0x0d6, 0x0aa, 0x074, 0x0fd,  
0x0d2, 0x0af, 0x072, 0x0fa,  
0x0da, 0x0a6, 0x078, 0x0f1,  
0x0d6, 0x0ab, 0x076, 0x0fe, //090 - 09F //Key 25 
round 1 (144 - 159) 
 
0x0b6, 0x092, 0x0cf, 0x00b,  
0x064, 0x03d, 0x0bd, 0x0f1,  
0x0be, 0x09b, 0x0c5, 0x000,  30 
0x068, 0x030, 0x0b3, 0x0fe, //0A0 - 0AF //Key 
round 2 (160 - 175) 
 
0x0b6, 0x0ff, 0x074, 0x04e,  
0x0d2, 0x0c2, 0x0c9, 0x0bf,  35 
0x06c, 0x059, 0x00c, 0x0bf,  
0x004, 0x069, 0x0bf, 0x041, //0B0 - 0BF //Key 
round 3 (176 - 191)  
 
0x047, 0x0f7, 0x0f7, 0x0bc,  40 
0x095, 0x035, 0x03e, 0x003,  
0x0f9, 0x06c, 0x032, 0x0bc,  
0x0fd, 0x005, 0x08d, 0x0fd, //0C0 - 0CF //Key 
round 4 (192 - 207) 
 45 
0x03c, 0x0aa, 0x0a3, 0x0e8,  
0x0a9, 0x09f, 0x09d, 0x0eb,  
0x050, 0x0f3, 0x0af, 0x057,  
0x0ad, 0x0f6, 0x022, 0x0aa, //0D0 - 0DF //Key 
round 5 (208 - 223) 50 
 
0x05e, 0x039, 0x00f, 0x07d,  
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0x0f7, 0x0a6, 0x092, 0x096,  
0x0a7, 0x055, 0x03d, 0x0c1,  
0x00a, 0x0a3, 0x01f, 0x06b, //0E0 - 0EF //Key 
round 6 (224 - 239) 
 5 
0x014, 0x0f9, 0x070, 0x01a,  
0x0e3, 0x05f, 0x0e2, 0x08c,  
0x044, 0x00a, 0x0df, 0x04d,  
0x04e, 0x0a9, 0x0c0, 0x026, //0F0 - 0FF //Key 
round 7 (240 - 255) 10 
 
0x047, 0x043, 0x087, 0x035,  
0x0a4, 0x01c, 0x065, 0x0b9,  
0x0e0, 0x016, 0x0ba, 0x0f4,  
0x0ae, 0x0bf, 0x07a, 0x0d2, //100 - 10F //Key 15 
round 8 (256 - 271) 
 
0x054, 0x099, 0x032, 0x0d1,  
0x0f0, 0x085, 0x057, 0x068,  
0x010, 0x093, 0x0ed, 0x09c,  20 
0x0be, 0x02c, 0x097, 0x04e, //110 - 11F //Key 
round 9 (272 - 287) 
 
0x013, 0x011, 0x01d, 0x07f,  
0x0e3, 0x094, 0x04a, 0x017,  25 
0x0f3, 0x007, 0x0a7, 0x08b,  
0x04d, 0x02b, 0x030, 0x0c5, //120 - 12F //Key 
round 10 (288 - 303) 
 
 30 
//Original Key 
//000 - 000 
//001 - 001 
//002 - 002 
//003 - 003 35 
//004 - 004 
//005 - 005 
//006 - 006 
//007 - 007 
//008 - 008 40 
//009 - 009 
//00A - 00A 
//00B - 00B 
//00C - 00C 
//00D - 00D 45 
//00E - 00E 
//00F - 00F 
 
//Plain text 
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//010 - 000 
//011 - 011 
//012 - 022 
//013 - 033 
//014 - 044 5 
//015 - 055 
//016 - 066 
//017 - 077 
//018 - 088 
//019 - 099 10 
//01A - 0AA 
//01B - 0BB 
//01C - 0CC 
//01D - 0DD 
//01E - 0EE 15 
//01F - 0FF 
 
//Data for constants 
//030 - 000 
//031 - 001 20 
//032 - 002 
//033 - 004 
//034 - 008 
//035 - 010 
//036 - 020 25 
//037 - 040 
//038 - 080 
//039 - 01B 
//03A - 036 
//03B - 000 30 
//03C - 000 
//03D - 000 
//03E - 000 
//03F - 00A //loop for decrypt 2 (10) 
 35 
//070 - 000 
//071 - 001 
//072 - FFF (-1) 
//073 - FF5 (-11) Nr2 
//074 - 009 (9) Nr1 40 
//075 - FF6 (-10) test Nr 1 (R=9) 
//076 - 008 (8) test Nr2 (R=9) 
//077 - FF0 (-16) 
//078 - FF5 (key.ex loop = 11 -> 1 last time to write 
last key ) 45 
//079 - 800 (extreme neg for braching) 
//07A - 010 (+16) 
//07B - FFE (-2) DECRYPT loop 1 (bypass) 
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//---------------KEY EXPANSION----------------// 
//run 10 rounds of key expansion algorithm 
0x000, 0x000, //304, 305 5 
 
//move current key to key mem 
0x400, 0x080, 0x000, //306 
0x401, 0x081, 0x000,  
0x402, 0x082, 0x000, 10 
0x403, 0x083, 0x000,  
0x404, 0x084, 0x000, 
0x405, 0x085, 0x000,  
0x406, 0x086, 0x000, 
0x407, 0x087, 0x000,  15 
0x408, 0x088, 0x000, 
0x409, 0x089, 0x000,  
0x40A, 0x08A, 0x000, 
0x40B, 0x08B, 0x000,  
0x40C, 0x08C, 0x000, 20 
0x40D, 0x08D, 0x000,  
0x40E, 0x08E, 0x000, 
0x40F, 0x08F, 0x000, //353 
 
//clear temp key var and ROT word 25 
0x07C, 0x07C, 0x000, //354 
0x07D, 0x07D, 0x000,  
0x07E, 0x07E, 0x000, 
0x07F, 0x07F, 0x000, //365 
 30 
//Rot Word 
0x40D, 0x07C, 0x000, //366 
0x40E, 0x07D, 0x000, 
0x40F, 0x07E, 0x000,  
0x40C, 0x07F, 0x000, //377 35 
 
//Sub word 
0xC00, 0x07C, 0x000, //378 
0xC00, 0x07D, 0x000, 
0xC00, 0x07E, 0x000,  40 
0xC00, 0x07F, 0x000, //389 
  
//XOR RCon 
//increment program + load RCON 
0x072, 0x189, 0x000, // 390 - 392 45 
 
//load Rcon (XOR to MSB key) 
0x430, 0x07C, 0x000, // 393 - 395 
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   30 
//key gen  
0x47C, 0x000, 0x000, //396 
0x47D, 0x001, 0x000,  
0x47E, 0x002, 0x000, 
0x47F, 0x003, 0x000,  35 
 
0x400, 0x004, 0x000, 
0x401, 0x005, 0x000,  
0x402, 0x006, 0x000, 
0x403, 0x007, 0x000,  40 
 
0x404, 0x008, 0x000, 
0x405, 0x009, 0x000,  
0x406, 0x00A, 0x000, 
0x407, 0x00B, 0x000,  45 
 
0x408, 0x00C, 0x000, 
0x409, 0x00D, 0x000,  
0x40A, 0x00E, 0x000, 
0x40B, 0x00F, 0x000, // 443 50 
 
//increment round key memory locations by 16 
0x077, 0x133, 0x000, //444 
0x077, 0x136, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x139, 0x000, 55 
0x077, 0x13C, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x13F, 0x000, 
0x077, 0x142, 0x000,  
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0x077, 0x145, 0x000, 
0x077, 0x148, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x14B, 0x000, 
0x077, 0x14E, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x151, 0x000, 5 
0x077, 0x154, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x157, 0x000, 
0x077, 0x15A, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x15D, 0x000, 
0x077, 0x160, 0x000, //491 10 
 
0x072, 0x078, 0x131, //492 - 494 (go to 305 + 1) 
//-------end key expansion------// 
 
//continue to jump to add key (ENCRYPT) 15 
0x072, 0x079, 0x251, //495 - 497 (go to 593 + 1) 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //498 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  20 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  25 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  30 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //545 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //546 35 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  40 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  45 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
232 
 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //593 
 
//Add roundkey (re-addressing + add round key) -> 
ENCRYPT 5 
0x480, 0x010, 0x000, //594 
0x481, 0x011, 0x000, 
0x482, 0x012, 0x000, 
0x483, 0x013, 0x000, 
0x484, 0x014, 0x000, 10 
0x485, 0x015, 0x000, 
0x486, 0x016, 0x000, 
0x487, 0x017, 0x000, 
0x488, 0x018, 0x000, 
0x489, 0x019, 0x000, 15 
0x48A, 0x01A, 0x000, 
0x48B, 0x01B, 0x000, 
0x48C, 0x01C, 0x000, 
0x48D, 0x01D, 0x000, 
0x48E, 0x01E, 0x000, 20 
0x48F, 0x01F, 0x000, //641 
 
0x077, 0x252, 0x000, //642 
0x077, 0x255, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x258, 0x000,  25 
0x077, 0x25B, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x25E, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x261, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x264, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x267, 0x000,  30 
0x077, 0x26A, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x26D, 0x000, 
0x077, 0x270, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x273, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x276, 0x000,  35 
0x077, 0x279, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x27C, 0x000,  
0x077, 0x27F, 0x000, //689 
 
//0x072, 0x073, 0x07F, //690 - 692 NEW Nr2, 40 
check if all 10rounds is done 
0x072, 0x073, 0x3FF, //continue to jump to shift 
row (ENCRYPT) 
 
//continue to end 45 
0x072, 0x079, 0x6D5, //693 - 695 (go to 1749 + 1) 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //696 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
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0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  5 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  10 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //743 
 15 
//Add roundkey (re-addressing + add round key) -> 
DECRYPT 
0x520, 0x040, 0x000, //744 
0x521, 0x041, 0x000, 
0x522, 0x042, 0x000, 20 
0x523, 0x043, 0x000, 
0x524, 0x044, 0x000, 
0x525, 0x045, 0x000, 
0x526, 0x046, 0x000, 
0x527, 0x047, 0x000, 25 
0x528, 0x048, 0x000, 
0x529, 0x049, 0x000, 
0x52A, 0x04A, 0x000, 
0x52B, 0x04B, 0x000, 
0x52C, 0x04C, 0x000, 30 
0x52D, 0x04D, 0x000, 
0x52E, 0x04E, 0x000, 
0x52F, 0x04F, 0x000, //791 
 
0x07A, 0x2E8, 0x000, //792 35 
0x07A, 0x2EB, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x2EE, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x2F1, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x2F4, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x2F7, 0x000,  40 
0x07A, 0x2FA, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x2FD, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x300, 0x000, 
0x07A, 0x303, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x306, 0x000,  45 
0x07A, 0x309, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x30C, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x30F, 0x000,  
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0x07A, 0x312, 0x000,  
0x07A, 0x315, 0x000,//839 
 
//continue to jump to inv shift row (DECRYPT) 
(one time loop) 5 
0x072, 0x07B, 0x7FF, //840 - 842 (go to 2047 + 1) 
 
0x071, 0x03F, 0xFFE, // jump to end is R=10 
//0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
 10 
0x072, 0x079, 0x8F2,//jump to 2289 if -ve (jump to 
inv mix column) 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //843 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  15 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  20 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  25 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //890 
 30 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //891 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  35 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 40 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  45 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //938 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //939 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
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0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  5 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  10 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //986 
 15 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //987 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  20 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 25 
0x000,  //1023 
//----------programmable addresses end--------// 
 
 
 30 
//----------AES ENCRYPTION SEQUENCE----------// 
//PC starts at 1024 
 
//9 rounds of permute - sub 
//clear data(32 - 47) and shift rows of plaintext to 35 
data(32 - 47) 
0x020, 0x020, 0x000, //1024 
0x021, 0x021, 0x000,  
0x022, 0x022, 0x000,  
0x023, 0x023, 0x000,  40 
0x024, 0x024, 0x000,  
0x025, 0x025, 0x000,  
0x026, 0x026, 0x000,  
0x027, 0x027, 0x000,  
0x028, 0x028, 0x000, 45 
0x029, 0x029, 0x000,  
0x02A, 0x02A, 0x000,  
0x02B, 0x02B, 0x000,  
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0x02C, 0x02C, 0x000, 
0x02D, 0x02D, 0x000,  
0x02E, 0x02E, 0x000, 
0x02F, 0x02F, 0x000, // (96) 
 5 
0x410, 0x020, 0x000,  
0x415, 0x021, 0x000, 
0x41A, 0x022, 0x000, 
0x41F, 0x023, 0x000, 
0x414, 0x024, 0x000, 10 
0x419, 0x025, 0x000, 
0x41E, 0x026, 0x000, 
0x413, 0x027, 0x000, 
0x418, 0x028, 0x000, 
0x41D, 0x029, 0x000, 15 
0x412, 0x02A, 0x000, 
0x417, 0x02B, 0x000, 
0x41C, 0x02C, 0x000, 
0x411, 0x02D, 0x000, 
0x416, 0x02E, 0x000, 20 
0x41B, 0x02F, 0x000, // 1119 
 
//sub bytes (stored in 010 - 01F) 
0xC00, 0x020, 0x000, //1120 
0xC00, 0x021, 0x000,  25 
0xC00, 0x022, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x023, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x024, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x025, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x026, 0x000,  30 
0xC00, 0x027, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x028, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x029, 0x000, 
0xC00, 0x02A, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x02B, 0x000,  35 
0xC00, 0x02C, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x02D, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x02E, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x02F, 0x000, // 1167 
 40 
 
//check that all 9 round completed 
0x071, 0x074, 0x672, // 1168 - 1170 (go to end of 
mix column for last round of add key) 
 45 
//mix column of data(32 - 47) and stored in 
data(32 - 47)  
//clear location(080 - 08F & 090 - 09F) and move 
data to location(080 - 08F & 090 - 09F) 
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0x050, 0x050, 0x000, //1171 
0x051, 0x051, 0x000,  
0x052, 0x052, 0x000,  
0x053, 0x053, 0x000,  
0x054, 0x054, 0x000,  5 
0x055, 0x055, 0x000,  
0x056, 0x056, 0x000,  
0x057, 0x057, 0x000,  
0x058, 0x058, 0x000, //(48) 
0x059, 0x059, 0x000,  10 
0x05A, 0x05A, 0x000,  
0x05B, 0x05B, 0x000,  
0x05C, 0x05C, 0x000, 
0x05D, 0x05D, 0x000,  
0x05E, 0x05E, 0x000, 15 
0x05F, 0x05F, 0x000, //1218 
 
0x060, 0x060, 0x000, //1219 
0x061, 0x061, 0x000,  
0x062, 0x062, 0x000,  20 
0x063, 0x063, 0x000,  
0x064, 0x064, 0x000,  
0x065, 0x065, 0x000,  
0x066, 0x066, 0x000,  
0x067, 0x067, 0x000, //(48) 25 
0x068, 0x068, 0x000, 
0x069, 0x069, 0x000,  
0x06A, 0x06A, 0x000,  
0x06B, 0x06B, 0x000,  
0x06C, 0x06C, 0x000, 30 
0x06D, 0x06D, 0x000,  
0x06E, 0x06E, 0x000, 
0x06F, 0x06F, 0x000, //1266 
 
0x420, 0x050, 0x000, //1267 35 
0x421, 0x051, 0x000,  
0x422, 0x052, 0x000,  
0x423, 0x053, 0x000,  
0x424, 0x054, 0x000,  
0x425, 0x055, 0x000,  40 
0x426, 0x056, 0x000,  
0x427, 0x057, 0x000,  
0x428, 0x058, 0x000, //(48) 
0x429, 0x059, 0x000, 
0x42A, 0x05A, 0x000,  45 
0x42B, 0x05B, 0x000,  
0x42C, 0x05C, 0x000,  
0x42D, 0x05D, 0x000, 
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0x42E, 0x05E, 0x000,  
0x42F, 0x05F, 0x000, //1314 
 
0x420, 0x060, 0x000, //1315 
0x421, 0x061, 0x000,  5 
0x422, 0x062, 0x000,  
0x423, 0x063, 0x000,  
0x424, 0x064, 0x000,  
0x425, 0x065, 0x000,  
0x426, 0x066, 0x000, //(48) 10 
0x427, 0x067, 0x000,  
0x428, 0x068, 0x000,  
0x429, 0x069, 0x000, 
0x42A, 0x06A, 0x000,  
0x42B, 0x06B, 0x000,  15 
0x42C, 0x06C, 0x000,  
0x42D, 0x06D, 0x000, 
0x42E, 0x06E, 0x000,  
0x42F, 0x06F, 0x000, //1362 
 20 
//column0 
0x423, 0x050, 0x000, // 1363 
0x420, 0x051, 0x000, // 
0x421, 0x052, 0x000, //  
0x422, 0x053, 0x000, //  25 
 
0x452, 0x060, 0x000, //  
0x453, 0x061, 0x000, //  
0x450, 0x062, 0x000, //  
0x451, 0x063, 0x000, //  30 
 
0x800, 0x050, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x051, 0x000, 
0x800, 0x052, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x053, 0x000, // 35 
 
0x450, 0x060, 0x000,  
0x451, 0x061, 0x000, 
0x452, 0x062, 0x000,  
0x453, 0x063, 0x000, // (72) 40 
 
0x020, 0x020, 0x000,  
0x021, 0x021, 0x000,  
0x022, 0x022, 0x000,  
0x023, 0x023, 0x000, //  45 
 
0x461, 0x020, 0x000,  
0x462, 0x021, 0x000, 
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0x463, 0x022, 0x000,  
0x460, 0x023, 0x000, // 1434 
 
//column1 
0x427, 0x054, 0x000, //1435 5 
0x424, 0x055, 0x000,  
0x425, 0x056, 0x000,  
0x426, 0x057, 0x000, // 
 
0x456, 0x064, 0x000,  10 
0x457, 0x065, 0x000,  
0x454, 0x066, 0x000,  
0x455, 0x067, 0x000, // 
 
0x800, 0x054, 0x000,  15 
0x800, 0x055, 0x000, 
0x800, 0x056, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x057, 0x000, // 
 
0x454, 0x064, 0x000,  20 
0x455, 0x065, 0x000, 
0x456, 0x066, 0x000,  
0x457, 0x067, 0x000, // 
 
0x024, 0x024, 0x000,  25 
0x025, 0x025, 0x000,  
0x026, 0x026, 0x000,  
0x027, 0x027, 0x000, //  
 
0x465, 0x024, 0x000,  30 
0x466, 0x025, 0x000, 
0x467, 0x026, 0x000,  
0x464, 0x027, 0x000, // 1506 
 
 35 
//column2 
0x42B, 0x058, 0x000, //1507 
0x428, 0x059, 0x000,  
0x429, 0x05A, 0x000,  
0x42A, 0x05B, 0x000,  40 
 
0x45A, 0x068, 0x000,  
0x45B, 0x069, 0x000,  
0x458, 0x06A, 0x000,  
0x459, 0x06B, 0x000,  45 
 
0x800, 0x058, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x059, 0x000, 
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0x800, 0x05A, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x05B, 0x000,  
 
0x458, 0x068, 0x000,  
0x459, 0x069, 0x000, 5 
0x45A, 0x06A, 0x000,  
0x45B, 0x06B, 0x000, 
 
0x028, 0x028, 0x000, 
0x029, 0x029, 0x000,  10 
0x02A, 0x02A, 0x000,  
0x02B, 0x02B, 0x000, 
 
0x469, 0x028, 0x000,  
0x46A, 0x029, 0x000, 15 
0x46B, 0x02A, 0x000,  
0x468, 0x02B, 0x000, //1578 
 
 
//column3 20 
0x42F, 0x05C, 0x000, //1579 
0x42C, 0x05D, 0x000,  
0x42D, 0x05E, 0x000,  
0x42E, 0x05F, 0x000,  
 25 
0x45E, 0x06C, 0x000,  
0x45F, 0x06D, 0x000,  
0x45C, 0x06E, 0x000,  
0x45D, 0x06F, 0x000,  
 30 
0x800, 0x05C, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x05D, 0x000, 
0x800, 0x05E, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x05F, 0x000,  
 35 
0x45C, 0x06C, 0x000,  
0x45D, 0x06D, 0x000, 
0x45E, 0x06E, 0x000,  
0x45F, 0x06F, 0x000, 
 40 
0x02C, 0x02C, 0x000, 
0x02D, 0x02D, 0x000,  
0x02E, 0x02E, 0x000,  
0x02F, 0x02F, 0x000, 
 45 
0x46D, 0x02C, 0x000,  
0x46E, 0x02D, 0x000, 
0x46F, 0x02E, 0x000,  
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0x46C, 0x02F, 0x000, // 1650 
 
//clear 010 = 01F 
0x010, 0x010, 0x000, //1651 
0x011, 0x011, 0x000,  5 
0x012, 0x012, 0x000,  
0x013, 0x013, 0x000,  
0x014, 0x014, 0x000,  
0x015, 0x015, 0x000,  
0x016, 0x016, 0x000,  10 
0x017, 0x017, 0x000, //(48) 
0x018, 0x018, 0x000, 
0x019, 0x019, 0x000,  
0x01A, 0x01A, 0x000,  
0x01B, 0x01B, 0x000,  15 
0x01C, 0x01C, 0x000, 
0x01D, 0x01D, 0x000,  
0x01E, 0x01E, 0x000, 
0x01F, 0x01F, 0x000, //1698 
 20 
//move the mixcolumn result from 020 - 02f to 010 
- 01f 
0x420, 0x010, 0x000, //1699 
0x421, 0x011, 0x000,  
0x422, 0x012, 0x000,  25 
0x423, 0x013, 0x000,  
0x424, 0x014, 0x000,  
0x425, 0x015, 0x000,  
0x426, 0x016, 0x000,  
0x427, 0x017, 0x000,  30 
0x428, 0x018, 0x000, 
0x429, 0x019, 0x000,  
0x42A, 0x01A, 0x000,  
0x42B, 0x01B, 0x000,  
0x42C, 0x01C, 0x000, 35 
0x42D, 0x01D, 0x000,  
0x42E, 0x01E, 0x000, 
0x42F, 0x01F, 0x000, //1746 
 
0x072, 0x079, 0x251, //1747 - 1749 (back to add 40 
key ENCRYPT) 
 
//move the encrypted result to 040 - 04f for 
decryption 
0x410, 0x040, 0x000, //1750 45 
0x411, 0x041, 0x000,  
0x412, 0x042, 0x000,  
0x413, 0x043, 0x000,  
0x414, 0x044, 0x000,  
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0x415, 0x045, 0x000,  
0x416, 0x046, 0x000,  
0x417, 0x047, 0x000,  
0x418, 0x048, 0x000, 
0x419, 0x049, 0x000,  5 
0x41A, 0x04A, 0x000,  
0x41B, 0x04B, 0x000,  
0x41C, 0x04C, 0x000, 
0x41D, 0x04D, 0x000,  
0x41E, 0x04E, 0x000, 10 
0x41F, 0x04F, 0x000, //1797 
 
0x072, 0x079, 0xFFE, //1798 - 1800 (END OF 
ENCRYPT) 
//0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1798 - 1800 (END OF 15 
ENCRYPT) 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1801 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  20 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  25 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  30 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1848 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1849 35 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  40 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  45 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
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0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1896 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1897 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  5 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  10 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  15 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1944 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1945 20 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  25 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  30 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1992 35 
 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //1993 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  40 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  45 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
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0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //2040 
 5 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000, //2041 
0x000, 0x000, 0x000,  
0x000, //2047 
 
 10 
//----------AES DECRYPTION SEQUENCE----------// 
//PC starts at 2048 
 
//9 rounds of inv permute - inv sub 
//clear data(32 - 47) and inv shift rows of 15 
ciphertext to data(32 - 47) 
0x020, 0x020, 0x000, //2048 
0x021, 0x021, 0x000,  
0x022, 0x022, 0x000,  
0x023, 0x023, 0x000,  20 
0x024, 0x024, 0x000,  
0x025, 0x025, 0x000,  
0x026, 0x026, 0x000,  
0x027, 0x027, 0x000,  
0x028, 0x028, 0x000, 25 
0x029, 0x029, 0x000,  
0x02A, 0x02A, 0x000,  
0x02B, 0x02B, 0x000,  
0x02C, 0x02C, 0x000, 
0x02D, 0x02D, 0x000,  30 
0x02E, 0x02E, 0x000, 
0x02F, 0x02F, 0x000, // (96) 
 
0x440, 0x020, 0x000,  
0x44D, 0x021, 0x000, 35 
0x44A, 0x022, 0x000, 
0x447, 0x023, 0x000, 
0x444, 0x024, 0x000, 
0x441, 0x025, 0x000, 
0x44E, 0x026, 0x000, 40 
0x44B, 0x027, 0x000, 
0x448, 0x028, 0x000, 
0x445, 0x029, 0x000, 
0x442, 0x02A, 0x000, 
0x44F, 0x02B, 0x000, 45 
0x44C, 0x02C, 0x000, 
0x449, 0x02D, 0x000, 
0x446, 0x02E, 0x000, 
245 
 
 
0x443, 0x02F, 0x000, // 2143 
 
//sub bytes (stored in 010 - 01F) 
0xC00, 0x020, 0x000, //2144 
0xC00, 0x021, 0x000,  5 
0xC00, 0x022, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x023, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x024, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x025, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x026, 0x000,  10 
0xC00, 0x027, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x028, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x029, 0x000, 
0xC00, 0x02A, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x02B, 0x000,  15 
0xC00, 0x02C, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x02D, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x02E, 0x000,  
0xC00, 0x02F, 0x000, // 2191 
 20 
0x040, 0x040, 0x000, //2192 
0x041, 0x041, 0x000,  
0x042, 0x042, 0x000,  
0x043, 0x043, 0x000,  
0x044, 0x044, 0x000,  25 
0x045, 0x045, 0x000,  
0x046, 0x046, 0x000,  
0x047, 0x047, 0x000,  
0x048, 0x048, 0x000, 
0x049, 0x049, 0x000,  30 
0x04A, 0x04A, 0x000,  
0x04B, 0x04B, 0x000,  
0x04C, 0x04C, 0x000, 
0x04D, 0x04D, 0x000,  
0x04E, 0x04E, 0x000, 35 
0x04F, 0x04F, 0x000, // (96) 
 
0x420, 0x040, 0x000,  
0x421, 0x041, 0x000, 
0x422, 0x042, 0x000, 40 
0x423, 0x043, 0x000, 
0x424, 0x044, 0x000, 
0x425, 0x045, 0x000, 
0x426, 0x046, 0x000, 
0x427, 0x047, 0x000, 45 
0x428, 0x048, 0x000, 
0x429, 0x049, 0x000, 
0x42A, 0x04A, 0x000, 
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0x42B, 0x04B, 0x000, 
0x42C, 0x04C, 0x000, 
0x42D, 0x04D, 0x000, 
0x42E, 0x04E, 0x000, 
0x42F, 0x04F, 0x000, // 2287 5 
 
/* 
//TEST! 
0x510, 0x040, 0x000, //744 
0x511, 0x041, 0x000, 10 
0x512, 0x042, 0x000, 
0x513, 0x043, 0x000, 
0x514, 0x044, 0x000, 
0x515, 0x045, 0x000, 
0x516, 0x046, 0x000, 15 
0x517, 0x047, 0x000, 
0x518, 0x048, 0x000,//dummy add key 
0x519, 0x049, 0x000, 
0x51A, 0x04A, 0x000, 
0x51B, 0x04B, 0x000, 20 
0x51C, 0x04C, 0x000, 
0x51D, 0x04D, 0x000, 
0x51E, 0x04E, 0x000, 
0x51F, 0x04F, 0x000, //791 
*/ 25 
 
//check that all 9 round completed 
0x072, 0x079, 0x2E7, // 2288 - 2290 (go to inv add 
key) 
 30 
//inv mix column 
0x050, 0x050, 0x000, //2291 
0x051, 0x051, 0x000,  
0x052, 0x052, 0x000,  
0x053, 0x053, 0x000,  35 
0x054, 0x054, 0x000,  
0x055, 0x055, 0x000,  
0x056, 0x056, 0x000,  
0x057, 0x057, 0x000,  
0x058, 0x058, 0x000, //(48) 40 
0x059, 0x059, 0x000,  
0x05A, 0x05A, 0x000,  
0x05B, 0x05B, 0x000,  
0x05C, 0x05C, 0x000, 
0x05D, 0x05D, 0x000,  45 
0x05E, 0x05E, 0x000, 
0x05F, 0x05F, 0x000, //2238 
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0x060, 0x060, 0x000, //2239 
0x061, 0x061, 0x000,  
0x062, 0x062, 0x000,  
0x063, 0x063, 0x000,  
0x064, 0x064, 0x000,  5 
0x065, 0x065, 0x000,  
0x066, 0x066, 0x000,  
0x067, 0x067, 0x000, //(48) 
0x068, 0x068, 0x000, 
0x069, 0x069, 0x000,  10 
0x06A, 0x06A, 0x000,  
0x06B, 0x06B, 0x000,  
0x06C, 0x06C, 0x000, 
0x06D, 0x06D, 0x000,  
0x06E, 0x06E, 0x000, 15 
0x06F, 0x06F, 0x000, //2385 
 
0x440, 0x050, 0x000, //2386 
0x441, 0x051, 0x000,  
0x442, 0x052, 0x000,  20 
0x443, 0x053, 0x000,  
0x444, 0x054, 0x000,  
0x445, 0x055, 0x000,  
0x446, 0x056, 0x000,  
0x447, 0x057, 0x000,  25 
0x448, 0x058, 0x000, //(48) 
0x449, 0x059, 0x000, 
0x44A, 0x05A, 0x000,  
0x44B, 0x05B, 0x000,  
0x44C, 0x05C, 0x000,  30 
0x44D, 0x05D, 0x000, 
0x44E, 0x05E, 0x000,  
0x44F, 0x05F, 0x000, //1314 
 
0x440, 0x060, 0x000, //1315 35 
0x441, 0x061, 0x000,  
0x442, 0x062, 0x000,  
0x443, 0x063, 0x000,  
0x444, 0x064, 0x000,  
0x445, 0x065, 0x000,  40 
0x446, 0x066, 0x000, //(48) 
0x447, 0x067, 0x000,  
0x448, 0x068, 0x000,  
0x449, 0x069, 0x000, 
0x44A, 0x06A, 0x000,  45 
0x44B, 0x06B, 0x000,  
0x44C, 0x06C, 0x000,  
0x44D, 0x06D, 0x000, 
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0x44E, 0x06E, 0x000,  
0x44F, 0x06F, 0x000, //1362 
 
//column0 
0x443, 0x050, 0x000, // 1363 5 
0x440, 0x051, 0x000, // 
0x441, 0x052, 0x000, //  
0x442, 0x053, 0x000, //  
 
0x452, 0x060, 0x000, //  10 
0x453, 0x061, 0x000, //  
0x450, 0x062, 0x000, //  
0x451, 0x063, 0x000, //  
 
0x800, 0x050, 0x000,  15 
0x800, 0x051, 0x000, 
0x800, 0x052, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x053, 0x000, // 
 
0x450, 0x060, 0x000,  20 
0x451, 0x061, 0x000, 
0x452, 0x062, 0x000,  
0x453, 0x063, 0x000, // (72) 
 
0x440, 0x042, 0x000,  25 
0x441, 0x043, 0x000,  
 
0x800, 0x042, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x042, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x043, 0x000,  30 
0x800, 0x043, 0x000, // x4time 
 
0x040, 0x040, 0x000,  
0x041, 0x041, 0x000,  
 35 
0x442, 0x040, 0x000,  
0x443, 0x041, 0x000, //  
 
0x442, 0x043, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x043, 0x000, //last xtime 40 
 
0x443, 0x040, 0x000,  
0x443, 0x041, 0x000, //  
 
0x441, 0x060, 0x000,  45 
0x440, 0x061, 0x000, 
0x441, 0x062, 0x000,  
0x440, 0x063, 0x000, // 
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0x040, 0x040, 0x000,  
0x041, 0x041, 0x000,  
0x042, 0x042, 0x000,  
0x043, 0x043, 0x000, //  5 
 
0x461, 0x040, 0x000,  
0x462, 0x041, 0x000, 
0x463, 0x042, 0x000,  
0x460, 0x043, 0x000, // 1434 10 
 
//column1 
0x447, 0x054, 0x000, //1435 
0x444, 0x055, 0x000,  
0x445, 0x056, 0x000,  15 
0x446, 0x057, 0x000, // 
 
0x456, 0x064, 0x000,  
0x457, 0x065, 0x000,  
0x454, 0x066, 0x000,  20 
0x455, 0x067, 0x000, // 
 
0x800, 0x054, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x055, 0x000, 
0x800, 0x056, 0x000,  25 
0x800, 0x057, 0x000, // 
 
0x454, 0x064, 0x000,  
0x455, 0x065, 0x000, 
0x456, 0x066, 0x000,  30 
0x457, 0x067, 0x000, // 
 
0x444, 0x046, 0x000,  
0x445, 0x047, 0x000,  
 35 
0x800, 0x046, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x046, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x047, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x047, 0x000, // x4time 
 40 
0x044, 0x044, 0x000,  
0x045, 0x045, 0x000,  
 
0x446, 0x044, 0x000,  
0x447, 0x045, 0x000, //  45 
 
0x446, 0x047, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x047, 0x000, //last xtime 
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0x447, 0x044, 0x000,  
0x447, 0x045, 0x000, //  
 
0x445, 0x064, 0x000,  5 
0x444, 0x065, 0x000, 
0x445, 0x066, 0x000,  
0x444, 0x067, 0x000, // 
 
0x044, 0x044, 0x000,  10 
0x045, 0x045, 0x000,  
0x046, 0x046, 0x000,  
0x047, 0x047, 0x000, //  
 
0x465, 0x044, 0x000,  15 
0x466, 0x045, 0x000, 
0x467, 0x046, 0x000,  
0x464, 0x047, 0x000, // 1506 
 
 20 
//column2 
0x44B, 0x058, 0x000, //1507 
0x448, 0x059, 0x000,  
0x449, 0x05A, 0x000,  
0x44A, 0x05B, 0x000,  25 
 
0x45A, 0x068, 0x000,  
0x45B, 0x069, 0x000,  
0x458, 0x06A, 0x000,  
0x459, 0x06B, 0x000,  30 
 
0x800, 0x058, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x059, 0x000, 
0x800, 0x05A, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x05B, 0x000,  35 
 
0x458, 0x068, 0x000,  
0x459, 0x069, 0x000, 
0x45A, 0x06A, 0x000,  
0x45B, 0x06B, 0x000, 40 
 
0x448, 0x04A, 0x000,  
0x449, 0x04B, 0x000,  
 
0x800, 0x04A, 0x000,  45 
0x800, 0x04A, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x04B, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x04B, 0x000, // x4time 
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0x048, 0x048, 0x000,  
0x049, 0x049, 0x000,  
 
0x44A, 0x048, 0x000,  5 
0x44B, 0x049, 0x000, //  
 
0x44A, 0x04B, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x04B, 0x000, //last xtime 
 10 
0x44B, 0x048, 0x000,  
0x44B, 0x049, 0x000, //  
 
0x449, 0x068, 0x000,  
0x448, 0x069, 0x000, 15 
0x449, 0x06A, 0x000,  
0x448, 0x06B, 0x000, // 
 
0x048, 0x048, 0x000, 
0x049, 0x049, 0x000,  20 
0x04A, 0x04A, 0x000,  
0x04B, 0x04B, 0x000, 
 
0x469, 0x048, 0x000,  
0x46A, 0x049, 0x000, 25 
0x46B, 0x04A, 0x000,  
0x468, 0x04B, 0x000, //1578 
 
 
//column3 30 
0x44F, 0x05C, 0x000, //1507 
0x44C, 0x05D, 0x000,  
0x44D, 0x05E, 0x000,  
0x44E, 0x05F, 0x000,  
 35 
0x45E, 0x06C, 0x000,  
0x45F, 0x06D, 0x000,  
0x45C, 0x06E, 0x000,  
0x45D, 0x06F, 0x000,  
 40 
0x800, 0x05C, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x05D, 0x000, 
0x800, 0x05E, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x05F, 0x000,  
 45 
0x45C, 0x06C, 0x000,  
0x45D, 0x06D, 0x000, 
0x45E, 0x06E, 0x000,  
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0x45F, 0x06F, 0x000, 
 
0x44C, 0x04E, 0x000,  
0x44D, 0x04F, 0x000,  
 5 
0x800, 0x04E, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x04E, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x04F, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x04F, 0x000, // x4time 
 10 
0x04C, 0x04C, 0x000,  
0x04D, 0x04D, 0x000,  
 
0x44E, 0x04C, 0x000,  
0x44F, 0x04D, 0x000, //  15 
 
0x44E, 0x04F, 0x000,  
0x800, 0x04F, 0x000, //last xtime 
 
0x44F, 0x04C, 0x000,  20 
0x44F, 0x04D, 0x000, //  
 
0x44D, 0x06C, 0x000,  
0x44C, 0x06D, 0x000, 
0x44D, 0x06E, 0x000,  25 
0x44C, 0x06F, 0x000, // 
 
0x04C, 0x04C, 0x000, 
0x04D, 0x04D, 0x000,  
0x04E, 0x04E, 0x000,  30 
0x04F, 0x04F, 0x000, 
 
0x46D, 0x04C, 0x000,  
0x46E, 0x04D, 0x000, 
0x46F, 0x04E, 0x000,  35 
0x46C, 0x04F, 0x000, // 1650 
 
 
//back to inv shift row 
0x072, 0x079, 0x7FF, //1709 - 1711 40 
 
//goto end 
//0x132, 0x133, 0xFFF, //707 - 709 
 
} with block = 1; 45 
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static macro proc 
Run_AES_ENC_DEC_URISC(enc_dec_ctrl_input); 
static macro proc Sleep (Milliseconds); 
 
static macro proc Run_xTime(data_in, data_out); 5 
static macro proc Run_Sub_Bytes(data_in, 
data_out, enc_dec_ctrl); 
 
 
 10 
 
void main(void) 
{ 
 
 //Run_AES_ENC_DEC_URISC(ENCRY15 
PT); 
 Run_AES_ENC_DEC_URISC(DECRYP
T); 
 
 while(1) 20 
 { 
   par 
   { 
 
   25 
 RC10LEDWriteMask(Memory[79][7:0]); 
   } 
   
 } 
} 30 
 
 
 
 
 35 
/* 
void main(void) 
{ 
 unsigned int 12 count; 
 //unsigned int 4 count_4b; 40 
 unsigned int 8 SevenSeg; 
 
 //PalVersionRequire (1, 2); 
    //PalSevenSegRequire (2);  
 45 
 //PalSevenSegEnable (PalSevenSegCT 
(0)); 
    //PalSevenSegEnable (PalSevenSegCT (1)); 
 
 //Run_AES_ENC_DEC_URISC(ENCRY50 
PT); 
254 
 
 
 Run_AES_ENC_DEC_URISC(DECRYP
T); 
 
  
 while(1) 5 
 { 
  for(count=64; count<=79; 
count++) //aes cipher data (ENC_DEC) 
  //for(count=16; count<=31; 
count++) //aes cipher data 10 
  //for(count=32; count<=47; 
count++) //aes cipher data 
   
  { 
   par 15 
   { 
    SevenSeg = 
Memory[count][7:0]; 
   
 RC10SevenSeg0WriteDigit(SevenSeg[7:20 
4],0); 
   
 RC10SevenSeg1WriteDigit(SevenSeg[3:
0],0); 
   25 
 //PalSevenSegWriteDigit(PalSevenSegC
T(0),SevenSeg[7:4],0); 
   
 //PalSevenSegWriteDigit(PalSevenSegC
T(1),SevenSeg[3:0],0); 30 
   
 RC10LEDWriteMask(count[7:0]); 
   } 
   Sleep(1000); 
  } 35 
 
 } 
 
 
  40 
  
// while(1) 
// { 
    
 45 
//   
 RC10LEDWriteMask(Memory[272][7:0]); 
//   
 Sleep(1000); 
 50 
    
 
   
255 
 
 
// } 
  
  
} 
*/ 5 
 
 
static macro proc Sleep (Milliseconds) 
{ 
    macro expr Cycles = 10 
(RC10_ACTUAL_CLOCK_RATE * Milliseconds) / 
1000; 
 //macro expr Cycles = 
(PAL_ACTUAL_CLOCK_RATE * Milliseconds) / 
1000; 15 
    unsigned (log2ceil (Cycles)) Count; 
 
    Count = 0; 
    do 
    { 20 
        Count++; 
    } 
    while (Count != Cycles - 1); 
} 
 25 
 
static macro proc 
Run_AES_ENC_DEC_URISC(ENC_DEC_CTRL_I
N) 
{ 30 
 // registers 
 unsigned int RegWidth_12b PC; 
 unsigned int RegWidth_12b R; 
 unsigned int RegWidth_12b MDR; 
 unsigned int RegWidth_12b MAR; 35 
 unsigned int RegWidth_12b Mem_Out; 
 
 unsigned int 4 counter; 
 unsigned int 8 SevenSeg; 
 unsigned int 1 Z; 40 
 unsigned int 1 N; 
 unsigned int 1 RUN; 
 unsigned int 2 Op_Code; 
 
 //registers signal 45 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_Mem_Out; 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_MAR_In; 
 50 
256 
 
 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_Input_A; 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_Input_B; 
 5 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_Adder_Out; 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_XOR_Out; 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 10 
Sig_xTime_Out; 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_SubBytes_Out; 
 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 15 
Sig_ALU_Out; 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_PC_Out; 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_MDR_Out; 20 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_MAR_Out; 
 signal unsigned int RegWidth_12b 
Sig_INV_R; 
 25 
 signal unsigned int 2 Sig_Op_Code; 
 signal unsigned int 2 Sig_ALU_MUX; 
 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_Z; 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_N; 30 
  
 //control signal 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_Mem_Read; 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_Mem_Write; 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_MDR_Write; 35 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_MAR_Write; 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_MAR_SEL; 
 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_Z_Write; 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_N_Write; 40 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_CIN; 
 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_R_Write; 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_PC_Write; 
 45 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_PCOUT_SEL; 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_COMP_SEL; 
 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_Op_Write; 
 signal unsigned int 1 Sig_Op_SEL; 50 
 
 //external switch for enc/dec 
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 signal unsigned int 1 
Sig_enc_dec_ctrl_input; 
 
 //xtime var 
 signal unsigned 1 5 
xoutput0,xoutput1,xoutput2,xoutput3,xoutput4,xo
utput5,xoutput6,xoutput7; 
 signal unsigned 8 out; 
 
/* 10 
 //intermediate signals value 
 Sig_MAR_Out = MAR; 
 Sig_MDR_Out = MDR; 
 Sig_INV_R = ~R; 
 Sig_PC_Out = PC; 15 
 Sig_Op_Code = Op_Code; 
*/ 
 
 // set initial stages 
 par 20 
 { 
 
 //Sig_Crypto_SW_sensor_input = 0; //low 
power mode - Skipjack 
 25 
 Sig_enc_dec_ctrl_input = 
ENC_DEC_CTRL_IN; //full power mode - AES 
 
 // PC Crypto Switch 
  par 30 
  {   
  
   // Controls 
  
 if(Sig_enc_dec_ctrl_input == ENCRYPT) 35 
   { 
 
    PC = 306; 
//AES encrypt 
     40 
   } 
     
   else 
   { 
    PC = 744; 45 
//AES decrypt 
   } 
  } 
 
  R = 0; 50 
  MDR = 0; 
258 
 
 
  MAR = 0; 
  Mem_Out = 0; 
  counter = 0; 
  Op_Code = 0; 
  RUN = 1; 5 
     
 } 
 
 while(RUN!=0) 
 { 10 
   
  par 
  { 
   par 
   { 15 
   
 Sig_MAR_Out = MAR; 
   
 Sig_MDR_Out = MDR; 
    Sig_INV_R 20 
= ~R; 
   
 Sig_PC_Out = PC; 
   
 Sig_Op_Code = Op_Code; 25 
   } 
    
 
   // Memory 
   par 30 
   {  
   
    // Controls 
   
 if(Sig_Mem_Read == 1) 35 
    { 
    
 par 
     { 
     40 
 Sig_Mem_Out = 
Memory[Sig_MAR_Out]; 
     
 Mem_Out = Sig_Mem_Out; 
     } 45 
    } 
    else 
if(Sig_Mem_Write == 1) 
    { 
    50 
 Memory[Sig_MAR_Out] = 
Sig_MDR_Out; 
    } 
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    else 
    { 
    
 Sig_Mem_Out = Mem_Out; 
    } 5 
   } 
    
   //OP MUX 
   if(Sig_Op_SEL == 1) 
   10 
 Sig_ALU_MUX = Sig_Op_Code; 
   else 
   
 Sig_ALU_MUX = 0; 
 15 
   //OP Code Register 
   if(Sig_Op_Write == 1) 
    Op_Code = 
Sig_Input_B[11:10]; 
   else 20 
    delay; 
 
   // Negative Flag 
   
 if(Sig_ALU_Out[11:11]==1) 25 
    { 
    
 Sig_N = 1; 
    } 
    else 30 
    { 
    
 Sig_N = 0; 
    } 
     35 
    // Zero Flag 
   
 if(Sig_ALU_Out==0) 
    { 
    40 
 Sig_Z = 1; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
    45 
 Sig_Z = 0; 
    } 
    
 
   //R Register 50 
   if(Sig_R_Write == 1) 
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    R = 
Sig_Input_B; 
   else 
    delay; 
    5 
   //Z Register 
   if(Sig_Z_Write == 1) 
    Z = Sig_Z; 
   else 
    delay; 10 
 
   //N Register 
   if(Sig_N_Write == 1) 
    N = Sig_N; 
   else 15 
    delay; 
 
   //MDR Register 
   if(Sig_MDR_Write 
== 1) 20 
    MDR = 
Sig_ALU_Out; 
   else 
    delay; 
    25 
   //MAR Register 
   if(Sig_MAR_Write 
== 1) 
    MAR = 
Sig_MAR_In; 30 
   else 
    delay; 
 
   //MAR SEL MUX 
   if(Sig_MAR_SEL == 35 
1) 
   
 Sig_MAR_In = 0[1:0] @ 
Sig_Mem_Out[9:0]; 
   else 40 
   
 Sig_MAR_In = Sig_ALU_Out; 
    
   //PC_OUT MUX 
   if(Sig_PCOUT_SEL 45 
== 1) 
   
 Sig_Input_B = Sig_Mem_Out; 
   else 
   50 
 Sig_Input_B = Sig_PC_Out; 
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   //COMP MUX 
   if(Sig_COMP_SEL 
== 1) 
   
 Sig_Input_A = Sig_INV_R; 5 
   else 
   
 Sig_Input_A = 0; 
    
   //PC Register 10 
   if(Sig_PC_Write == 1) 
    PC = 
Sig_ALU_Out; 
   else 
    delay; 15 
 
    
   // Adder  
   par 
   { 20 
   
 Sig_Adder_Out = Sig_Input_A + 
Sig_Input_B + (0[10:0] @ Sig_CIN); 
   } 
 25 
   //XOR 
   par 
   { 
   
 Sig_XOR_Out = 0[1:0] @ 30 
(Sig_Input_B[9:0] ^ ~Sig_Input_A[9:0]); 
   } 
 
   //xTime 
   par 35 
   { 
    xoutput0 = 
Sig_Input_B[7]; 
    xoutput1 = 
Sig_Input_B[7] ^ Sig_Input_B[0]; 40 
    xoutput2 = 
Sig_Input_B[1]; 
    xoutput3 = 
Sig_Input_B[7] ^ Sig_Input_B[2]; 
    xoutput4 = 45 
Sig_Input_B[7] ^ Sig_Input_B[3]; 
    xoutput5 = 
Sig_Input_B[4]; 
    xoutput6 = 
Sig_Input_B[5]; 50 
    xoutput7 = 
Sig_Input_B[6]; 
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    out = 
xoutput7 @ xoutput6 @ xoutput5 @ xoutput4 @ 
xoutput3 @ xoutput2 @ xoutput1 @ xoutput0; 
   
 Sig_xTime_Out = 0[3:0] @ out; 5 
   } 
 
   //Sub Bytes 
   par 
   { 10 
   
 Run_Sub_Bytes(Sig_Input_B, 
Sig_SubBytes_Out, Sig_enc_dec_ctrl_input); 
   } 
 15 
 
   //ALU MUX 
   par{ 
    
   if(Sig_ALU_MUX == 20 
0) 
   
 Sig_ALU_Out = Sig_Adder_Out; 
 
   else 25 
if(Sig_ALU_MUX == 1) 
   
 Sig_ALU_Out = Sig_XOR_Out; 
 
   else 30 
if(Sig_ALU_MUX == 2) 
 
   
 Sig_ALU_Out = Sig_xTime_Out; 
 35 
   else 
if(Sig_ALU_MUX == 3) 
   
 Sig_ALU_Out = Sig_SubBytes_Out; 
   else 40 
   delay; 
   } 
    
   //controller 
   par 45 
   { 
/* 
Entered by truthtable: 
COMP_SEL = A' B C' D; 
R_Write = A' B' C D'; 50 
Cin = A' B' C D + A' B C' D + A' B C D' + A B' C' D'; 
N_Write = A' B C' D; 
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Z_Write = A' B' C' D'; 
PCOUTsel = A' B' C' D + A' B' C D' + A' B C' D' + 
A' B C' D + A' B C D; 
PC_write = A' B' C D + A' B C D' + A' B C D + A B' 
C' D'; 5 
MDRWrite = A' B C' D; 
MARWrite = A' B' C' D' + A' B' C' D + A' B' C D + 
A' B C' D' + A' B C D'; 
Mem_read = A' B' C' D + A' B' C D' + A' B C' D' + 
A' B C' D + A' B C D; 10 
Mem_wrt = A' B C D'; 
OP_write = A' B' C' D; 
OP_sel = A' B C' D; 
MARSEL = A' B' C' D + A' B C' D'; 
*/ 15 
 
 
   
 Sig_COMP_SEL = (~counter[3] & 
counter[2] & ~counter[1] & counter[0]);// 20 
 
   
 Sig_R_Write = (~counter[3] & 
~counter[2] & counter[1] & ~counter[0]);// 
 25 
    Sig_CIN = 
(counter[3] & ~counter[2] & ~counter[1] & 
~counter[0]) | (~counter[3]  & counter[1] & 
~counter[0]) | 
     30 
   (~counter[3] & counter[2] & ~counter[1] 
& counter[0]) | (~counter[3] & ~counter[2] & 
counter[1]);// 
 
   35 
 Sig_N_Write = (~counter[3] & counter[2] 
& ~counter[1] & counter[0]);// 
 
   
 Sig_Z_Write = (~counter[3] & 40 
~counter[2] & ~counter[1] & ~counter[0]);// 
 
   
 Sig_PCOUT_SEL = (~counter[3] & 
counter[2] & counter[1] & counter[0] & N) |  45 
     
   (~counter[3] & 
~counter[2] & counter[1] & ~counter[0]) | 
(~counter[3]  & counter[2] & ~counter[1]) | 
     50 
   (~counter[3] & 
~counter[1] & counter[0]);// 
 
   
 Sig_PC_Write = (counter[3] & 55 
~counter[2] & ~counter[1] & ~counter[0]) | 
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   (~counter[3] & 
counter[2] & counter[1]) | 
     
   (~counter[3] & 5 
counter[1] & counter[0]);// 
     
   
 Sig_MDR_Write = (~counter[3] & 
counter[2] & ~counter[1] & counter[0]);// 10 
     
 
   
 Sig_MAR_Write = (~counter[3] & 
~counter[1] & ~counter[0]) | 15 
     
   (~counter[3] & 
counter[2] & ~counter[0]) | 
     
   (~counter[3] & 20 
~counter[2] & counter[0]);// 
 
   
 Sig_Mem_Read = (~counter[3] & 
~counter[2] & counter[1] & ~counter[0]) |  25 
     
   (~counter[3] & 
counter[2] & ~counter[1]) | 
     
   (~counter[3] & 30 
~counter[1] & counter[0]) | 
     
   (~counter[3] & 
counter[2] & counter[0]); 
 35 
   
 Sig_Mem_Write = (~counter[3] & 
counter[2] & counter[1] & ~counter[0]);// 
 
   40 
 Sig_Op_Write = (~counter[3] & 
~counter[2] & ~counter[1] & counter[0]);// 
 
   
 Sig_Op_SEL = (~counter[3] & counter[2] 45 
& ~counter[1] & counter[0]);// 
 
   
 Sig_MAR_SEL = (~counter[3] & 
counter[2] & ~counter[1]) | 50 
     
   (~counter[3] & 
~counter[1] & counter[0]); 
 
/* 55 
Minimized: 
COMP_SEL = A' B C' D; 
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R_Write = A' B' C D'; 
Cin = A B' C' D' + A' C D' + A' B C' D + A' B' C ; 
N_Write = A' B C' D; 
Z_Write = A' B' C' D'; 
PCOUTsel = A' B' C D' + A' B C'  + A' C' D + A' B 5 
D; 
PC_write = A B' C' D' + A' B C  + A' C D; 
MDRWrite = A' B C' D; 
MARWrite = A' C' D' + A' B D' + A' B' D; 
Mem_read = A' B' C D' + A' B C'  + A' C' D + A' B 10 
D; 
Mem_wrt = A' B C D'; 
OP_write = A' B' C' D; 
OP_sel = A' B C' D; 
MARSEL = A' B C'  + A' C' D; 15 
*/ 
     
   
 if(counter==8) 
    { 20 
    
 counter = 0; 
    } 
    else 
    { 25 
    
 counter = counter + 1; 
    } 
 
   30 
 if(PC==4095) 
    { 
    
 RUN = 0; 
    } 35 
    else 
    
 delay; 
   } 
   40 
 
  } 
 
 } 
 45 
} 
 
 
 
 50 
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//run sub-bytes 
macro proc Run_Sub_Bytes(data_in, data_out, 
enc_dec_ctrl) 
{ 
//variables for sub-bytes 5 
 signal unsigned 8 input, cipher, affout, 
istage9out; 
 
 signal unsigned 1 
output0,output1,output2,output3,output4,output510 
,output6,output7; 
 //signal unsigned 1 
input0,input1,input2,input3,input4,input5,input6,
input7; 
 15 
 signal unsigned 1 
aff0,aff1,aff2,aff3,aff4,aff5,aff6,aff7; 
 
 signal unsigned 1 
iInput0,iInput1,iInput2,iInput3,iInput4,iInput5,iI20 
nput6,iInput7; 
 
 signal unsigned 1 
x0,x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7; 
  25 
 signal unsigned 1 
xt10,xt11,xt12,xt13,xt14,xt15,xt16,xt17; 
 signal unsigned 1 
xt20,xt21,xt22,xt23,xt24,xt25,xt26,xt27; 
  30 
 signal unsigned 1 s0,s1,s2,s3,s4,s5,s6,s7; 
  
 signal unsigned 1 
y1,y2,y3,y4,y5,y6,y7,y8,y9,y10,y11,y12,y13,y14,y1
5,y16,y17,y18,y19,y20,y21; 35 
 
 signal unsigned 1 t0,t1; 
 signal unsigned 1 
t2,t3,t4,t5,t6,t7,t8,t9,t10,t11,t12,t13,t14,t15,t16,t1
7,t18,t19,t20,t21,t22,t23,t24; 40 
 signal unsigned 1 
t25,t26,t27,t28,t29,t30,t31,t32,t33,t34,t35,t36,t37,
t38,t39,t40; 
 signal unsigned 1 t41,t42,t43,t44,t45; 
 signal unsigned 1 45 
t46,t47,t48,t49,t50,t51,t52,t53,t54,t55,t56,t57,t58,
t59,t60,t61,t62,t63,t64,t65,t66,t67; 
 
 signal unsigned 1 
z0,z1,z2,z3,z4,z5,z6,z7,z8,z9,z10,z11,z12,z13,z14,z50 
15,z16,z17; 
  
 signal unsigned 1 
invaff10_out,invaff11_out,invaff12_out,invaff13_o
ut,invaff14_out,invaff15_out,invaff16_out,invaff1755 
_out; 
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 signal unsigned 1 
invaff20_out,invaff21_out,invaff22_out,invaff23_o
ut,invaff24_out,invaff25_out,invaff26_out,invaff27
_out; 
  5 
 signal unsigned 1 u10, u11, u12, u13; 
 signal unsigned 1 u20, u21, u22, u23; 
   
 
 signal unsigned 1 te10, te11, te20, te21; 10 
  
 signal unsigned 1 enc_dec_mux_sw; 
 
par{ 
 15 
 par{ 
 input = data_in[7:0]; 
 enc_dec_mux_sw = enc_dec_ctrl; 
 }  
 20 
 
  
 par 
 { 
 xt17 = input[7]; 25 
 xt16 = input[6]; 
 xt15 = input[5]; 
 xt14 = input[4]; 
 xt13 = input[3]; 
 xt12 = input[2]; 30 
 xt11 = input[1]; 
 xt10 = input[0]; 
 } 
  
  35 
  
 //inv affine 1 
 par 
 { 
 u10 = xt11 ^ xt14; 40 
 u11 = xt13 ^ xt16; 
 u12 = xt10 ^ xt15; 
 u13 = xt12 ^ xt17; 
  
 invaff17_out = xt16 ^ u10; 45 
 invaff16_out = xt13 ^ u12; 
 invaff15_out = xt14 ^ u13; 
 invaff14_out = xt11 ^ u11; 
 invaff13_out = xt12 ^ u12; 
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 invaff12_out = xt17 ^ u10; 
 invaff11_out = xt10 ^ u11; 
 invaff10_out = xt15 ^ u13; 
  
 te10 = invaff12_out ^ 1; 5 
 te11 = invaff10_out ^ 1; 
 } 
  
  
  10 
 par{ 
 //encrypt decrypt MUX 
 if(enc_dec_mux_sw == ENCRYPT)  
//ENCRYPT = 1, DECRYPT = 0 
 { 15 
  par{ 
  x0 = xt17; 
  x1 = xt16; 
  x2 = xt15; 
  x3 = xt14; 20 
  x4 = xt13; 
  x5 = xt12; 
  x6 = xt11; 
  x7 = xt10; 
  } 25 
 } 
 
 else 
 { 
  par{ 30 
  x0 = invaff17_out; 
  x1 = invaff16_out; 
  x2 = invaff15_out; 
  x3 = invaff14_out; 
  x4 = invaff13_out; 35 
  x5 = te10; 
  x6 = invaff11_out; 
  x7 = te11; 
   
  } 40 
 
 } 
 } 
  
  45 
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//top linear transformation 
//input: x0,x1,x2,x3...x7 
//output: x7,y1,y2,y3...y21 
 par{ 
 y14 = x3 ^ x5; 5 
 y13 = x0 ^ x6; 
 y9 = x0 ^ x3; 
 
 y8 = x0 ^ x5; 
 t0 = x1 ^ x2; 10 
 y1 = t0 ^ x7; 
 
 y4 = y1 ^ x3; 
 y12 = y13 ^ y14; 
 y2 = y1 ^ x0; 15 
 
 y5 = y1 ^ x6; 
 y3 = y5 ^ y8; 
 t1 = x4 ^ y12; 
 20 
 y15 = t1 ^ x5; 
 y20 = t1 ^ x1; 
 y6 = y15 ^ x7; 
 
 y10 = y15 ^ t0; 25 
 y11 = y20 ^ y9; 
 y7 = x7 ^ y11; 
 
 y17 = y10 ^ y11; 
 y19 = y10 ^ y8; 30 
 y16 = t0 ^ y11;  
 
 y21 = y13 ^ y16; 
 y18 = x0 ^ y16; 
 } 35 
 
//middle non-linear section 
//input: x7,y1,y2,y3...y21 
//output: z0,z1...z17 
 40 
//t25 -> t40 inversion in GF(2^4) 
 par{ 
 t2 = y12 & y15; 
 t3 = y3 & y6; 
 t4 = t3 ^ t2; 45 
 
 t5 = y4 & x7; 
 t6 = t5 ^ t2; 
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 t7 = y13 & y16; 
 
 t8 = y5 & y1; 
 t9 = t8 ^ t7; 
 t10 = y2 & y7; 5 
 
 t11 = t10 ^ t7; 
 t12 = y9 & y11; 
 t13 = y14 & y17; 
 10 
 t14 = t13 ^ t12; 
 t15 = y8 & y10; 
 t16 = t15 ^ t12; 
 
 t17 = t4 ^ t14; 15 
 t18 = t6 ^ t16; 
 t19 = t9 ^ t14; 
 
 t20 = t11 ^ t16; 
 t21 = t17 ^ y20; 20 
 t22 = t18 ^ y19; 
 
 t23 = t19 ^ y21; 
 t24 = t20 ^ y18; 
  25 
 
 //inversion in GF(2^4) 
 
 t25 = t21 ^ t22; 
 t26 = t21 & t23; 30 
 t27 = t24 ^ t26; 
 
 t28 = t25 & t27; 
 t29 = t28 ^ t22; 
 t30 = t23 ^ t24; 35 
 
 t31 = t22 ^ t26; 
 t32 = t31 & t30; 
 t33 = t32 ^ t24; 
 40 
 t34 = t23 ^ t33; 
 t35 = t27 ^ t33; 
 t36 = t24 & t35; 
 
 t37 = t36 ^ t34; 45 
 t38 = t27 ^ t36; 
 t39 = t29 & t38; 
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 t40 = t25 ^ t39; 
 
 
 t41 = t40 ^ t37; 
 t42 = t29 ^ t33; 5 
 t43 = t29 ^ t40; 
 
 t44 = t33 ^ t37; 
 t45 = t42 ^ t41; 
 10 
 z0 = t44 & y15; 
 z1 = t37 & y6; 
 z2 = t33 & x7; 
 
 z3 = t43 & y16; 15 
 z4 = t40 & y1; 
 z5 = t29 & y7; 
 
 z6 = t42 & y11; 
 z7 = t45 & y17; 20 
 z8 = t41 & y10; 
 
 z9 = t44 & y12; 
 z10 = t37 & y3; 
 z11 = t33 & y4; 25 
 
 z12 = t43 & y13; 
 z13 = t40 & y5; 
 z14 = t29 & y2; 
 30 
 z15 = t42 & y9; 
 z16 = t45 & y14; 
 z17 = t41 & y8; 
 } 
 35 
//bottom linear transformation 
//input:z0,z1...z17 
//output:so,s1...s7 
 par{ 
 t46 = z15 ^ z16; 40 
 t47 = z10 ^ z11; 
 t48 = z5 ^ z13; 
 
 t49 = z9 ^ z10; 
 t50 = z2 ^ z12; 45 
 t51 = z2 ^ z5; 
 
 t52 = z7 ^ z8; 
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 t53 = z0 ^ z3; 
 t54 = z6 ^ z7; 
 
 t55 = z16 ^ z17; 
 t56 = z12 ^ t48; 5 
 t57 = t50 ^ t53; 
 
 t58 = z4 ^ t46; 
 t59 = z3 ^ t54; 
 t60 = t46 ^ t57; 10 
 
 t61 = z14 ^ t57; 
 t62 = t52 ^ t58; 
 t63 = t49 ^ t58; 
 15 
 t64 = z4 ^ t59; 
 t65 = t61 ^ t62; 
 t66 = z1 ^ t63; 
 
 s0 = t59 ^ t63; 20 
 s6 = ~(t56 ^ t62); 
 s7 = ~(t48 ^ t60); 
 
 t67 = t64 ^ t65; 
 s3 = t53 ^ t66; 25 
 s4 = t51 ^ t66; 
 
 s5 = t47 ^ t65; 
 s1 = ~(t64 ^ s3); 
 s2 = ~(t55 ^ t67); 30 
 } 
 
 
 //output inverse 
 par{ 35 
 xt27 = s0; 
 xt26 = s1; 
 xt25 = s2; 
 xt24 = s3; 
 xt23 = s4; 40 
 xt22 = s5; 
 xt21 = s6; 
 xt20 = s7; 
 } 
  45 
 
  
 //inv affine 2 
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 par 
 { 
 u20 = xt21 ^ xt24; 
 u21 = xt23 ^ xt26; 
 u22 = xt20 ^ xt25; 5 
 u23 = xt22 ^ xt27; 
  
 invaff27_out = xt26 ^ u20; 
 invaff26_out = xt23 ^ u22; 
 invaff25_out = xt24 ^ u23; 10 
 invaff24_out = xt21 ^ u21; 
 invaff23_out = xt22 ^ u22; 
 invaff22_out = xt27 ^ u20; 
 invaff21_out = xt20 ^ u21; 
 invaff20_out = xt25 ^ u23; 15 
  
 te20 = invaff22_out ^ 1; 
 te21 = invaff20_out ^ 1; 
 } 
  20 
 
  
 par{ 
 //encrypt decrypt MUX 
 if(enc_dec_mux_sw == ENCRYPT)  25 
//ENCRYPT = 1, DECRYPT = 0 
 { 
 par{ 
 output7 = xt27; 
 output6 = xt26; 30 
 output5 = xt25; 
 output4 = xt24; 
 output3 = xt23; 
 output2 = xt22; 
 output1 = xt21; 35 
 output0 = xt20; 
 } 
 } 
 
 else 40 
 { 
 par{ 
 output7 = invaff27_out; 
 output6 = invaff26_out; 
 output5 = invaff25_out; 45 
 output4 = invaff24_out; 
 output3 = invaff23_out; 
 output2 = te20; 
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 output1 = invaff21_out; 
 output0 = te21; 
 } 
 
 5 
 } 
 } 
  
  
 10 
 par{ 
 cipher = output7 @ output6 @ output5 @ 
output4 @ output3 @ output2 @ output1 @ output0; 
 data_out = 0[3:0] @ cipher; 
 } 15 
   
 }   
 
} 
  20 
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APPENDIX II: PHOTOGRAPHS 
Celoxica RC10 Board 
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Celoxica RC203 Board 
 
 
 
